Nicolás Maduro

Early in his life, Nicolas Maduro was inspired to pursue political organizing by the left-wing politics of his father. He started his career as a bus driver that worked his way through the ranks of the Caracas transit workers’ union before becoming a military officer. His deeper involvement with Venezuela’s government began in 1999, when he was a member of the National Constituent Assembly that rewrote the constitution. He began serving in the National Assembly, the legislative body established under the new constitution, in 2000, and was reelected in 2005. From 2005 to 2006, he served as the president of the body. However, in 2006, he began serving as Venezuela’s foreign minister under Chávez. In this role, he worked to advance regional cooperation initiatives, such as the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA), and pursued relationships with leaders of other countries. In early 2012, Maduro’s political career advanced further when Chávez won reelection and named Maduro as the vice president.

On December 8th 2012, before leaving to Havana for a surgery to treat cancer from which he would never recover from, Chávez announced that his preferred successor would be Vice President and Chancellor Nicolás Maduro. After 14 years of Chávez’s rule, his death on March 5th 2013, left Maduro as the de facto leader. As stipulated in the Constitution in the event of the President’s death, presidential elections took place on April 14th 2013 to determine a president to serve the remainder of Chávez’s term. In this election, Maduro ran against Henrique Capriles and won with 51% of the vote. Because of the narrow margin, Capriles announced that he would not recognise Maduro’s election as legitimate until the votes were recounted. The National Election Council decided to conduct an audit of the ballots, but Capriles refused to participate, so Maduro was sworn in as president on April 19th 2013.

Chavismo is the political regime that was established by Hugo Chávez after his presidential election victory of 1999. Chávez’s ideology is partly characterized by how he styled himself as a leader for unity across Latin America. He championed the “Bolivarian Revolution”, a socialist program for much of Latin America. The Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA) was an alternative economic partnership with the goals of implementing socio economic reforms across Latin America and countering US-led initiatives to proliferate free market policies. Overall, he saw himself as a democratic socialist, who wanted to build a participatory democracy, institute a basic welfare system, and address Venezuela’s chronic social problems.

However, his leadership was also characterized by authoritarian policies and poor quality of life. Throughout his presidency, he implemented policies which would secure his future in the presidency, ranging from using excessive social spending policies to increase his approval ratings before elections to changing the constitution in 2009 to allow for his indefinite reelection. These policies also resulted in shortages in food and other fundamental necessities, as well as increases in the crime and mortality rates.

As Chávez’s chosen successor, Maduro has worked to maintain Chávez’s policies that frame him as a strong leader for Venezuela. However, this also meant that Maduro inherited and perpetuated many of the problems that existed under Chávez. Today, many Venezuelans struggle with low accessibility of goods, and democracy is restricted with high militarization of government institutions and limits on freedoms of expression.

The oil industry in Venezuela is controlled by Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), which earns the largest share of Venezuela’s foreign exchange. It was first nationalized in 1976 under the government of Carlos Andrés Pérez (1970s-80s). This event increased the state’s capacity to extract revenues from the oil industry. During his mandate, Carlos Andrés Pérez invested heavily in developing Venezuela’s manufacturing base in an attempt to dissuade the country’s heavy dependence on imports.

By the time Chávez came to power in 1999, PDVSA had gained significant autonomy. However, his government brought the company back under the government’s authority by changing the constitution. The state’s acquisition of PDVSA meant that many of the company’s oil revenues would directly go to the government and specially to invest in Chávez’s social programmes.

By 2003, Chavez used revenues from PDVSA for the implementation of social programs like Misiones Bolivarianas. Misiones Bolivarianas are programs aimed at distributing oil wealth through public development in collaboration with communities put forward between 2002-2006. Given that these “free checks” were financed by petrodollars, it made the system unsustainable and vulnerable to retrenchment, as money would end at some point. This is what occurred during the presidency of Maduro. Collapse in the price of oil, inflation, capital flight, corruption, impoverishment and social unrest, has affected Maduro’s governance since he came to power in 2013. With the economy’s dependence on oil, market fluctuations in the price of oil made budgeting impossible, especially after early 2015.

Maduro has continued many of Chávez’s methods of governance. Both leaders sought to centralize government power. One way that both did this was through changing the constitution. In 1999, Chávez came to power with the aid of the newly written constitution, which Maduro contributed to writing as a member of the National Constituent Assembly. Chávez also sponsored a package of constitutional changes in 2009 which allowed for his indefinite reelection. Similarly, Maduro has used his influence with the Supreme Court to minimize the constitutional power of the national assembly. For example, in March 2017, the Supreme Court ruled to dissolve the National Assembly, and by May of the same year, Maduro convened a constituent assembly to write a new constitution. The National Assembly did not reconvene until January 2021, where it was dominated by the PSUV as a result of low voter turnout and voter suppression, giving Maduro de facto power in the institution. Tactics of political centralisation have been a key part of policies by both Chávez and Maduro.

The military has been a significant tool for consolidating political power for both leaders, but especially Maduro. The military has helped them stay in control by the arresting opposition, shutting down protests, and defending contested election results. Military leaders have been motivated by the opportunity to enrich themselves through corruption and illicit industries, as well as the fear that they would be prosecuted under a new government.

