• Pashinyan is diversifying Armenia’s foreign relations, but structural dependence on Russia constrains how far that diversification can go. 
• Pashinyan’s Real Armenia doctrine grounds his foreign policy reorientation in a broader vision of Armenian statehood built on sovereignty and security. 
• Western partnerships provide alternatives to Moscow, but domestic and structural constraints limit how quickly Pashinyan can pivot toward them.

Why is Pashinyan MILD?

Answer: Nikol Pashinyan is MILD because his strategy broadens diplomatic options without ending Russian dependence.

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan is pursuing a policy of diversification to reduce decades-long dependence on Russia without completely rupturing ties. The strategy’s primary objective is not simply to align Armenia with the West, but to avoid replacing one external dependency with another. This shift stems from a perceived Russian failure in its role as Armenia’s security guarantor in the 2020 and 2023 Nagorno-Karabakh conflicts. Pashinyan’s foreign policy is directly linked to his ideological doctrine, Real Armenia. He argues that Armenia must abandon the concept of Greater Armenia and instead redefine its identity around internationally recognised borders and state capacity.

Pashinyan has targeted several pillars of Russian security leverage. He has distanced Armenia from the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), freezing its participation in 2024, signalling de facto disengagement from Russian-led security structures. Additionally, arms imports from Russia fell below 10% of Armenia’s total defence procurement in 2024, compared to 94% from 2011-2020, with France and India emerging as suppliers. Pashinyan has also deepened ties with the United States (US) through the Charter on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and the European Union (EU) with the Partnership Agenda. Whilst these measures reduce Russian influence, they do not by themselves replace it.

Yet, the diversification strategy remains only partially successful. Membership in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) offers regulatory easing and market access for Armenian goods, but also reinforces dependence and limits alternative trade integration. Armenia is also heavily reliant on Russia for energy, with 87% of all natural gas imports and 100% of nuclear fuel coming from Russia in 2023. Whilst Pashinyan has added Western partners in the security and diplomatic spheres, Armenia remains fundamentally economically dependent on Russia, limiting the scope for a rapid strategic realignment.

What is changing Pashinyan’s heat level?

Answer: Declining trust in Russia and support for Western relations, yet domestic and structural constraints limit how far and quickly Pashinyan can diversify.

Russia’s diminished credibility does not remove its ability to shape Pashinyan’s policy space, as Moscow still holds structural leverage through business interests tied to critical infrastructure. Russian-Armenian billionaire Samvel Karapetyan illustrates this dynamic through his control over the Electricity Networks of Armenia (ENA), the state’s main energy distributor. Russian-linked economic actors retain influence over critical infrastructure, making de-linking not only a costly foreign policy choice but a domestic one as well. 

Another major actor is the Armenian Apostolic Church (AAC), which rejects the ideological foundations of Pashinyan’s Real Armenia. Positioning itself as the institutional custodian of traditional Armenian national and religious identity, the AAC is often at odds with Pashinyan’s vision of a state defined by internationally recognised borders. This opposition increases the political costs of normalisation with Azerbaijan and Turkey, as it frames compromise as a betrayal of Armenian identity rather than a necessary step towards strengthening Armenian sovereignty.

Public opinion is a key reason the diversification strategy remains politically viable, giving him a domestic mandate to pursue alternative partnerships without an immediate electoral penalty for “abandoning Russia”. The IRI’s May 2026 report found that 61% of respondents think Armenia is heading in the right direction, and 57% of respondents favoured a hedging foreign policy strategy, including 36% who supported a “Pro-Western orientation while maintaining relations with Russia”. These findings suggest that Pashinyan’s hedging enjoys majority public support, although its intensity varies.

However, this support is conditional. Whilst Armenians increasingly favour Western engagement, there is far less consensus on politically sensitive issues such as normalisation with Azerbaijan and the redefinition of Armenian identity. Pashinyan’s political runway is widest when expanding partnerships, but narrows when diversification requires concessions that opposition can frame as undermining Armenian identity or sovereignty. 

Furthermore, the lack of a two-thirds supermajority in the National Assembly means that Pashinyan is unable to pass the constitutional changes required to ratify a peace treaty with Azerbaijan. This effectively vetoes a key pillar of Pashinyan’s normalisation agenda, demonstrating that his strategy remains constrained by domestic realities despite his party winning 49.8% of the popular vote in the 2026 parliamentary election.

What is driving Pashinyan?

Answer: Real Armenia is built on survivable sovereignty: reducing overdependence, lowering the costs of conflict, and grounding political legitimacy in pragmatism.

Politically, Pashinyan presents himself as a leader willing to confront the consequences of Armenia’s recent defeats, in contrast to opponents whom he accuses of offering unrealistic alternatives. Rather than promising to restore historical claims, his vision centres on peaceful coexistence within Armenia’s recognised borders. He presents pragmatism, rather than nationalistic rhetoric, as the basis of his political legitimacy.

Beyond his electoral goals, Pashinyan seeks an Armenia capable of making its own sovereign choices without needing to defer to any single patron. His government has therefore pursued institutional reforms and closer partnerships with the EU and US to strengthen governance, resilience, and economic capacities, whilst maintaining working relations with Moscow. Pashinyan’s foreign policy is not simply a shift towards the West, but a part of a broader state-building project by strengthening resilient institutions, pursuing pragmatic diplomacy, and balancing external relationships rather than swapping one dependency (Russia) for another (West).

What does this mean for you?

Answer: Pashinyan’s diversification strategy tests whether Armenia can reduce its dependence on Russia without creating new vulnerabilities. 

In the short term, success would give Armenia greater strategic autonomy, diplomatic flexibility, and a widened network of economic and security partners. It marks a shift in a state historically shaped by Russian security guarantees to one seeking to determine its own strategic trajectory. 

In the long term, Pashinyan’s strategy will depend on his ability to translate his vision into lasting institutions. Should diversification become embedded within Armenia’s economy, governance, and foreign policy institutions, it would provide a durable model of sovereignty that avoids overdependence on any external power. However, if it fails, Armenia risks becoming caught between a weakened relationship with Russia and partnerships too limited to fill the gap, leaving the state exposed to the same vulnerabilities Pashinyan seeks to overcome. 

Thomas de Waal argues, drawing on the experience of Saakashvili’s Georgia, that over-personalised Western support for a reformist leader without investment in institutions can turn a short-term success story into a long-term crisis. The significance of Pashinyan’s strategy lies not in diversification itself, but in whether it produces sustained institutional reform that outlasts his leadership.