• Since Marcos Jr.’s electoral victory in the 2022 Presidential election and Xi Jing Ping’s consolidation of power within the CCP that same year, Marcos Jr. has shifted Filipino foreign policy away from China, overturning the previous administration’s cooperative approach.
• To Xi Jing Ping the South China Sea is emblematic of a historic empire he and his philosophy are trying to restore. For Marcos Jr., The South China Sea is crucial to maintaining Filipino sovereignty. Both agree, however, on the Sea’s  economic significance for the region. 
• While the region has historically been subject to fierce contention, escalations post June 2024 have served to make relations between Marcos Jr. and Xi Jing Ping harder to navigate.

Why are Xi Jinping and Marcos Jr. frenemies? 

Answer: Even though conflict has escalated between Marcos Jr. and Xi Jinping economic ties and military alliance prevents open hostilities.  

The frequency of confrontation between the Philippines and China in the South China Sea has been growing markedly since the electoral victory of Marcos Jr. “Bong Bong” in May 2022. A key flashpoint of confrontation has been the Second Thomas Shoal, where a marooned WWII ship has acted as a naval base to protect Filipino claims in the surrounding waters since 1999. Here, tensions between Marcos Jr. and Xi Jinping reach their height as both leaders claim the shoal as theirs.

In June 2024, military boats from both sides rammed into each other and the subsequent hand-to-hand combat resulted in a Philippine sailor losing a finger. This event, was the most violent confrontation between the two nations in recent history and elucidates the rising conflict in the South China Sea. Ever since, the underground shoal and its neighbouring Spaltry Islands have served as recurring areas of naval confrontation.

Anxieties over the South China Sea have been of great importance in Filipino politics. Indeed, during the May 2022 presidential elections, they became central to Marcos Jr. ‘s campaign which encapsulated an anti-Chinese rhetoric and firm stance on maritime boundaries. He dismissed opposition as puppets of Xi Jinping and his subsequent foreign policy is the implementation of a promised categorically strong stance against Chinese influence on Filipino sovereignty. 

In contrast, his predecessor Rodrigo Duterte had opted for a cooperative approach, which resulted in a period of stability (2016-2021). Duterte embraced peaceful ties with China and was met with a fewer frequency of conflict. The Philippines has effectively adopted a hedging strategy against China, as its fidelity towards the US or China shifts with each regime, it avoids binding itself to one superpower. Hence, it benefits from the development of military capabilities under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), its bilateral defense agreement with the US. Concurrently it sustains strong trade and investment from China. Each administration juggles between cooperation and confrontation to avoid direct alignment or dealignment; allowing shifts in approach between leaders. 

Additionally, Marcos Jr. relies on China for trade, with deepening economic ties further alienating the probability of conflict despite escalating confrontation. Chinese trade accounts for  13% of all exports (consisting of electronic equipment, rare earth materials and machinery) and  26% of all imports (namely electronics, nuclear machinery and oil products) in 2025. In this context, the Philippines cannot risk economic sanctions as it would jeopardize a developing economy. A 50% trade sanction would result in loss of $20 billion and 882,500 jobs and a 75% sanction could result in a loss of $30 billion and 1.3 million jobs primarily in the tech and mining industry. 

Placating the needs of China is thus crucial for Marcos Jr.’s own stability and the prosperity of the Philippines. However this is a dilemma faced by all the countries in the South China Sea, what differentiates the Philippines is a defence alliance with the US. Signed in 1951 the The Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States of America is a crucial fulcrum to even the playing field with Beijing. For the US the alliance ensures security in the pacific and acts as a barrier to China’s expansion.

As a result of these intervening factors the relationship between Marcos Jr.  and Xi Jinping is dynamic and complex. The two countries have reached an effective stalemate in the conflict. Despite China’s tactics in the South China Sea, wider diplomatic relations between the two countries remains cordial. As a result, their relationship, neither hostile or overtly friendly, is dynamic.

What does Xi Jinping want? 

Answer: Guided by Xi Jinping, China pursues a dream of national rejuvenation that requires dominance in Asia and control over the South China Sea. 

