Macron-Security

Emmanuel Macron

Macron is France’s supreme authority in terms of defence and foreign affairs. Indeed, in the French political system, the role of the president is most associated with being Head of the Armed Forces. As former French Prime Minister Chaban-Delmas explained, the president has a “reserved presidential domain composed chiefly of defence and diplomacy”. 

National security is a key subject for Macron; the shock of the 2015  terrorist attacks which cost the lives of 137 people in Paris and the 2016 terrorist attacks which cost the lives of 86 people in Nice still burn bright in French memory. As such, the French president has increased military action against jihadists, restrained immigration and sought to stabilize regions that directly impact France, notably the Sahel and Maghreb regions. His bid to guarantee the safety of the French citizens also goes through the European Union, as he believes a unified European defence strategy is key not only for the safety of French people but also for all European people. 

Macron’s main security challenges lie in counterterrorism operations in the Sahel, European security integration, involvement in the Libyan civil war and rescuing Iran’s relations with the West. Macron has worked closely with his Foreign Policy Minister Le Drian on African matters, while the French president has attempted to leverage France’s diplomatic weight to advance on issues of European security integration and Iranian relations. 

The Future of European Security Integration

To Macron, European security integration has a key stake in the European project (eventually leading to a European federation). Indeed, unified European security would not only lead to a safer Europe, but also to an EU with clearer objectives in international affairs, and a sense of common purpose for European people. Macron knows that the development of common security goals for EU member states is key to building a unified European security project, and thus key to further European integration. 

European security integration’s ultimate objective is the creation of a European security force, led and funded by the EU itself. The first step in European security integration is to standardize and unite the European defence sectors. To this end, Macron has strongly advocated for an increase in French and European defence spending, even in the wake of the Coronavirus. Macron’s push for a European defence agency with autonomous funds translated to the increase in funding of the European Defence Fund (EDF), decided in 2018. EDF works to foster cooperation on research and development of military technology/equipment and is set to receive €8 billion for the 2021-2027 period from the EU budget (down from €13 billion due to Covid-19). Macron has also proposed increasing cooperation between EU armies, notably mingling units amongst each other and participating in common exercises. This initiative is personified by the Franco-German Brigade which exists since 1989, and Macron has expanded this initiative to Eastern European Countries. 

However, the backbone of European defence is currently NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), a military alliance between the US and European countries. In 2019, Macron called NATO “braindead”, hoping to spark talks of a European defence force. Instead, Macron realized that many European countries, including Germany, still support NATO, as they see American backing as key to their defence, both in terms of geopolitics but also defence spending, manpower and materials. NATO also has a strong historical connotation for Eastern European countries, who see the Organization as a vital organization to protect themselves from Russian interests. As such, Macron’s comments were rebuffed by Merkel, who reinforced Germany’s commitment to NATO

Furthermore, Macron recognizes that an army is an embodiment of a nation’s power, of the government’s ability to defend its people and as the safeguard of a nation’s system. In light of this, he knows that the EU is not sufficiently developed politically or militarily for the European peoples to accept replacing their national armies with a European one. Nevertheless, 68% of Europeans think that the EU should do more in security and defence policy. A vocal proponent of a strong French military and for the development of a European security force, Macron has positioned himself as a centrepiece of European security integration. Support from European public opinion gives him more leeway in the intra-European negotiations, which has so far translated to joint European security exercises, the European Defense Fund and standardization of the dense defence sector in Europe. 

Furthermore, the Trump administration has grown displeased with NATO, arguing that member states do not pay the 2% of the GDP they owe to the organization and that the US is single-handedly paying for European security. Trump has also associated NATO with trans-Atlantic trade, threatening to weaken NATO if the EU does not cease what he calls “unfair trade practices”. His recent decision to withdraw 9,500 US troops from Germany (bringing the total down to 25,000) due to Germany’s perceived unfair trade practices and contributions to NATO under 2% of the GDP has weakened Merkel’s pro-NATO stance. As such, the Covid-19 crisis and American foreign policy open the door for Macron to successfully push for increased European security integration. 

Interventions in Western Africa and the Sahel

France has been leading counterterrorism operations in the Sahel since 2013 when France intervened at the behest of the Malian government to take back the North of the country from jihadist forces (Operation Sevral). In 2014, this operation was expanded to the whole of the Sahel region, in cooperation with G5 Sahel (Operation Barkhane). Macron and Le Drian have coordinated French foreign policy in the region together, notably intensifying Operation Barkhane due to increased jihadist attack against G5 Sahel’s national armies since 2017. Macron’s foreign policy in the Sahel region aims to stabilize the region, remove jihadist groups and help the Sahel countries develop economically, politically and militarily.  

