• Bihi’s MoU with Ethiopia triggered the resignation of his Defense Minister and sparked protests ahead of the next Presidential elections. 
• The MoU`s success depends on Ethiopia, which is seen as a controversial and unreliable partner in the eyes of Somaliland’s public opinion.
• Although a potential win towards recognition, the MoU does not compensate for the political and economic crises de facto state faces.

Why is President Bihi’s heat level COLD? 

Answer: Strong opposition to the MoU with Ethiopia undermines President Bihi’s credibility and support in the lead-up to the Presidential elections.

Somaliland is a unique case of an unrecognized state in the horn of Africa. With its capital in Hargeisa, the country has operated with its own currency, military and governing structure since 1992. For decades, the de facto state has been praised by international organizations and scholars as a model of good governance in Africa based on its political stability and steady socioeconomic development.

Since his election in 2017, President Bihi has prioritized achieving international recognition for Somaliland. The United Arab Emirates have since appointed a representative to Hargeisa, while Kenya and Taiwan have established liaison offices in the country. Bihi’s strategy relies on a quid pro quo principle whereby he offers resources to middle powers competing in the region in exchange for their recognition.

One prominent example of Bihi’s use of smart diplomacy is the Berbera Corridor. It provides the landlocked state of Ethiopia with an alternative trade route that reduces its dependency on Djibouti. In exchange, the UAE gains control of the Berbera port on the strategic Gulf of Aden through a lease and investment agreement. 

Following the same approach, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Hargeisa and Addis Ababa was announced at the beginning of this year. In the agreement, President Bihi promises his neighbour a 20-kilometre shoreline for its naval forces under a 50-year lease in exchange for formal recognition. However, offering any part of their territory to Ethiopia is a red line for many who live in Somaliland.

The MoU has been widely condemned as “unacceptable” in Somaliland, sparking protests across the country and prompting the Defense Minister’s resignation in opposition shortly after the announcement. Amid the already destabilizing political and economic crises the de facto state faces, the MoU further undermined Bihi’s credibility ahead of the next presidential elections taking place in November this year.

What is changing President Bihi’s heat level?

Answer: The MoU increases mistrust of President Bihi’s leadership at times when the economic crisis stresses inter-ethnic rivalries with Ethiopia.

The MoU arrived at a moment of economic downturn. Livestock – the backbone of the economy in Somaliland – has been decimated by a prolonged drought that has displaced more than 800,000 people, with two in three households losing their animals and traders struggling to satisfy the demand that flows across the Berbera corridor.

Somali-Ethiopian economic relations are riddled with mistrust due to decades of violence and competition. In 2022, Addis Ababa’s decision to double the price of khat, the fourth most valuable crop in terms of export revenues, reignited violence between Oromos and Somalis across the region. 

The tension culminated in a ban on khat imports from Ethiopia by the Somaliland Khat Association. The Khat case illustrates that sharing resources with Ethiopia is a political cleavage while relying on Addis Ababa for recognition disregards the deep-rooted tensions between the two countries 

The MoU also raises questions on his leadership considering that Ethiopia previously lost its 19% in the Berbera port when they failed to meet the conditions of a previous agreement on time. The MoU is a nonbinding agreement, hence he cannot guarantee that Addis Ababa will uphold its end of the bargain in this quid pro quo arrangement.

What is driving President Bihi?

Answer: President Bihi struggles to maintain power amid the escalation of violence and opposition since his decision to delay elections two years ago. 

The sociopolitical fabric of Somali society is influenced by clan structures. They play a fundamental role in the formulation of norms, mobilizing towards political goals, and organizing the population at a local level. While the broader group of the Isaaq clan is at the core of Somaliland, other peripheral communities feel increasingly disconnected from the capital Hargeisa. 

Core-periphery relations dramatically froze when President Bihi extended his mandate for two additional years at the end of his term in 2022. The decision sparked protests that resulted in deadly clashes. In the city of Las Anod the violence escalated to an armed conflict against the Dhulbahante clan, the biggest clan in Eastern Somaliland. The clash led to the creation of a separate administration named SSC-Khaatumo, which requested its reincorporation into the Federal Republic of Somalia. 

Other parties previously harmed by Bihi’s use of smart diplomacy over the last 7 years are exploiting this division. For example, Djibouti – whose trade monopoly has been contested by the Berbera corridor – recently hosted the leader of the SSC Khaatumo administration. 

Instead of deflecting attention from the internal political and economic crisis, the MoU deepened division in the country. President Bihi is failing to control the situation and turns to violent suppression of dissent, dramatically cooling down his heat level. President Bihi now faces the next election with his credibility hitting an all-time low. 

What does this mean for you?

Answer: The great prospects of peace and prosperity that reinforced Somaliland’s claim for recognition are at stake. 

The Horn of Africa is one of the most fragile regions in the world. Somalia has been considered a terra nullius since the start of the civil war back in 1991. The power vacuum of the failed state has led to the proliferation of Al-Shabab, while global warming is also worsening the situation, with the worst drought in 40 years leaving 36 million people severely food insecure in the region.

President Bihi’s claim to recognize Somaliland argues that the country strives to maintain political stability and embrace democratic governance. The media embraced this claim, depicting the de facto state as an “oasis of stability” or “democratic miracle”. 

Historically, countries such as the United Kingdom and multilateral organizations were drawn to recognise Somaliland based on good democratic governance and steady socioeconomic development. Nevertheless, as President Bihi cools down and conflict ignites in Somaliland we can see the next November elections as a turning point. 

If the internal political crisis escalates and Ethiopia fails to comply with the MoU, the lives of more than six million people and one of the very few cases of peace and prosperity in the Horn of Africa move closer to further instability.