• Erdoğan and al-Sharaa align to stabilize Syria, easing refugee pressure on Türkiye and legitimizing Damascus’ transitional authority.
• Erdoğan’s request to assimilate Kurdish autonomy in Northeastern Syria into the new Republic of Syria puts al-Sharaa’s unity and integration effort at stake
• Al-Sharaa cooperates with Erdoğan to revive Syria’s economy and maintain military presence while navigating regional and domestic instability.

Why are Erdoğan and Ahmed al-Sharaa in camaraderie?

Answer: The need to alleviate migratory pressure drives Erdoğan to strengthen relations with al-Sharaa after the end of the Ba’ath regime. 

On February 2025, Ahmed al-Sharaa, formerly known as Abu Mohammed al-Jawlani, dedicated his first visit abroad as the new head of the interim government of Syria to reaffirm relations with Ankara. Both countries shared their interest in promoting Türkiye’s involvement in building a new Syria, including coordinating military operations and sharing insights on the configuration of the new republic. 

Media outlets immediately attributed President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to be the big winner of al-Assad’s sudden outage in December 2024. Türkiye’s stake in Syria is not new, the country has been on the ground since 2016, when under Operation Euphrates Shield it occupied Northern parts of the country. Ankara is also the main supporter of the Syrian National Army (SNA), a key armed group during the last decisive offensive.

But Erdoğan’s interests in Syria are beyond military. Türkiye has been the largest refugee hosting country in the world since 2014, with 3.5 million Syrians within its borders, which is more than the whole EU combined. This pressure has saturated the Turkish electorate. For example, in the presidential election results in 2023, when Erdoğan achieved a third term by a close margin, the leader of the main opposition party, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, improved his results with a slogan that read “suriyeliler gi-de-cek!”, meaning: Syrians will leave! 

Erdoğan understands that relying on the €9-billion-migration deal signed in 2016 with the EU is not a sustainable solution anymore. While 48% of Turkish people preferred the deportation of Syrians in 2017, this number has increased to 88% in 2022.  To find a solution to the migratory challenge, Ankara even pursued a dialogue with al-Assad on a long-term alternative for the refugees, despite the decision causing unrest across pro-Turkish factions in Syria such as the SNA.

In less than two months after the fall of Bashar al-Assad, 235,000 Syrians migrated back, bringing hope to Turkish policymakers. However, political uncertainty, a soaring inflation, and lack of public services quickly de-accelerated the voluntary and safe return of refugees. Erdoğan hence wields a strategic interest in supporting the peacebuilding effort in Syria, one that connects him with the interim government led by al-Sharaa.

What does Erdoğan want?

Answer: Erdoğan seeks to achieve a decisive victory over Kurdish revolutionary forces and expand Ankara’s influence via military presence and economic growth

The asymmetrical relationship between both leaders means that Erdoğan will seek more than just peace in Syria. One of his top priorities is to weaken the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK) after almost 50 years of war with never-ending sporadic clashes. For example, 5 people were killed and 22 were wounded in Ankara back in October 2024 during a coordinated attack by two Kurdish revolutionaries. In retaliation, Ankara launched airstrikes against their positions in Syria and Iraq.

Erdoğan has demanded al-Sharaa to suppress the Autonomous Administration of Northeastern Syria (AANES) and the Kurdish militias in the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), especially the People’s Defense Units (YPG). After more than a decade of war, the SDF and the AANES currently possess a de facto control of almost one-half of Syria. Meanwhile, Ankara has repeatedly accused the SDF of supporting the PKK, which is designated as a “terrorist” organisation internationally.

The PKK and its network operating across the Middle East challenges Erdoğan’s geopolitical agenda. In 2024, a quadrilateral MoU between Türkiye, Qatar, the UAE and Iraq was signed to build the “Iraq Development Road”. The project aims to create a trade route that connects the Red Sea to Europe via Iraq and Türkiye with Ankara being the leading promoter. However, Kurdish militias such as the PKK or the YPG threatened its construction around the Syrian-Iraqi border.

To protect the project, Erdoğan recently pledged a 40-kms security corridor across the border in Iraq and is using Turkish military bases in the Iraqi territories of Duhok and Erbil, in the Syrian-Turkish-Iraqi border, to launch operations against the PKK. In addition, Ankara has agreed with al-Sharaa to establish new military bases that would strengthen his position against the PKK and YPG.

But Erdoğan’s political agenda is not only limited to the Middle East. On December 22nd, 2024, a potential maritime agreement to share an Exclusive Economic Zone with Syria was announced. In the draft proposal, it also included the recognition of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) following Erdogan’s ambitious political and economic agenda in the Mediterranean sea, where his military presence underscores infrastructure projects and exploitation of mineral resources, a strategy first implemented in Libya. 

This agenda is driven by Türkiye’s fuel and money needs. Syria enjoys untapped fossil fuel resources within its borders, while most of its energy infrastructure has been dramatically devastated by more than a decade of civil wars. It’s estimated that Syria may hold up to 28.5 trillion cubic meters of gas, enough to be the third largest global exporter after Iran. In contrast, Türkiye is still heavily dependent on oil and gas imports to sustain its own demand. 