For Macron, stabilizing the situation in the Sahel is essential to France and Europe’s security. The region holds a key strategic position in Africa, acting as a gateway between Sub-Saharan Africa and the Maghreb, and thus a central element of Europe’s southern borders. Furthermore, the Sahel links the Maghreb with West Africa, acting as a passage point between the main francophone spheres of influence in Africa. As such, Macron needs to stop the conflict in the Sahel from spilling over to the neighbouring regions. If the jihadist threat were to expand, France and Europe would be confronted with mass migration, possible jihadist infiltrations, cuts in EU-Africa trade and de-stabilization of West Africa (detrimental to French interests). 

Macron has had a strong emphasis on protecting France’s borders from terrorism while increasing defence spending, so the intervention in the Sahel also has roots in his domestic policy. The French president’s military action against jihadists in Iraq and Syria are supported by 90% of the French population, while Operation Barkhane is supported by 60% of the population. Furthermore, it’s key for Macron to demonstrate that France remains a major military power, not only to the French people but also the world as a whole. French military power gives Macron an advantage in international affairs while allowing him to secure French interests abroad. 

It is also important to note that the French intervention was directly requested by the G5 Sahel, and France has the support of the UN and UN Security Council (so France is not acting unilaterally). Nevertheless, Macron does not want to be embroiled in a lasting counter-insurgency conflict with a no-exit strategy. To this end, the French president has sought the financial support of the international community for G5 Sahel, so that the region’s states may be self-sustainable in defence and security in the future. Macron has secured pledges for €450 million of donations to the G5 Sahel, notably increasing the EU’s contribution from €50 million to €100 million. Nevertheless, the money has been slow to arrive, and France has had to increase their involvement in the region in 2020 due to an intensification of jihadist attacks. 

Operation Barkhane currently has 5000 French troops on the ground and 6 attack jets. European nations support the French intervention, notably with Estonia, Britain and Denmark contributing materials and troop support. So far, 41 French deaths and  600 to 1000 jihadist deaths have been recorded. As in West Africa however, France’s intervention in the Sahel is hampered by hostile public opinion, which is starting to frustrate French diplomats.

Online misinformation has been extremely effective at turning the Sahel’s populations against Operation Barkhane, notably through conspiracy theories, claims of neo-colonialism and frustration at the ongoing jihadist threat. Misinformation campaigns allege that France is funding jihadists, or even directly attacking G5 Sahel’s army bases, in an effort to keep a military presence in the Sahel. These campaigns are strongly linked to China, which is trying to gain ground in the region.

In late 2019, Le Drian threatened to reconsider the French military intervention if G5 Sahel did not work to secure more favourable public opinions. Macron is frustrated that France is seen as an enemy by the public in the Sahel, although a French military intervention was directly requested by the G5 Sahel’s governments, and because increasing French deaths seem to go unnoticed by the local public. France recently scored a major win, killing AQIM leader Abdelmalek Droukdel and creating hope for a swifter end to the conflict. 

The Libyan Question

France’s role in the Libyan Civil War since 2011 has been subject to many questions and much scrutiny. France is directly responsible for the current state of chaos in Libya, as it led a NATO mission to overthrow (and eventually kill) longtime Libyan dictator Ghaddafi. However, France refused to engage in the post-Gaddafi reconstruction of Libya, which soon broke out into another civil war amongst warring warlords. Eventually, two main factions emerged: the internationally recognized GNA based in Tripoli, and the LNA’s warlord Haftar based in Benghazi. 

Since Macron took office, France has officially been supporting the internationally backed GNA, but in reality has emerged as one of Haftar’s (LNA) strongest backers. Macron met with Haftar multiple times, notably organizing a summit between the warlord and GNA leader Al-Sarraj in an attempt to create a power-sharing arrangement. However, this summit bore no fruits, and the Libyan civil war resumed in full force. Macron has supplied Haftar’s forces, and played a key role in coordinating the UAE and Egypt’s support of the LNA.

