Macron-Politics

Emmanuel Macron

From “Great Reformer” to “President of the Rich”, Emanuel Macron has been given many labels throughout his presidency. An ambitious political leader, Macron has been confronted with the realities of French public opinion, the power of labour unions and opposition to his liberal policies. Nonetheless, Macron has had success implementing certain reforms on his quest to create jobs, make the French economy competitive and limit public debt. A European visionary, Macron has repeatedly sought to accelerate European integration but is limited by European partners who are unwilling to trigger the necessary reforms in such a short time span. Finally, the French president has sought to use French diplomatic power to maintain French influence in West Africa and strengthen transatlantic ties. The following sections will outline Macron’s political maneuvering to achieve his objectives of domestic reform, European reform, French foreign policy in Western Africa and transatlantic politics. 

Minister of Economy and Industry

In 2014, Macron was nominated Minister of the Economy and Industry by Manuel Valls, Prime Minister of the Hollande government. As Minister of the Economy, he sought to promote liberal economic policies, notably in the labour market. The Macon law deregulated working on Sundays, the bus transportation industry and the driving school monopoly. The OECD estimated that this law would increase the French GDP by 0.3% over 5 years. Macron was also a strong proponent of the law “El Khomri”, which was a deep reform of the French labour laws, essentially making it easier for French companies to hire and fire employees. This reform aimed to make the French economy more competitive while increasing the number of jobs. Macron’s time as Minister of the Economy played a strong role in the elaboration of his economic policies as president, allowing him to link his personal liberal ideology with the realities of public opinion and the constraints of governance in a democratic system.  

Certain aspects of his time as minister have been thoroughly critiqued, notably for policies pertaining to industries. He was accused of inaction when several companies shut down their factories, leading to thousands of job losses. He approved the sale of French company Alstom to General Electric, as GE had promised to create 1000 jobs in France by 2018. Instead, by 2019, GE had removed 1050 jobs in France. Macron also increased the stake of France’s investment in Renault from 15% to 20%, which caused substantial tensions with Renault’s partner Nissan, and in 2019 with the Japanese state (Carlos Ghosn’s evasion from Japan). 

Macron’s industrial and liberal economic policies were criticized by labour unions, the working class and parts of the socialist party. These critics pushed Macron further to the political right while fueling allegations well into his presidency that he was not preoccupied with the wellbeing of the French working class. Furthermore, the Hollande government used the “49.3” to pass the Macron and El Khomri laws. 49.3 is an article of French constitutional law that allows the executive to force the adoption of a Bill if the government receives a vote of confidence from the National Assembly. This constitutional article is very unpopular in France as it’s commonly seen as a denial of democracy. Although unpopular, it showed Macron that reforms could be implemented even in the face of large social contestation, thus empowering him to propose more ambitious reforms throughout his presidency. 

Macron’s time as Minister of the Economy helped him refine his liberal socio-economic views while showing him which part of his ideology could be implemented in a French political setting. Although he was met with resistance from the left, Macron’s reforms were popular with the French population. Furthermore, he saw an impressive rise in popularity, as the number of French citizens who didn’t know who Macron was, fell from 47% to 18% between 2014-2016. With disagreements brewing between Macron and the rest of the government over which reforms to lead (Valls considered Macron’s reforms were too liberal) as well as the creation of En Marche! in 2016, Macron left the Hollande government in August of the same year to concentrate on the presidential run. The new presidential candidate explained that the socialist government “did a lot of things halfway”, and 87% of the population supported his decision to leave. With newfound popularity, experience and a refined political project, Macron was poised to run for the French presidency. 

Domestic Reforms and Political Maneuvering

In June 2017, En Marche! won an absolute majority in the National Assembly (the equivalent of House of Representatives), with 308 seats out of 577. This majority gave Macron free reign to implement his reforms, as the government’s policies have to be passed by the National Assembly. In September 2017, Macron’s first major reform of France’s labour laws was passed by the National Assembly. This was one of the major economic reforms he had promised and it marked a big win for him while exploiting his majority in Congress. However, Macron’s other main reforms have hit more substantive opposition in France. 

When the French president initiated his reform of the retirement system in 2018, labour unions started nationwide strikes on all public transport, essentially paralyzing the country, while large protests were held in the street. However, unlike the carbon tax, the retirement system reform was a central element of Macron’s program, and he refused to back down. In the National Assembly, the opposition submitted thousands of amendments to the law project, which have to be debated individually, thus delaying indefinitely the adoption of the law by the En Marche! majority.

