• Sultani Makenga’s M23 movement seeks political recognition and territorial control, utilising state weakness and Tutsi marginalization.
• President Tshisekedi aims to restore state authority and delegitimize M23 through military action and hardline diplomacy.
• Despite a fragile ceasefire, the conflict remains unresolved, with ongoing violence, humanitarian risks, and stalled negotiations.

Why is Sultani Makenga Hostile towards Félix Tshisekedi?

Answer: Sultani Makenga’s hostility toward Tshisekedi stems from past failed peace deals, Tutsi marginalization, and M23’s fight for political recognition and control of mineral-rich areas.

The ongoing conflict between President Félix Tshisekedi’s government and the March 23 Movement (M23), led by Sultani Makenga, epitomizes the persistent struggle for power, legitimacy, and security in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). This hostility is deeply rooted in unresolved political, ethnic, and economic grievances, notably the failure to implement numerous past peace agreements including the March 23, 2009 accord and subsequent agreements like the 2013 Nairobi Declaration, due to their flawed enforcement, exclusionary nature, and neglect of root causes like land disputes and Tutsi marginalisation.

M23 was originally formed in 2012 primarily by Congolese Tutsi defectors from the Congolese army (FARDC). The group emerged accusing the government of reneging on the 2009 peace deal (Amani Leo Agreement) that was designed to reintegrate former rebels from the National Congress for the Defence of the People (CNDP), a previous Tutsi-led group, into the national army. Although militarily defeated in 2013, the group re-emerged in late 2021, citing Kinshasa’s failure to honor the 2013 Nairobi Declaration and its ongoing neglect of Tutsi security. 

The situation escalated sharply on January 27 2025, with M23 launching offensives that seized strategic towns and resource-rich areas in North Kivu province, including the mining zones of Walikale, which are notably rich in cassiterite (tin ore), coltan, and gold. The collapse of Angolan-led peace talks between President Félix Tshisekedi’s government and M23 on March 18 2025, triggered by Kinshasa’s insistence on total rebel disarmament and M23’s demands for political recognition and amnesty, marked a critical impasse.

In April 2025, a U.S.-brokered ceasefire agreement in Doha established the first mutually recognized truce since the escalation in 2025. Both parties committed to drafting a peace deal by May 2. However, the humanitarian crisis remains acute, with over 7 million displaced and basic services collapsing. This situation persists even as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) begins withdrawing its military peacekeeping forces from the region, a process reported to have started in April 2025.

What does Sultani Makenga want?

Answer: Sultani Makenga aims to legitimise M23 by seeking political recognition, territorial control, and protection for Tutsis in eastern DRC amid regional power struggles and failed peace efforts.

Sultani Makenga, as the leader of M23, seeks to secure political and territorial autonomy for the Tutsi community in eastern DRC, positioning M23 as a legitimate political and military actor. His objectives are shaped by a complex interplay of ethnic identity, historical grievances, and regional geopolitics.

The fragile security environment, marked by weak governance, endemic corruption, and fierce competition over mineral resources, directly enables armed groups like M23 to present themselves as alternatives to the state. Functioning as the armed wing of the Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC), M23 actively implements state-like governance structures and prioritises control over strategic, mineral-rich regions. This not only finances its operations but also positions the group as a key player in global supply chains for critical minerals, further solidifying its influence and deepening interference in the local economy and governance.

Rwanda’s alleged support for M23 remains a decisive factor, with the group serving as a proxy for Kigali’s interests in countering hostile militias and securing access to DRC’s mineral wealth. In turn, Makenga views the Kinshasa government as unreliable, given its repeated failures to honor agreements with rebel factions in the past. 

The conflict advances Makenga’s goals both militarily and politically. M23’s control of mineral-rich territories like North Kivu provides critical funding through illicit trade, while sustained unrest forces Kinshasa and international actors to acknowledge M23’s relevance in peace talks. Makenga’s strategy is shaped by multiple actors, with Rwanda reportedly providing military and logistical aid, exerting the greatest influence. Regional bodies like the East African Community (EAC) and African Union (AU) have called for dialogue but lack enforcement mechanisms. International actors, including the UN and Western governments, have issued condemnations and sanctions, but these actions have so far failed to meaningfully deter rebel advances.

What does Félix Tshisekedi want?

Answer: President Félix Tshisekedi’s core objective is to restore state authority and stability in eastern DRC by neutralizing the M23, reasserting control, and bolstering his legitimacy largely by insisting on rebel disarmament.

President Félix Tshisekedi’s primary objective is to restore state authority and stabilise the mineral-rich east of the DRC by neutralizing M23, reasserting government control, and reinforcing his own political legitimacy. He frames Rwanda’s alleged support for M23 as an existential threat to Congolese sovereignty, using this narrative to mobilize national support and justify military operations.

