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• Burmese Commander-in-Chief Hlaing faces increasing challenges as coordinated rebel offensives intensify, leading to significant territorial losses.
• Despite Chinese and Russian support, Hlaing’s power continues to decrease amid strengthened rebel offensives, internal dissent, and international sanctions.
• To secure his rule, Hlaing is pushing for elections, enforcing military conscription, and relying on alternative power bases.

Why is Min Aung Hlaing’s heat level COLD?

Answer: Hlaing is COLD as losses in control of territory continue despite Chinese and Russian backing of the junta.

In February 2021, Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing led a coup d’état in Myanmar, declaring himself Prime Minister and replacing Aung San Suu Kyi, ending 11 years of civilian rule. Hlaing’s takeover triggered mass protests across the country, which were met with intense military crackdowns. As resistance grew, long-standing ethnic insurgencies escalated into a full-scale civil war. 

For two years after the coup, the junta managed to push back insurgent advances, keeping rebel groups fragmented and on the defensive. However, since October 2023, Hlaing’s grip on power has been increasingly challenged by coordinated rebel offensives. Operation 1027 launched by the Three Brotherhood Alliance was the turning point. The alliance, consisting of the Arakan Army, Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), launched a joint attack that inflicted the junta’s first major territorial losses, in northern Myanmar. This marked a shift from scattered rebel insurgencies to a more unified resistance. 

Subsequent coordinated offensives, including Operation 1107 and Operation 1111, further expanded the offensive to the East of the country. By January 2025, the Tatmadaw controlled less than 50% of the country as continuous, coordinated rebel offensives steadily eroded its hold. The growing unity among ethnic rebel factions has been the key driver of the junta’s territorial losses, significantly weakening Hlaing’s control over Myanmar.

Despite these heavy losses, Hlaing remains in power sustained by China and Russia, keeping him cold rather than freezing. Beijing has been the Tatmadaw’s main ally since the coup in 2021, supplying weapons, economic aid, information technology and providing diplomatic backing. This support is not ideological, but strategic. With the 2000-kilometer shared border, China prioritizes stability to protect its economic interests, particularly its investments in Myanmar through the Belt and Road Initiative, and to manage security risks in the border area. Even as the junta suffers battlefield setbacks, China views it as the most viable actor for maintaining centralised control in Myanmar. 

Russia has also retained strong ties with Hlaing since the coup, supplying arms, fighter jets, and military aid, as well as cooperating on building a nuclear power plant in Myanmar. 

However, as rebel offensives escalate, Hlaing has become increasingly dependent on his allies.  His failure to retake MNDAA-held territory for over a year exposed this weakness. Only after Beijing intervened in January 2025, forcing a ceasefire and cutting MNDAA’s supply lines, did the junta reclaim lost ground. This underscores that with domestic military strength eroding, his allies have shifted from supporters to the guarantors of his survival.

What is changing Min Aung Hlaing’s heat level?

Answer: Escalating rebel pressures, sanctions, and territorial losses are forcing Hlaing to secure foreign support and reinforce junta control.

The territory lost by the junta, mainly through Operation 1027, was geographically strategic for Hlaing, as it secured economic stability and political leverage through trade with China. The major territorial losses have mostly occurred over large parts of Northern Myanmar, bordering China, an area containing key trade stations that facilitated the flow of goods, revenues, and investments essential to the junta’s financial stability. 

The rebels seized control of four of the five formal trade stations along the border, which, between the coup and June 2024, accounted for 97% of Myanmar’s cross-border trade with China. With these critical trade points now under rebel control, the junta’s ability to regulate trade and maintain its economic position has been severely weakened.

International sanctions from the EU, UK, US, and Canada have further tightened pressure on Hlaing, by restricting military funding and foreign investments. These measures have disrupted arms procurements and economic stability, increasing the Tatmadaw’s dependence on China and Russia, while simultaneously fueling internal dissatisfaction.Hlaing is also encountering diminishing support within the Tatmadaw as a result of major territorial losses that have shattered confidence in his leadership, eroding trust in his command.