To move past this political deadlock, Macron activated the “49.3”, an article of French constitutional law that allows the executive to force the adoption of a Bill if the government receives a vote of confidence from the National Assembly. As the Hollande government had passed the “Macron law” with the 49.3 when he was the Minister of the Economy, Macron knew he had a way to pass his more ambitious reforms even in the event of political division in Parliament. However, 49.3 is very unpopular in France as it’s commonly seen as a denial of democracy and a method to pass laws that the people don’t want. Nevertheless, Macron was confident that his “silent majority” would support his action. As the government was about to adopt the reform of the retirement system, Covid-19 hit France and all reforms were put on hold. By February 2020, before the pandemic arrived, only 32% of the French population approved of Macron (Ifop poll), combined with a noticeable decline in the favorable press for the president. With his approval rating still lagging in the 30% following the Covid-19 crisis, Macron now has to re-think his political strategy and communication to garner domestic support for his political project.

The Dream of European Reform

Macron’s main objective in European politics is to find common ground with Merkel on European integration. Indeed, Merkel is the most powerful player in Europe, and all propositions to initiate reforms in the EU go through the German chancellor. Macron’s European project, which he outlined in the famous Sorbonne Speech (2017), was to create a budget for the European Union and accelerate European security integration. Merkel has not always been open to Macron’s substantial reforms, but 2020 has seen steady improvements on the security axis and rapid improvements on the European budget due to necessity from the Covid-19 crisis. For the EU to be governed effectively, France and Germany must be on the same wavelength. Hence, Macron has led a pragmatic approach to convince Merkel to initiate EU reforms in tandem with France, notably when the political situation is right.  

Macron’s other challenge has been finding common ground with the other European countries, having notably been at odds with Poland and Hungary on the distribution of immigrants according to EU quotas, as well as the Netherlands and Austria on further European fiscal integration. To remedy such divide within the EU, Macron has long been a proponent of a “two-speed” Europe, where countries ready to integrate further are allowed to do so, while others may integrate at a later time. The project of a two-speed Europe is currently unlikely to be approved. However, although France may face some opposition from the above-mentioned nations, a Franco-German reform plan would have the final say (notably in Eurobonds, the intermingling of national armies), thus giving Macron leverage in European politics as long as he is supported by Germany.

Macron also needs to garner support from within the EU bureaucracy itself, as his “coup” of Manfred Weber in favour of Von Der Leyen for president of the EU Commission was looked down upon by the EU technocrats. A direct consequence of Macron’s aggressive political maneuvering resulted in the voting down of his nominee, Sylvie Goulard, as French commissioner. However, Macron still holds significant support with the confirmation of Ursula von der Leyen as European Commission president, his Belgian ally -Charles Michel in the European Council, France’s Christine Lagarde at the European Central Bank and Michel Berger as the European commissioner for the European market.

These European partners have worked with Macron on a number of key subjects, notably Michel Berger in support of an EU tax on tech giants (GAFA tax). Macron has also proposed reforms for the EU Parliament and political system, notably creating great European debates on the future of the Union intending to turn European public opinion in favour of further integration. Strikingly, 62% of European feel that the EU does not understand the needs of its citizens, while 54% of Europeans say the EU is inefficient. Euroscepticism has been a constant thorn in the heel of European integration, and Macron will have to lead significant democratic reforms within the EU to convince the European population of the EU’s benefits.

Toning down Francàfrique in West Africa

France remains the major foreign power in Western Africa, benefitting from close ties with former French colonial countries (notably with the Economic and Monetary Union of West Africa, UEMOA). However, in recent years, West African public opinion has turned against France, seeing many of its interests and involvement in the region as neo-colonist. In light of these developments, Macron’s foreign policy in West Africa is centred around evolving from Françafrique to create equal relations with each nation.

Although this foreign policy is in line with the previous administration (personified by Jean-Yves le Drian, Minister of Defense under Hollande and Minister of Foreign Policy under Macron), Macron has presented himself as a new generation of French leaders willing to renovate France’s relations with Africa (which he outlined during his 2018 trip to West Africa). Of course, the French president’s goal remains to consolidate France as the main foreign power in the region for the long-term future.