To exploit these resources, the interim energy minister of Syria has already asked Ankara to be a key investor and trade-partner. Moreover, building infrastructure is a profitable business, and the logistical and industrial network to be built would enable cross-border trade between the two countries, an economic relationship that could have generated 6 billion dollars in the last 13 years if the civil war did not occur. 

What does Ahmed al-Sharaa want?

Answer: Al-Sharaa aims to unify Syria under inclusive Islamism and revive the economy, while navigating ethnic tensions and foreign pressures.

Traditionally, a fundamental requirement for a functional state is for the government to wield the “monopoly of violence”. Syria exhibits a rich mosaic of ethnicities and religions. The longevity of the Syrian civil war and the grassroot nature of political movements allowed for the emergence of multiple militias and shifting alliances for over a decade. In an exclusive CNN interview before the fall of Damascus, al-Sharaa’s discourse affirmed religious-inclusive and moderated Islamism. 

The first pledge of the transitional government has been to reunite the country as a single entity and build strong institutions with Islam at the core. During a National Dialogue conference, the interim president delivered a statement rejecting discrimination against other ethnic groups and religions in the new Republic of Syria. However, his political and military career spearheading radical Islamism in Syria as the leader of the HTS and the al-Nusra Front, militias related to al-Qaeda, undermines his credibility as a reconciliatory figure in Syria. 

The uncertainty has been instrumentalised by Israel’s PM Netanyahu, who prophesied an imminent oppression of Druze communities in the South to justify the expansion of Israeli-occupied Syrian to Quneitra, Daraa and Suwayda. Amid the increasing pressure from Israel, al-Sharaa struck a deal with Druze representatives in Suwayda to integrate local communities into government security forces. However, a couple of weeks later a clash between local bedouin tribes and the Druze challenged peace in Southern Syria. 

The interim government rapidly deployed forces in Suwayda to control the situation after dozens were killed between both groups. However, the scale of the conflict quickly accelerated when Sheikh al-Hijri, one Druze spiritual leader, called for violent resistance against government forces and the creation of a Druze-led military council. The death toll increased up to around 500-1,000 casualties. 

In support, Israel launched strikes against the Ministry of Defense in Damascus aiming to dissuade al-Sharaa from preserving military presence next to its border. Tel Aviv’s geopolitical interests clash with Erdoğan’s agenda in the Middle East and al-Sharaa’s push for reuniting Syria. A fragmented Syria poses no challenge to Israel’s expansion beyond the already-occupied Golan Heights up to the Kurdish-administred territories via the so-called David’s corridor. 

Meanwhile in Western Syria, more than 1,000 people died in March during clashes against pro-Assad loyalists in Latakia after pro-government forces murdered civilians from the Alawite minority as part of revenge killings. Similarly, ISIS has intensified attacks against the military and the Christian minority. Inter-ethnic or religious violence directly harms al-Sharaa’s ability to integrate Syria and the necessary stability to attract investments, lift sanctions, allow international aid in and ultimately revive the exhausted economy.

But the biggest challenge towards integration remains between the Kurds and al-Sharaa. The Kurds control almost 50% of Syria’s territorial mass, most of the country’s fossil resources, and retain a consolidated military capacity. The US, the main supporter of the Kurds in Syria, pressured the SDF to secure a ceasefire, an agreement to which they had to accept after Washington’s u-turn with Ukraine.

Trump’s threat to leave Northeastern Syria, along with Erdoğan’s military push across the region against PKK’s bases, noticeably weakened the SDF’s bargaining power. Pressures culminated in an agreement reached to merge their territories into the new republic with the SDF being integrated under Damascus’ military command. But the heightened sectarian violence across the country is delaying any process of integration.

These events has led to two outcomes. On the one hand, around 400 representatives from various ethnic minorities have met in the Kurdish-controlled city of Hassakeh. The conference included leaders from Alawite, Christian, Kurds and Druse groups opposed to the government and called for a decentralized ruling of Syria. On The other hand, Turkish and Syrian defense ministers have signed a MoU to strengthen al-Sharaa’s military capacity.

More dependency in Turkey presents a dilemma. Erdoğan’s terms for the Kurds are unacceptable for them. Even under a weakened bargaining power, a military response by Damascus or Ankara could collapse the fragile consensus. A military clash could also cause the re-emergence of Daesh in Syria as prisons with hundreds of former ISIS soldiers are currently controlled by SDF forces. Therefore, it is critical for al-Sharaa to balance Türkiye ‘s support with the requests of other political forces and minorities in the country.

What is Erdoğan doing?

Answer: Erdoğan combines military action and diplomacy to weaken the PKK during Syria’s transition and reunification effort. 

While Ankara is the big winner of Al-Assad’s fall, Tehran’s regional influence weakens after the fall of the Ba’ath regime. The disruption of the Shia corridor that connected the so-called “Axis of Resistance” further weakened Iran’s position in the Middle East. Beyond Syria, Israel’s successful Operation Northern Arrows, which targeted Hezbollah’s leadership and infrastructure, and the direct clash with Iran during June 2025, has debilitated Tehran further. 

