• Nikol Pashinyan’s decision to freeze Armenia’s participation in the CSTO reflects a deterioration of ties between Armenia and Russia 
• Whilst ties have declined, and Russian military presence in Armenia reduced, cooperation persists and Armenia remains reliant on Russia, especially concerning maintaining economic security 
• Pashinyan is now attempting to solidify peace in the region, diversify Armenia’s relations to reduce dependence on Russia and determine a stable and secure future for Armenia.

Why are Putin and Pashinyan FRENEMIES?  

Answer: Pashinyan’s signalling to exit the Russian-led CSTO organisation reflects a deterioration of ties between the two, but cooperation officially persists.

In June 2024, Prime Minister of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan officially announced that Armenia will leave the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in a move that only further consolidates the fraying of relations between Armenia and Russia. Armenia officially joined the CSTO in 2002, and is also a member of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) alongside four other post-USSR states. Since Armenia’s independence in 1991, Russia has acted as Armenia’s main security guarantor, especially important as it looked to protect Nagorno-Karabakh from Azerbaijan incursion. 

Pashinyan’s decision comes as a direct reaction to the failure of Russia to provide for the security of their traditional ally Armenia in the face of Azerbaijani incursion into the long-disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan invaded the territory back in 2020 which was followed by a six-week war that ended with a Russian-brokered ceasefire. Russian peace-keeping forces were then stationed there, but the ceasefire collapsed due to ongoing intermittent military clashes. Armenia officially ceded the territory in September 2023. 

Putin’s ability to project Russia as regional hegemon has been challenged by a lack of notable military successes in Ukraine and thinly spread resources. As a result, Azerbaijan took advantage of diverged Russian focus when it invaded Nagorno Karabakh. Putin has failed to provide for Armenian security in the eyes of Armenians when Azerbaijan expelled thousands of ethnic Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh. For Pashinyan, this was a major political loss domestically. 

Putin’s ability to exercise influence in the Caucasus has since changed. Russian peacekeeping forces have officially exited Nagorno-Karabakh, and Russian military presence on Armenia’s borders is waning, with the last significant Russian military presence limited to one military base in Gyumri. Pashinyan has expressed that he sees no interest in further Russian military presence in his country. 

Despite this, cooperation on all fronts extending from trade to official diplomatic ties remains, and since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, trade relations have increased. Armenia has provided benefits for exporting goods to and through its territory to Russia, as it is not under sanctions. 

Armenia imports about 87% of its gas from Russia, relying largely on Russia for fuel imports, and providing for Armenia’s energy security. Russia is still Armenia’s biggest trade partner and Armenia still relies on Russia as its main security guarantor.  

What does Putin want? 

Answer: ‘’Putin is distancing himself from the conflict citing Pashinyan’s own failures in foreign policy and trust of the West to blame for an Armenian defeat.’’ 

Whilst ties between Pashinyan and Putin have waned, Putin has found an indispensable partner in Azerbaijan and has committed to increasing ties with the country. This is especially important with Putin’s growing international isolation after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine which means he cannot risk jeopardising partnerships, even if it is to the detriment of members of the CSTO such as Pashinyan. In a post-Ukrainian order, Putin’s dependence on Azerbaijan, and another important regional player Turkey has grown, as Putin emphasises economic relations with the two actors to maintain influence in the Caucasus. 

Putin understands that Armenia is still heavily reliant on Russia in terms of trade and security and can capitalise on Pashinyan’s failures to negotiate long-term peace with Azerbaijan. This can push Pahinyan back into the Russian sphere of influence and increase Putin’s influence in the Caucasus. Putin does not see Armenia as having the same level of significance it once had in terms of allyship, especially considering Pashinyan’s moves to diversify relations and alleviate Armenia’s dependence on Russia. 

Putin who enjoys positive relations with his Azeri counterparts has distanced himself away from the conflict not to aggravate Russian-Azeri relations. His relationship with Azerbaijan, especially in terms of trade, has grown. Increases in exports of gas from Russia to Azerbaijan, an even more important partner for the EU since the Ukraine war in terms of fuel imports, have even raised questions about the efficacy of sanctions and diverting away from Russian fuel imports. Significantly, the EU has ramped up gas imports from Azerbaijan to replace Russia after it invaded Ukraine in 2022, and has raised concerns that Russian gas is nevertheless being funnelled through Azerbaijan to the EU.

Statements from Russian State Media officials, and the Russian foreign ministry indicate that Putin is looking to reframe the outcome of the conflict as a direct result of Pashinyan’s failures in domestic and foreign policy. Putin places blame on Pashinyan’s pivot west and his attempts at diversifying Armenian relations, whilst moving away from Russia. Putin has blamed Pashinyan’s unwillingness to work effectively with Russia towards peace in Nagorno-Karabakh, in addition to criticising Pashinyan’s continued insistence on the failure of Russia to come to their aid and the lack of support from the CSTO alliance to have culminated in Armenia’s defeat.    