Tshisekedi’s approach is constrained by deep-rooted governance challenges: weak institutions, pervasive corruption, and limited state presence in conflict zones. The protracted instability has eroded public trust, increasing pressure on Tshisekedi to demonstrate effective leadership. By insisting on M23’s disarmament as a precondition for negotiations, he seeks to delegitimize the group and avoid granting it political recognition—a stance that has repeatedly stalled peace efforts.

This hardline approach also serves domestic political purposes: it counters criticism, consolidates Tshisekedi’s authority, and projects strength amid public frustration. However, it has generated tensions with international actors advocating for diplomacy. 

As of June 13th 2025, a tenuous peace persists, but the ceasefire between Kinshasa and M23 remains highly fragile and frequently violated, even as the US intensifies its push for a broader peace deal between Rwanda and the DRC by June or July. Qatar continues to facilitate parallel peace negotiations, specifically between the Congolese government and M23; delegations were recently recalled to Doha for further discussions. Despite a truce declared in April, M23 continues to control significant territories in North Kivu, whose capital is Goma and borders Rwanda and Uganda, and South Kivu, with its capital Bukavu and bordering Rwanda, Burundi, and Tanzania. Recent reports have highlighted severe human rights violations by M23, such as the execution of civilians, which have intensified scrutiny of the ceasefire’s effectiveness.

What is Félix Tshisekedi doing?

Answer: Félix Tshisekedi aims to restore control in eastern DRC by defeating M23, denying its legitimacy, and framing Rwanda’s backing as a threat to national sovereignty.

President Tshisekedi has adopted a multi-pronged strategy in response to the M23 crisis. Initially, he agreed to direct peace talks with M23, scheduled for April 9, 2025, in Doha, Qatar. Although these talks were postponed due to organisational issues, this shift toward negotiation, after years of rejecting direct engagement reflects mounting military pressures and diminishing regional support.

Tshisekedi has also engaged in regional diplomacy, participating in mediation efforts led by Angola and the African Union. These initiatives recognize the systemic need for regional collaboration to address the conflict’s cross-border dimensions and to build broader support for peace. 

Notably, Tshisekedi has intensified efforts to restructure the FARDC, aiming to address long standing issues such as corruption, poor coordination, and low morale. These reforms are seen as essential for restoring state authority and deterring future insurgencies. International partners, including the United States and the European Union, have pledged technical and financial support to these initiatives. 

At the same time, Uganda maintains a complex partnership with the DRC government, conducting joint operations against Islamist insurgents such as the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). However, Uganda also pursues its own strategic and economic interests, including influence over Congolese resources and regional competition with Rwanda. This dual role, marked by a direct military presence such as the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF) taking control of Kasenyi and Tchomia in June 2025, and alleged links to groups like M23, adds complexity to peace efforts by increasing the number of armed actors and intensifying regional rivalries.

Who is winning and what about you?

Answer: The conflict in eastern DRC remains unresolved, with M23 gaining ground and tightening control despite FARDC counterattacks.

The conflict in eastern DRC remains unresolved and highly fluid. The M23-led Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC) continues to control key urban centers such as Goma in North Kivu province and Bukavu in South Kivu province, along with strategic mineral-rich areas like Walikale in North Kivu province.  

In March 2025, FARDC, supported by allied militias, launched a counter-offensive to halt M23’s westward advance toward Kisangani. This operation temporarily stalled the rebels’ progress, particularly after the recapture of strategic locations like Kibati around March 13 and defensive efforts near Walikale. However, these gains were short-lived; M23 forces swiftly regrouped and while pro Congolese government forces retook control of the Walikale district capital in early April, M23 resumed their broader offensive. This marked their deepest incursion westward, bringing them within 400 kilometers of Kisangani. Despite regional support, the FARDC continues to grapple with structural issues such as poor coordination and entrenched corruption, and low morale, which have severely limited its capacity to reclaim territory or decisively defeat the rebels.

A sustainable resolution to the conflict requires FARDC reform and anti-corruption efforts, a verifiable ceasefire from M23, and an end to Rwanda’s alleged support for armed groups. In the short to mid term, international pressure, credible monitoring, and gradual demilitarisation of M23-held areas will be key to stabilising eastern DRC and enabling inclusive political dialogue.

Looking ahead, the future of eastern DRC remains uncertain as Qatari-initiated peace talks stall and trust erodes between parties. The recent, unauthorised trip of a former Congolese president to M23-held areas has further complicated negotiations, signaling deep fractures within the Congolese political elite and raising concerns about parallel power plays.

To tighten control over Goma, M23 arrested suspected pro-government, civil servants and community leaders in Goma, while forcibly repatriating thousands of Congolese civilians to Rwanda between May 10 to 13 2025 which were seen as tactics aimed at eliminating opposition and tightening the group’s political and territorial control. 

These actions have escalated fears of widespread repression, including arbitrary detention, forced displacement, and reprisal killings. With M23 tightening its hold, civilians face mounting protection risks, and the potential for a humanitarian disaster looms if the international community fails to respond decisively.