• The candidate for Polish Prime Minister Tusk’s coalition has lost the presidential race against the one from the PiS opposition, Karol Nawrocki
• Tusk and Nawrocki have opposing agendas,  most notably their country’s  national security, favouring either cooperation with the EU or the US.
• The new President now has  the power to obstruct  Tusk’s policy-making by vetoing legislations and influencing external affairs.

Why is Tusk COLD?

Answer: The loss of the presidential election to the nationalist candidate, Karol Nawrocki, poses further constraints on Tusk’s ability to pursue his agenda, especially in furthering European defence forces.

Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, after pursuing a pro-EU policy since his election in 2023, has lost the presidential election to the conservative candidate, Karol Nawrocki. On June 2, 2025, the candidate for the national conservative Law and Justice (PiS) party won the second electoral round runoff with 50.9% of the votes against Tusk’s favoured candidate, Rafal Trzaskowski. Despite this loss, reflecting lingering deep divisions in his popular support, Tusk has demonstrated his continuing support in parliament by winning a vote of confidence on June 11th. However, with 243 in favor against 210 in opposition, the vote also indicated Tusk only has a narrow majority to support his efforts.

The new Polish President has been vocal on his opposition to Tusk’s agenda which focuses on the expansion of civil rights, further European integration, and Poland’s strategic interests amid the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine. In particular, contrary to Tusk’s complete support for Ukraine, aligned with Brussels,  Nawrocki has expressed a more nuanced position, calling for denying Kyiv entry into the EU and NATO while still maintaining logistical support and military aid.

Additionally, Nawrocki’s view of the Ukrainian conflict, coupled with his opposition to further European integration, also clearly opposes Tusk’s efforts in developing a closer European integrated defence. The Prime Minister, since his election in 2023, has prioritised a cohesive European response to growing international uncertainties. Regionally, Tusk has positioned Poland at the forefront of European politics, especially in foreign and defence policy. 

Since President Trump’s election, given his administration’s depreciation of transatlantic security relations, Warsaw has been extremely active in pushing for increased European defence cooperation both within and outside of NATO. 

However, President Nawrocki has expressed his worry about Poland’s growing loss of sovereignty to Brussels, especially on strategic national interests and defence. Instead, he has expressed his favour to strengthen the bilateral relations with the US, believed to be the sole credible security provider, despite growing uncertainties among other NATO members.

Despite clashing agendas with the new president, both nationally and in foreign affairs, the Prime Minister still has political support in parliament to move forward with his policies. This leaves Tusk in a cold spot, but not freezing. Most importantly, the Prime Minister’s multi-party coalition, despite being politically diverse and fractured, still holds the majority in parliament, and the victory of the confidence vote cemented Tusk’s hold on the executive. Additionally, Tusk’s administration had already been working in cohabitation with a PiS president under the former President Andrzej Duda.

What is changing Tusk’s heat level?

Answer: The new Nawrocki presidency is set to use its powers to obstruct Tusk’s policy-making efforts both internally and externally by vetoing legislation and blocking European-oriented defence strategies.

Nawrocki and his party have expressed their willingness to pursue a more active presidency compared to the previous Duda one. Despite the fact that the Polish role of president is largely symbolic. Nonetheless, a more involved presidency has the potential to destabilise and obstruct  Tusk’s government both internally and externally. 

Internally, the president holds veto power on legislation on grounds of appropriateness and compliance with the Constitution. This can be used to impair or delay policy-making efforts by the Prime Minister. The veto on legislation over appropriateness, whose lack of subject matter make it the most flexible instrument available to the President to influence policy, can however be rejected by a ⅗ majority in parliament. However, in the current state of affairs, the lack of a strong majority in parliament, reconfirmed by the confidence vote, increases the effectiveness of the President’s vetoes, making them unavoidable. 

Additionally, as State representative in international relations and as commander-in-Chief of the Polish Armed Forces, the President holds significant leverage in Warsaw’s external affairs, central to Tusk’s efforts on security. Nawrocki will need to approve Tusk’s national security strategy and defence strategy, including contested points such as more European military integration or on further support to Ukraine.

This new, more active presidency, fully within its powers, can therefore significantly obstruct internal and external policy-making for Tusk, making governing much more difficult for the Polish PM.  This loss of leverage in policy-making would in the end further weaken Tusk’s already decreasing popular support, leading to a resurgence of the conservative opposition.

What is driving Tusk?

Answer: Tusk is driven by the need to strengthen Poland’s military alliance with the EU while maintaining strong support domestically.

Maintaining Poland’s alliance with the US after President Trump’s reelection has been a key factor for Tusk’s push towards securitisation. The aforementioned tension between Poland and Ukraine was exacerbated by President Trump’s unwillingness to continue US support, leading Warsaw to a strategic crossroads between Washington and Kyiv. While Ukraine is a natural ally for Poland due to their common strategic interests, Polish reliance on NATO for its own national security makes appeasement of the new US president a priority. 

Tusk’s raise of the defence budget to 4.7%, a significant increase from 2024 and vastly superior to any other European NATO member, aims at keeping Warsaw in line with Washington’s requirements to continue their partnership.

Although Washington’s support is critical for Warsaw’s security, the same holds true for an integrated European defence system. Without a united European front able to provide quick military responses, Polish forces would not be able to ensure the protection of national territory, despite the additional funds allocated to defence. To this extent, Tusk has been vocal about increasing European funds for military expenses through voluntary joint loans, capitalising on the national funds preallocated. These European investments would focus especially on defensive capabilities such as the “Eastern Shield”, a fortification of the Polish eastern border.

But Tusk’s prioritisation of national security also caters to maintaining his domestic popular support, particularly important after the loss of the presidential election to the PiS. To this effect, Tusk’s attention to external threats allows for a “rally around the flag” effect, boosting his popularity. 

What does this mean for you?

Answer: The return of Eurosceptic conservative politics in Poland hampers the European efforts towards collective defence amid growing insecurity and weakening transatlantic alliance. 

Under Tusk, Poland has been at the forefront of European defence talks, advocating for greater integration and preparedness to the climate of instability that the Union is facing. Warsaw seeks to respond to the growing external threats of the EU as a collective, capitalising on an economy of scale, aiming to provide security for itself and the Union at large. To do so, Warsaw has been leading the way by increasing military budgets, recruitments, and modernisation of forces.

The increasing questioning of the stability of the transatlantic alliance has further pushed Brussels towards decreasing reliance on Washington for its defence. However, despite the growing instability in Europe and in its neighborhood, many governments are still torn on their support for a united European defence. Warsaw has also been attempting to balance maintenance of its ties with Washington and push for the development of European defence capacity-building. While Tusk has so far been supportive of increasing European strategic autonomy, President Nawrocki’s favor of Washington’s current administration might undermine these policy efforts.

Despite the future of European strategic autonomy not resting in Tusk’s ability to push on with his agenda, Poland’s role as one of the top European defence spenders makes Warsaw a pivotal component for the EU’s strategic aims. A Polish disengagement with debates on strategic autonomy could push other, more skeptical Member States to revert to a now insecure transatlantic defence umbrella.