Although Macron retains very strong relations with West African governments, France observes with a wary eye the increase of Chinese involvement in the region, notably granting loans and building infrastructure to governments. Notably, Chinese loans to Ivory Coast have gone from $0 in 2000 to $2.5 billion in 2015. In 2019, Exim Bank of China loaned €511 million to Ivory coast for the construction of water and electricity infrastructure. However, France remains Ivory Coast’s biggest economic partner, with French FDI totalling €1.1 billion, French imports totalling €787 million and French exports totalling €1.1 billion. Furthermore, France has been heavily invested on the world stage in alleviating the Ivorian debt, notably cancelling up to €3.5 billion of debt. France has also granted numerous developmental loans to Ivory Coast, granting €1.125 billion for the 2015-2020 period to develop water, energy, education, transport, agriculture, and business. The way these loans are structured by the French Agency of Development (AFD), the money never leaves Ivory Coast as it is reinvested into the country by France as soon as the loan has been repaid. Thus, France remains Ivory Coast’s main partner (and will retain that status for the foreseeable future), but Macron needs to convince Ivorian public that France has Ivory Coast’s best interests at heart, and is not acting with neo-colonialist objectives.

Macron’s will to move away from Françafrique has led to the removal of the CFA Franc in partnership with UEMOA countries, which will become the Eco currency in 2020. UEMOA will adopt the Eco as a common currency, accelerating regional integration in the Union and within ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) as a whole. The Eco will stay pegged to the Euro and guaranteed by the Bank of France, allowing it to restrain inflation and reassure foreign investors (or be too dependent on France and restrain investment according to the critics). Nevertheless, the new Eco currency strengthens France’s position as the main regional foreign power; West African regional integration is now led by French ally UEMOA (and Ivory Coast), rather than anglophone Nigeria. If anglophone and lusophone countries want to participate in West African regional integration and join the common currency, they will have to enter the French sphere of influence. As such, Macron’s political maneuvering in West Africa has restored the geopolitical initiative to France and its allied francophone countries in the region. 

Macron has also promised to increase French investment in West Africa, as well as supporting small and medium-sized companies. Macron has worked to secure aid from the European Union, as the EU will invest €100 million in the G5 Sahel. These funds will help France retain its extensive influence in the region, pushing back against recent Chinese economic expansion. Throughout the Covid-19 pandemic, Macron has also been pushing the international community to alleviate the debts of African nations.

Finally, a major staple of French involvement in West Africa is its military presence. France has many military camps throughout Western Africa, participating in counterinsurgency operations and training of West African armies. Macron has stepped up the intensity of Operation Barkhane, which combats terrorists in the Sahel. These counterinsurgency operations in the Sahel are an important display of French military power, keeping the French military engaged (it has seen waves of de-funding since the end of the Cold War) and fulfilling Macron’s campaign promises to increase military spending.

Furthermore, the Sahel’s stability is key to France, as it directly impacts West African stability (as seen by the recent increase of jihadist attacks in Burkina Faso and Ivory Coast). Although the French military is a key stabilizing force in the region, it is also highly unpopular, notably in Mali and Burkina Faso as of late. Extensive misinformation campaigns from China accusing the French of prolonging the conflict for neo-colonialist interests have been highly effective, while the region’s populations are wary of the continuing jihadist threat. With attacks increasing in Burkina Faso, Mali and even crossing into Ivory Coast, West African public opinion is critical of France’s inability to finish off the jihadist groups despite the extensive French military presence in the region. Macron’s main objective for the 2020s is to turn African public opinion in favour of French actions in the region.

Transatlantic Politics

Macron also aims to reinforce France’s alliance with the US. He has actively engaged in diplomacy by wooing Trump, hoping to spare France of the American president’s unpredictability. By becoming a close ally to Trump, Macron hoped to reorient US foreign policy to multilateralism and position himself as a key intermediary in EU-US trade/defence talks. Although Macron’s relationship with Trump was at first promising, it eventually broke down due to US-French trade disputes regarding taxing of US tech giants and retaliatory tariffs on French cheese/wine. Macron’s explosive claim that NATO was braindead and push for further European security integration also soured French-American relations. 

Macron has also made several overtures to Russia, saying “Russia is profoundly European” and taking a diplomatic role with Putin. Macron also hoped to position himself as a key intermediary between Russia and Europe, and was more successful in this regard than with Trump. France has also retained strong relations with China, which were observed by large exchanges of medical supplies during the Covid-19 pandemic. Overall, Macron’s foreign policy seeks to reinstate France as a major diplomatic nation in international relations, notably as a key intermediary between the EU and the rest of the world.

David Salinger

R&A Editor in Chief