Xi Jinping’s thought on socialism with Chinese characteristics for a New Era (XJT) was ingrained in the constitution of the Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in October 2017. XJT’s goal is to manufacture one people consolidated under one party, principle and leader. Subsequently, a core belief is the reconstruction of a prehistoric China with ancient borders and spheres of influence. After Xi’s historic election to a third term in October 2022 his philosophy became the blueprint for China’s future. However, a key obstacle to an ideology that is ineffective without the perception of control is China’s inability to exercise sovereignty in the South China Sea. 

Xi asserts that this area is a part of Chinese sovereign territory on the basis of the historic 9-dash line. The demarcation covers 90% of the South China Sea and is based on a 1947 map and China’s 2000 years of historic control of these maritime routes. The South China Sea is thus a subject of immense national pride and esteem for a regime that idealises its own past. In order to fulfill his political and cultural vision for China, control of the South China Sea remains integral to China’s future. 

In addition to boosting nationalist sentiments, control over the South China Sea has serious economic implications. The region’s maritime trade routes account for 21%-36% of  global trade, with estimates placing its significance to be 3-5 trillion dollars annually. Consequently 40% of all Chinese trade and 80% of all imports pass through the sea. Xi thus has significant vested interest to control one of the most important trade routes in the world. 

In contrast, the cost of trying to control this region is a declining international image, worsened by the PCA ruling and unfavorable perception in South East Asian countries. In 2016, the UN Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled in favour of the Philippines and declared the 9 dash line as unlawful in international law. Most importantly the arbitration, despite remaining unrecognised by China, has compromised China’s legal narrative in subsequent legal and international forums. Additionally, for the Philippines it provides crucial diplomatic leverage. This ruling has increased the symbolic weight of the region for Xi and has prompted a more confrontational approach to the South China Sea, increasing reliance on facts-on-the-water tactics.

Concurrently, Xi desires a cessation of the US’s Freedom of Navigation Patrols (FNOP). These pose a direct challenge to China’s efforts to establish control through deterrence and exclusion from the South China Sea and act as a barrier to intimidation tactics. The frequency of FONOPs has increased from 5 in the period of 2015-2016 to nearly4 in 2022 alone. Xi’s goal of a subjugated and peaceful South China Sea prerequisites a diluted US presence, whose stake in the region, especially through their military alliance with the Philippines, is currently too costly to directly engage with.

What does Marcos Jr. want? 

Answer:  Asserting sovereignty in the South China Sea has crucial economic and political benefits.

Almost immediately after coming to power Marcos Jr. declared that the nation “will not lose an inch” of territory in the South China Sea in order to protect Filipino sovereignty and economic vitality within maritime boundaries. The 2013 PCA ruling solidified the unlawful conduct of China and has validated efforts to reassert Filipino control.

Nonetheless conflict has led to revenues in the South China Sea dropping by 11% from $1.45 billion to $1.27billion as Chinese patrols make economic activity in the region increasingly unsafe. With 77 Chinese vessels operating within Filipino exclusive economic zones the depletion of fishing stocks have led to a 0.02% drop GDP resulting in the loss of over 17,000 maritime jobs. In contrast to Duterte’s pivot to ameliorating relationship with China, Marcos Jr. ‘s goal is to enforce internationally recognised maritime claims and defend economic access to critical maritime zones. 

The Philippines has a 15% rate of poverty and 5.7% GDP growth, a very much lower-middle-income country, the South China Sea represents a crucial source of revenue needed to drive welfare programmes. Some of these include efforts to lower food prices and healthcare (Kadiwa. PhilHealth) while making buses free (Love bus) all of which currently lack sufficient funding.

Achieving these objectives also requires maintaining strong relations with the United States. The 1951 Mutual Defence Treaty underpins routine joint patrols in the South China Sea and reinforces control over areas administered by the Philippines. However, Marcos Jr. is tempered by a necessity to maintain a largely cordial relationship with China, its largest development lender.  Between 2000 and 2022 it contributed US$9.1 billion in state direct financing, 22% of all annual foreign investment primarily for its belt and road initiative. 