Macron supports Haftar for key French national security reasons. Libya directly represents the southern French border (and European border). As with the Sahel, instability in Libya creates the risk of jihadist infiltration in Europe, opens the door to mass migration, and risks pulling the entire region in conflict. Since Macron’s number one priority is to prevent terrorist attacks in France, he has attempted to stabilize the situation in Libya by supporting a local leader who best aligns with French goals and values. The French president’s objective is to put in power a leader who will stabilize Libya, combat extremist Islamic groups, create a secular political system (ideally held by Haftar solely) and become a key Maghrebin partner for France in the future. With France’s southern border secure, Macron could also levy his newly increased influence in the region to promote the exploitation of Libyan gas by French companies. 

Unfortunately for Macron, Haftar has not had the expected military success, and was pushed out of Tripoli by the Turkish backed GNA, all the way back to Sirte in the centre of the country. France’s role in the conflict has been increasingly criticized by the international community, notably for opposing the internationally recognized GNA. 

Most importantly, Macron’s attempts to levy French influence in the Maghreb have been countered by other powers, and the Libyan civil war has deteriorated into an elaborate conflict of webbed alliances. Macron’s key partner in support of Haftar is the UAE’s crown prince Mohammed bin-Zayed. Bin-Zayed’s Gulfication strategy seeks to put in power secular strongmen throughout the Arab world capable of guaranteeing stability in their countries and combating extremist Islamic groups, while developing their nation’s economy on the Emirati model. This political project fit Macron’s vision for North Africa, not only on a French national security standpoint, but also as a political project following the failures of the Arab Spring. UAE’s strongest ally in the region Egypt has also been a strong backer of Haftar, weary of the Libyan conflict spilling into Egypt.

Furthermore, Haftar enlisted the aid of Russia, which sent Wagner Group mercenaries to fight with the LNA. In a Haftar-controlled Libya, Russia would gain a foothold in Africa, threaten Europe’s southern border, and gain access to Libyan oil fields.

As such, Macron has catapulted France into a 4 nation alliance of France-Russia-UAE-Egypt backing Haftar, an alliance in which all parties have vastly differing objectives. On the other side, Turkey has intervened by sending Turkish and Syrian troops in favour of the GNA, turning the tide of the war against Haftar and pushing the LNA back to Sirte. Now, France and Russia are forming a formal alliance on the Libyan question, and the Quadruple alliance has set the red line of the Turkish advance at Sirte (this approach has been successful so far). Essentially, the foreign powers have split Libya in two: the western part belongs to the GNA and the eastern part to Haftar. 

The developments in Syria raise the important question: is Macron out of his depth? The French president has involved France in an increasingly complicated conflict, with world powers coming head to head. Macron has entered an alliance with Russia, formally opposing NATO ally Turkey and the internationally recognized Libyan government. Although it is still too early to say for sure, Macron’s ambition of returning France to a leading hard power force in the world may have backfired in Libya. Concretely, his continued support of Haftar has extended the Libyan civil war, and put his priority objective of preserving French national security at risk. 

Diplomacy Between US and Iran

Macron has attempted to levy France’s influence as a historic diplomatic power to save the JCPOA. The French president sought to act as a mediator between Iran and the US, hoping to bring Trump and Rouhani to the negotiating table. Macron was eager to keep burgeoning EU-Iran business going with Teheran, while winding down tensions in the Persian Gulf. More importantly, the EU had been heavily invested in the JCPOA, and had indirectly given its word to Iran that the US would honour its obligation, so Macron was keen to preserve the EU’s diplomatic standing with Iran and on a global scale.

Macron’s diplomatic efforts to help both nations find common ground on nuclear proliferation, economic sanctions and Iranian military expansion in the Middle East have largely ended with failure. He almost succeeded in getting Trump and Rouhani to meet at the UN General Assembly in 2019, but Rouhani said he did not have the authorization to meet the American President. Macron hoped to leverage his good relations with Trump and the EU’s willingness to improve relations with Teheran, but was stonewalled by Trump who had made pulling out of the JCPOA a central element of his foreign policy. Failure to save the Iran Nuclear Deal re-installed crushing economic sanctions on Iran, restricted EU dealings with Teheran due to the US’s economic power, and flared tensions in the Persian Gulf. Macron came under fire both from Teheran for letting the US exit the JCPOA, and from the Trump administration for trying to rescue the deal against American wishes. However, Macron’s persistence to save the JCPOA was highly noted by the international community.

David Salinger

R&A Editor in Chief