Venezuela’s economic policies have shifted from Chávez to Maduro because of changing circumstances in the world economy. As Venezuela became wealthy as a result of their massive export of oil in a global economy with high oil prices, Chávez used revenues from PDVSA for social programming initiatives. However, under Maduro, as global oil prices have fallen, Venezuela has experienced an economic crisis with hyperinflation, extensive shortages of consumer goods, and a 96% poverty rate. Maduro’s attempts to revive the country’s economy through policies, such as creating a new cryptocurrency or restructuring debt, have had little effect on the situation.

Regarding foreign policy, Chávez’s administration benefitted from the rise of emerging power and the high oil prices. Extractivism attracted many countries to Venezuela which enriched the country’s economy even more. However, when Maduro came to power the booming oil driven financial years had already ended and many economic allies were also going under harsh economic conditions. Even as oil prices recovered, Venezuela faced US sanctions targeting the oil industry, which also contributed to decreases in production. As Chávez’s foreign minister, Maduro pursued relationships and alliances with world leaders and drove initiatives such as ALBA. While foreign policy was a driving force for the ambitions of Chávez’s government, Maduro has reduced emphasis on the regional projects pursued under Chávez and focused on developing relationships with powers like Russia and China. Regarding Venezuela’s relationship with the US, Chávez’s hatred and rejection of the US was a significant aspect of his ideology. Despite Maduro’s history of continuing that narrative, in many ways it is now being set aside for economic reasons.

In late 2013 into early 2014, Maduro’s government faced severe economic problems, including high inflation and shortages in consumer goods and foreign currency. Many of these challenges came as global oil prices fell. The declining economic conditions inspired protests in the streets. Primarily led by students opposing Maduro’s response, the protests spread from San Cristóbal to other cities, including Caracas, in February 2014, resulting in deaths, injuries, and arrests. However, Venezuela’s rural residents, as well as the police and military, supported Maduro, and protests diminished by May of 2014. As these protests overshadowed the first year of Maduro’s presidency, their legacy played a role in fostering divisions among the electorate moving forward.

In 2015, the PSUV lost control of the National Assembly for the first time in sixteen years. The new majority opposed Maduro and threatened to remove him from office through various tactics, including shortening the term of the presidency and collecting signatures to initiate a recall election. However, the Supreme Court undermined both of these efforts, first with the decision that a constitutional amendment to shorten the presidential terms would not apply to the term Maduro was completing at the time, and then by dissolving the National Assembly in 2017. Despite efforts to remove him from office, Maduro used these events to strengthen his authority over the institutions of governance.

Throughout the pandemic, COVID-19 has spread rapidly through Venezuela and has worsened their humanitarian crisis. However, Maduro has used the pandemic to further consolidate power. In the elections convened in December 2017, the PSUV won 255 of the 277 seats in the National Assembly. In increasingly challenging humanitarian conditions, Maduro’s opposition has had greater difficulty mobilizing to continue countering his repressive methods of governance.

Maduro’s opposition leaders have struggled to gain the upper hand for years. Henrique Capriles, the former presidential candidate that lost to Maduro in the 2013 elections, has been a notable critic of Maduro’s government. Leading protests at the time of the 2013 elections, he has accused Maduro of maintaining power through fraudulent elections. However, his strategy has attempted to bring the opposition away from street protests to focus on making change through institutions and negotiations. His work has been successful on some fronts – in 2021, he negotiated with Maduro’s government to include two representatives from the opposition parties on the new National Electoral Council. 

Another significant figure in the opposition movement has been Leopoldo López. López’s strategy for opposition centers around making change through protests and mobilization. His activity as an opposition activist dates back to 2002, when he was labeled as a “coup leader” for his participation in the 2002 protests against Chávez. López was also one of the leaders of the 2014 student protests, looking for increased security, the release of political prisoners, and changes to economic policy. A member of the Voluntad Popular party, López also used social media to mobilize the #lasalida movement.

However, the opposing strategies of these two leaders has led to divisions in the opposition movement. The lack of consensus on whether to use protests or negotiations to make change has made it difficult to coordinate efforts to elect opposition candidates or influence Maduro’s policies. Divisions have also been fostered by the debate over whether to participate in a flawed democracy or to abstain from the democratic processes in protest.
After Maduro’s second term election as president in 2019, a new life of opposition appeared with Juan Guaidó coming to the forefront of the opposition. In 2018, the assembly ruled the presidential elections unconstitutional, as most opposition leaders were barred from participating, the date of the election was moved, and there were no observers. Thus, the assembly interpreted the election as falling under a constitutional void, in which case the president of the assembly becomes the interim president until new elections are arranged. As the President  of the National Assembly, Guaidó declared himself to be the country’s acting president. Juan Guaidó has been recognised as the interim president by nearly 60 countries, with which Maduro has broken off diplomatic relations. While Guaidó once united the opposition, his support has splintered because of the broader debates over strategies of opposition and the struggle of mobilizing in the pandemic. The splintering among Maduro’s opposition has prevented effective action from being taken against him.