While Israel’s occupation of Southern Syria challenges al-Sharaa’s control and reconciliation with Druze communities, Iran’s fatigue helps him face al-Assad’s previous allies still present in the country. For example, Hezbollah forces stationed in Al-Qasr, Lebanon, shelled the villages of Zeita and Al-Masriya. Quickly, Beirut and Damascus signed an agreement in Saudi Arabia to reaffirm their shared border and enhance security coordination, aiming to curb Hezbollah’s smuggling operations in Syria.

Parallelly to Iran’s fall in Syria and Lebanon, Erdoğan has been strengthening its economic ties with Kurdish communities not affiliated with the PKK, especially with the Iraqi Kurdish Regional Government led by Barzani, leader of the conservative Kurdish Democratic Party. The idea behind this move is not only to isolate the PKK and its network, but also to equally push for his political and economic agenda. 

The historical territory that the Kurds in the Middle East claim lies over petroleum resources. Most of the gas and oil resources in Syria are under the soil controlled by the AANES. In Iraq, oil trade drove economic growth in the region until crude flows to Türkiye were halted in 2023 after the International Chamber of Commerce ruled Ankara to pay Baghdad $1.5 billion in damages for unauthorised exports with the Kurdish Regional Government between 2014 and 2018. 

On January 2025, Barzani and Erdoğan met in Ankara to coordinate against “all forms of terrorism” in the new Syria, which refers to revolutionary YPG militia presence in Northeastern Syria. In addition, Erdoğan pledged to resume oil trade and promote economic cooperation through the Development Road plan. Through this agreement Erdoğan pushes Syrian Kurds one step further from Iraq while receiving the fuel to drive the Turkish economy.

Meanwhile in Türkiye, the leader of the PKK, Abdullah Öcalan, initiated a new peace process at the age of 75 and after more than 25 years in prison by request of the leader of the Turkish far right party MHP. A few weeks later, Öcalan made a startling announcement from prison asking for a ceasefire and to disarm and dissolve the PKK, sending shockwaves across the Kurdish revolutionary movement in countries where its militias operate, including Türkiye, Syria, Iraq and Iran. 

After several years of inflation and economic stress, Ankara is not in the financial position to rebuild Syria alone. However, Erdoğan can help accelerate the recognition of the government. The Gulf countries are fundamental to this end as they have the financial resources to promote stability and growth in the country. For example, Riyadh announced in July 2025 a $6.4b-investment in infrastructure after a Saudi-Syrian forum. 

Erdoğan has also been a central player along with Saudi Arabia in convincing president Trump to lift sanctions on Syria, an action also followed by the EU, who in addition pledged €2.5b euros to aid the country’s transition process and humanitarian challenge across not only Syria but also countries hosting displaced in Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq and Türkiye.

Who is winning and what about you?

Answer: Power asymmetries between al-Sharaa and Erdoğan’s camaraderie creates obstacles to attain peace and prosperity during the peacebuilding effort.

Erdoğan and al-Sharaa have a symbiotic relationship built on a common goal: rebuilding a stable and prosperous Syria. But Ankara’s vision includes achieving a decisive victory over the YPG or PYD, even at the expense of overrunning Damascus’ sovereignty on domestic affairs. For example, the Turkish Foreign Minister threatened to take action if Kurdish revolutionary groups were not assimilated in a new Syria. 

Damascus’ growing dependency on Türkiye precludes al-Sharaa from pushing Ankara to retreat from the Turkish-occupied territories. Without Afrin and the Turkish-occupied M4 motorway strip, al-Sharaa’s pledge to unify Syria is improbable. Hence Damascus is already engaging with other major powers that could dilute Ankara’s presence, including China, the European Union, or even Russia.  

Two key questions will determine the success of their symbiotic relationship. On the one hand, al-Sharaa’s ability to appeal to Kurdish communities within the Rojava territory, who mistrust Ankara’s peace initiative with Öcalan. This is particularly central to succeed in the implementation of the SDF agreement, whose details remain secretive. If Ankara forces its agenda over Damascus, former militants of the YPG could turn to guerrilla fighting for survival.

On the other hand, Türkiye needs to control the SNA to prevent revenge killings or ethnic violence against the Kurds in contested and contentious enclaves, including Deir-Ezzor or Kobani and Manbij. These cities have already experienced fragile peace during the retreat of Assadist forces: the SDF retreated by request of the SNA and Ankara. Ultimately, both militias will have to coexist under a single army if the SDF agreement is implemented. 

The most realistic scenario seems to be one in which the Kurds do retain regional autonomy in some aspects of their internal political affairs without necessarily reaching the degree of the Iraqi Kurdistan. But the question remains as to whether the new government led by al-Sharaa is capable of reaching the balance between Türkiye’s geopolitical agenda and the promotion of socio-political cohesion with Kurdish communities from Northeastern Syria. A future, only possible if other destabilising factors such as Israel, ISIS or Iran’s proxies in the region allows it.