Hlaing’s arbitrary dismissals and promotions have disrupted the Tatmadaw’s chain of command, sidelining experienced officers in favor of loyalists, fueling divisions and weakening morale. The Tatmadaw’s ideological foundation is crumbling. Once seen as the guardian of state, race, and Buddhism, the brutality of the military has disillusioned soldiers, leading to rising defections.

What is driving Min Aung Hlaing?

Answer: Min Aung Hlaing is driven by his need to secure political survival amid growing threats to his authority.

Hlaing is focused on securing his political survival as increased rebel insurgencies and major territorial losses threaten his grip on power. To maintain control across Myanmar, Hlaing is pushing for elections to legitimise his rule, seeking political support beyond the Tatmadaw, and enforcing conscription to sustain his armed forces.

After seizing power in 2021, the junta has repeatedly extended the state of emergency, allowing the military to assume all government functions and granting Hlaing legislative, judicial, and executive power. Yet, with its seventh extension as of February 2025, his grip on power remains fragile.

Despite this, Hlaing remains persistent in holding elections to ensure his role as Prime Minister of Myanmar. By organising elections whilst extending military rule, he aims to consolidate power under the facade of democracy. His goal is to maintain control until the conditions are favorable for highly managed elections which Hlaing has announced will take place by the start of 2026. 

The elections will also serve as a tool to legitimise Hlaing’s position domestically and internationally, potentially easing international financial sanctions and arms embargoes whilst mitigating diplomatic isolation. A formal election will further enforce the Tatmadaws dominance in Myanmar, allowing Hlaing to potentially tighten his grip on power and project an image of a stable political transformation.

As Hlaing loses control of the Tatmadaw, he is seeking support outside the military, as a strategic tool for survival. He is turning to the  Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), the junta’s civilian political arm, originally created as a tool to give the illusion of multi-party governance whilst ensuring military control over the country’s political system. Now, as Hlaing’s grip on the military is weakening, he has placed trusted military figures like Myo Zaw Thein and Aung Soe, retired high-ranking Tatmadaw officers, into key USDP positions to ensure the party remains firmly aligned with his agenda. 

By embedding loyalists from the military into the USDP, Hlaing is transforming it into a parallel power base, through which he can sustain power despite the diminishing military support. The USDP will offer a more stable political structure that could help Hlaing legitimise his leadership while broadening his national influence. With control over the USDP, Hlaing can secure backing from political elites, and thereby shape electoral outcomes in his favour.

Additionally, in February of 2024, Hlaing announced a conscription law stating all men aged 18 to 35, and all women aged 18 to 27 must serve a minimum of two years in the military. This has since led to the drafting of over 60000 men and women. The law signals Hlaing’s desperation to maintain control amid growing resistance, as the prime minister seeks to compensate for battlefield losses. 

What does this mean for you?

Answer: Myanmar’s future remains uncertain, with risks for escalated resistance and potential power vacuums threatening to worsen the ongoing humanitarian crisis.

Following the coup in February of 2021, Myanmar has faced a severe humanitarian crisis with over 3.3 million people displaced and approximately 28000 political prisoners detained, both internally and internationally. The situation is unlikely to improve in the foreseeable future for two main reasons.

Firstly, the planned elections in 2026 will likely exacerbate violence rather than resolve the conflict. Hlaing seeks to use these elections to legitimize his rule under the guise of democracy while ensuring continued military control. The opposing, ethnic rebel groups view the elections as a farce and an attempt to solidify military dominance. This will fuel further resistance and could provoke intensified violence as various factions contest legitimacy of the process, deepening the entrenched conflict.

Secondly, even if the junta’s leadership crumbles, the likelihood for an exacerbated civil war remains high. Myanmar’s approximately 170 active armed rebel groups, though united in their opposition to the Tatmadaw, have conflicting goals and engage in inter-group violence. Should the junta lose control, these factions are unlikely to reach consensus on governance, creating a power vacuum that could prolong the conflict.