What does Pashinyan want? 

Answer: ‘’Pashinyan wishes to maintain his legitimacy and credibility as a leader domestically by seeking to establish peace with Azerbaijan, opening new fronts for cooperation and alleviating reliance on Russia.’’

Pashinyan has agreed to recognize Azerbaijani sovereignty over Nagorno Karabakh, pending further discussions and has further officially ceded territory to Azerbaijan, returning four bordering villages as part of what he deems a necessary action towards establishing long-term peace in the region. Pashinyan has called for constitutional reform to recognize these changes officially and is under pressure from both Azerbaijan and Turkey to accept the opening of the Zangezur Corridor that will connect Azerbaijan with its exclave, Nakhchivan. This remains a contentious issue for Pashinyan as Azerbaijan’s president Aliyev has demanded the corridor be free from Armenian checks. 

Armenia’s defeat in Nagorno-Karabakh has challenged Pashinyan’s leadership domestically and has significantly reduced his popularity at home. It is now in Pashinyan’s interests to push for long-term peace with Azerbaijan to prevent further Armenian losses and to protect his reputation amongst the Armenian public who is growing increasingly resentful towards him. Pashinyan understands that making certain concessions regarding border issues with Azerbaijan, and the issue of the Zangezur Corridor are important in establishing long-term peace with Azerbaijan that will prevent future Azeri military incursion into Armenian territory, determining stability and security in Armenia that can pave the way for a conflict free period of development for Armenians. 

Securing long-term peace with Azerbaijan is not only important in this regard, but it can allow for the establishment of official diplomatic relations between the two countries, and also between Armenia and Turkey which can initiate cooperation in terms of trade in the future. Armenia, bordering both Azerbaijan and Turkey, can benefit from the reopening of borders that can facilitate extensive trade and movement of individuals between the countries, hence increasing cooperation and trade in the region. Pashinyan is aware that he cannot alienate Russia completely and must be cautious to what extent he can pursue especially Western cooperation so as to not antagonise Putin.  

What is Pashinyan doing?

Answer: ‘’In an attempt to decrease Armenia’s reliance on Russia, Pashinyan is diversifying relations globally, fostering cooperation with the West, and initiating dialogue with regional actors.’’

Armenia’s participation in the CSTO has been frozen by Pashinyan, who has also announced his intention to quit the group even though an exit strategy has not yet been decided. As Moscow has been strengthening its connections with Azerbaijan, Pashinyan has been fostering relationships with the West. This year, he met with both EU and US officials in Brussels, who offered financial support to the country to help deal with the repercussions of the Nagorno-Karabakh war and guarantee Armenia’s stability and development in the future. Pashinyan has received positive feedback about Armenia’s potential EU membership bid, but this isn’t on the cards in the short or even long term just yet. 

Pashinyan has met with France’s Macron, and the two are strengthening bilateral ties, with France even pledging to supply Armenia with CAESAR self-propelled howitzers. Additionally, Pashinyan has found a dependable and significant ally in India and has increased buying weapons from India.

Pashinyan ratified the ICC treaty, meaning that should Putin decide to visit Armenia, he will be detained there. He has sent humanitarian aid to Ukraine and has even met with the leader of the Belarussian opposition.  He also announced that there would be no more military bases in Russia beyond the one that exists in Gyumri. All this has come to the dismay of Putin, as Pashinyan looks to lessen his reliance on Russia and diversify and build on relations globally.  

In terms of Pashinyan’s attempts at establishing peace in the Caucasus, Pashinyan has met with and held talks with Azerbaijan’s president Aliyev as well as meeting Turkey’s President Erdogan. Pashinyan understands the importance of cooperation with Turkey towards establishing peace in the region, especially important as Turkey has now filled the power vacuum left behind by Russia. Both Azerbaijan and Russia enjoy relations with Turkey who has maintained ties with both the West and Russia since the start of the war in Ukraine. 

What about you? 

Answer: ‘’Pashinyan is choosing peace over confrontation at the expense of his own ambitions, as Armenia’s future continues to remain uncertain, stuck between west and east.’’

A favourable peace agreement with Azerbaijan for Pashinyan includes one in which he does not have to make any further concessions on behalf of Armenia. Whilst this allows for initiating long-term peace, stability and security in Armenia that can invite cooperation, especially in an economic context long-term, it can also reduce Pashinyan’s popularity at home in the short term. This threatens his ability to stay in power, as evident with the continued protests against him and puts into question his ability to secure another term in 2026.

However, Pashinyan understands that achieving long-term peace with Azerbaijan will require him to make concessions and whilst, to the dismay of many Armenians, it can act to the benefit of Armenia’s economic, security, and political future, at the cost of his personal ambitions. A noble approach to policy making which other leaders could learn from.