For Marcos Jr., remaining in power is a priority considering  senate losses in the 2025 midterm elections to the Duterte camp. Hence, China’s increasing aggression is crucial in fostering maritime assertiveness that aligns with prevailing public sentiment. China is increasingly unpopular with the Filipino people, a study conducted in 2025 showed them to have one of the highest negative perceptions of the Chinese rivaling that of the Taiwanese. Another poll by the OCTA research showed that 74% of Filipinos view China as the Philippines greatest threat.

Marcos Jr.’s foreign policy toolbox has revolved around capitalising on public frustration for political gain especially through social media. With the same apparatus of paid vloggers, restricted freedom of the press and disinformation networks that fueled his rise, Marcos Jr. portrays China, especially in the west South China Sea, as agitating and the Filipino response as heroic. Increasing the effectiveness of this method is the dominance of social media in Filipino daily life, with an average screen time of 4 hours a day, double that of the UK. Therefore, even in a position of power asymmetry Marcos Jr. capitalises on popular animosity towards China for popular credibility.

What is Marcos Jr. doing?

Answer: Marcos Jr.’s transparency initiative requires key alliances with regional players and a fierce lawfare approach. 

Faced with the dilemma of hard balancing and appeasement Marcos Jr. has diverged greatly from the previous administration to create his own approach to China-Philippines relations. Most strikingly, building closer ties with the US has become a core pillar of foreign policy rather than engagement with China. Marcos Jr. was the first ASEAN head of state to visit the US under the Trump administration in July of 2025. Unlike his neighbours, whose ties with China are improving, he secured guarantees of joint military exercises with the US in the South China Sea and a slight reduction in tariffs.

While the ASEAN way champions cooperation, consultation and consensus building with China, the Philippines has chosen the US and limits cooperation with China. A wider consequence of this policy is a series of sprawling military alliances with other key regional players and neighbours that position the Philippines at the forefront of regional collaboration. 

Core to these alliances is the Philippines transparency initiative. Marcos Jr.’s strategy aims to highlight China’s practices in grey area zones in the South China Sea. By exposing the questionable legality of China in the sea, the Philippines aims to legitimise international support and cooperation in its favour.  Subsequently, regional powers like Japan, Australia and India have created a squad in the South China Sea. 

Since Marcos Jr. came into office the Philippines has secured a military modernisation commitment up to $500 million from the US, a military information agreement in 2024, and has brought together additional players like Canada with a status of visiting forces agreement in 2025 and security and defense dialogue with the EU. In securing these military agreements Marcos Jr. has responded to Chinese aggression by ensuring protection for his country. 

The transparency initiative is only a part of a larger “lawfare strategy” that aims to undermine Chinese presence in the region through international instruments. Since 2016 the Philippines has filed over 461 diplomatic protests against China’s conduct, with Marcos Jr.’s administration filing 77 in its first year.  After the historic ruling in 2016 these efforts have only intensified, and have been adopted by Vietnam and indonesia. However, the potency of these efforts hinge on China accepting the authority of international law, which is not the case. Furthermore, China has welcomed this tactic and uses ASEAN forums to counter argue the validity of actions and often engages directly with Filipinos when claims against it are made.

Who is winning and what about you?

Answer: On the legal battlefield Marcos Jr. has a clear upper hand,  at the sea however the victor is not as clear.

The events in the South China Sea have international implications and involve almost every leading power.  In the worst possible scenario, China and the US enter into direct military confrontation as the Philippines invokes its defensive agreement. While the possibility of this taking place may loom, the deep economic ties between China and the Philippines, let alone the US, would make confrontation beyond its current scale too costly to justify. The fragile balance achieved in the South China Sea is relatively sustainable as escalations often subside.  A key proof of this rhetoric is that the height of tensions in 2024 were eventually subdued.

The Philippines earned the tacit approval of the international community when it won its arbitration in 2016. This legal victory has effectively shifted perception of the conflict and marked China as an aggressor, the consequence of which China is still trying to change nearly 10 years later. At sea, however, the victor of the conflict seems to be much more blurred.

Even with its many military alliances, the Philippines is unable to match the might of the Chinese fleet, its technology or its manpower. Resultantly, it is cornered into balancing tactics and heavily relies on the US rather than its own capabilities. Should the US ever withdraw its support, the situation will drastically change. Hence, the complexities of the conflict make its future hard to predict and its conflicts hard to consequentialise.