• Yunus’s chances of delivering a smooth political transition are fading as military pressure and political divisions deepen. 
• Public backlash over stalled reforms and controversial decisions has undermined Yunus’s interim government.
• Bangladesh faces a growing risk of military intervention amid rising domestic tensions and deteriorating relations with India.

Why is Yunus COLD?

Answer: Mohammed Yunus is cold as he faces rising military pressure and fragmented political support, which undermine his ability to govern effectively.

Muhammad Yunus assumed leadership following the fall of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s government, who had ruled Bangladesh for 15 years under her party, the Awami League (AL). Protests erupted on 1 July 2024, initially led by students opposing a controversial quota system that reserved over half of government jobs for descendants of freedom fighters and underrepresented groups such as women and people from poorer areas of the country. 

As protests grew, the government responded with force, declaring a nationwide curfew, cutting internet access, and deploying the military. On 5 August, Hasina reportedly fled the country. Following consultations with political leaders, Nobel Peace Prize laureate Muhammad Yunus was appointed to lead an interim government, with a mandate to restore stability and prepare the country for new elections. 

Since taking office, Yunus has struggled to push through reforms or set a date for new elections due to the lack of a common ground between major political factions. 

On one hand, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) guided by Begum Khaleda Zia, now the dominant political force, is pushing for a vote by December 2025. The party opposes Yunus’ proposed reforms, such as a two-term limit for prime ministers, and has demanded the resignation of two student leaders, Nahid Islam and Asif Mahmud, who led the 2024 protests and were appointed by Yunus as advisers in the interim government. The BNP warned that failure to meet these demands could end its cooperation with the Yunus-led administration. 

On the other side, the National Citizen Party (NCP) and Jamaat-e-Islami (the country’s largest Islamist party, banned a decade ago by former Prime Minister Hasina and reestablished by Yunus in 2024) have expressed support for Yunus’s reforms, demanding for reform push before before elections, because they want to prepare and build alliances.  

This political division is stalling Yunus’s reform agenda, limiting his ability to lead the country through this critical transition.

What is changing Yunus’ heat level?

Answer: Yunus’s interim government is under increasing pressure as political and public confidence continues to erode due to unresolved electoral uncertainty and stalled reforms. 

On May 21 2025, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) organised its first major protest against the interim government. Thousands of BNP supporters demanded the installation of their candidate, Ishraque Hossain, as mayor of the capital. The BNP accuses Yunus’ administration of blocking an Election Commission ruling that recognised Hossain’s victory in the 2020 mayoral election. Although officially declared the winner, Hossain has yet to assume office, with the city currently overseen by a government-appointed administrator. In response, BNP supporters have blocked access to the mayoral office, disrupting local services. 

The military is also exerting growing pressure on Yunus, with Army Chief Waker-Uz-Zaman publicly demanding elections by December 2025 to end military involvement in civilian governance, warning that extended troop deployment for civil duties could weaken national defence. 

Moreover, the army is opposing key initiatives advanced by Yunus. One of the most contentious issues is the proposed humanitarian corridor into Myanmar’s war-torn Rakhine State. The army chief has denounced the plan, reportedly advanced without military consultation, as a “bloody corridor” and a direct threat to national security. 

Intended to facilitate aid delivery, civilian evacuations, and possible Rohingya repatriation, the corridor would be managed by international agencies and pass through territory controlled by Myanmar’s military and armed groups. The military fears it could become a foreign-dominated buffer zone near the Bangladesh border, undermining national control and inviting external influence. 

These pressures have coincided with a series of politically sensitive decisions by Yunus that have sparked protests against his governance. In particular, Yunus lifted the decade-long ban on Jamaat-e-Islami, and released several Islamist leaders from detention. These moves sparked backlash from secular and moderate groups, who fear the revival of Islamist influence within Bangladesh’s political landscape. 

Moreover, the introduction of the Public Service (Amendment) Ordinance 2025, which allows for the dismissal of government employees without a formal inquiry or process, triggered prolonged protests across multiple sectors. Thousands of civil servants condemned the ordinance as authoritarian and unlawful. In response, Yunus has imposed a ban on rallies near government offices. 

Beyond civil servants, thousands of primary school teachers mobilised nationwide, demanding better wages and benefits. Meanwhile, Yunus’s plan to restructure the National Board of Revenue (NBR), a key reform demanded by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), was withdrawn following employee protests. The IMF’s loan to Bangladesh comes with strict conditions requiring economic reforms, including splitting the National Board of Revenue to boost tax collection. The interim government’s attempt to implement these changes without employee consultation sparked protests, forcing its cancellation. 

What is driving Yunus?

Answer: Yunus is driven by a desire to stabilise Bangladesh through electoral, constitutional, and institutional reforms before handing over power.  

Professor Muhammad Yunus has announced that preventing a return to authoritarian rule and laying the foundation for a people-centred, welfare-oriented state requires urgent and far-reaching reforms. At the heart of his agenda is the creation of a fair and transparent electoral system, to be achieved rby estructuring critical state institutions, including the police, public administration, judiciary, the Anti-Corruption Commission, and the Election Commission. To guide these efforts, six expert-led commissions have been established by Yunus, each tasked with formulating reforms in these key areas. 

Yunus is also focused on securing a political consensus around key reforms. He aims to finalise the ‘July Charter‘, a joint agreement outlining reform commitments from all major parties, before the first anniversary of the student-led protests of July 2024. 

On the economic front, the Yunus-led interim government inherited a severely strained economy. Years of fiscal mismanagement, systemic weaknesses in the banking sector, and rising debt, particularly during the Awami League’s 15-year tenure, which saw approximately $44.38 billion in foreign loans, left the country grappling with double-digit inflation and falling foreign reserves. 

In response, Yunus, backed by newly appointed Bangladesh Bank Governor Ahsan H. Mansurhas, pursued reforms focused on stabilising reserves, controlling inflation, and cleaning up the banking system. Key measures have included halting money printing, raising interest rates, and requesting $762 million in financial support from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as part of a broader stabilisation effort.

What does this mean for you?

Answer: The unfolding crisis could prompt the military to expand its influence and could strain relations between Bangladesh and India.

The army in Bangladesh is an important power player that has the capacity to upend elected and non-elected leaders. Its recent rejection of key civilian proposals (including a humanitarian corridor into Myanmar, foreign involvement in Chattogram Port, and the launch of Starlink) signals that the military may assert a more prominent and active role during this delicate transitional period. 

Tensions are also spilling over into the country’s foreign relations, particularly with India. New Delhi’s support for the ousted Awami League (AL) government and its decision to grant exile to Sheikh Hasina have fueled anti-Indian sentiment in Bangladesh, as these actions are perceived as interferences intended to destabilise the interim government and pave the way for AL’s return. Diplomatic frictions have been intensified by India’s frequent criticisms of Bangladesh’s handling of religious violence and minority rights, especially in relation to attacks on the Hindu community. In response, Indian authorities have tightened visa restrictions for Bangladeshi citizens. 

Economic cooperation between the two nations has also declined. The Adani Group, one of India’s largest conglomerates and closely aligned with Prime Minister Narendra Modi, has reduced electricity exports to Bangladesh over unpaid bills, many of which date back to Hasina’s administration.  New Delhi introduced in May 2025 restrictions on Bangladeshi exports worth around $770 million, about 42% of their bilateral trade. The new regulations ban several key products, such as garments (Bangladesh’s largest export and a vital source of foreign exchange) from entering India through more convenient land borders and must now arrive by sea via the two designated ports of Kolkata and Nhava Sheva, increasing both transit time and shipping costs for Bangladeshi exporters.