• Togolese President of the Council of Ministers Faure Gnassingbé signed a military agreement with Russia in March 2025.
• The agreement reinforces Gnassingbé’s hold on power and brings Togo closer to the Alliance of Sahel States (AES).
• Lomé could become a permanent part of Russian’s strategy in the Gulf of Guinea, testing international responses to Moscow’s growing presence in the region.

Why is Gnassingbé HOT?

Answer: Gnassingbé’s military agreement with Russia has moved from a signed commitment to concrete cooperation, widening the circle of partners backing his government.

On 9 July 2026, the US-sanctioned Russian cargo vessel Mikhail Britnev docked in Lomé carrying around 50 military vehicles bound for Mali. It was the first Russian military shipment through Togo, and the clearest sign yet that Togolese President of the Council of Ministers Faure Gnassingbé’s 2025 defence agreement with Moscow is in operation. 

Faure Gnassingbé has been in power in Togo since succeeding his father, Gnassingbé Eyadéma, in 2005. Through his latest change of the Togolese constitution, in May 2025 Gnassingbé assumed the position of President of the Council of Ministers, which holds the executive power and has no fixed term limit. 

Signed by Gnassingbé in March 2025, the military agreement covers the training of Togolese soldiers by Russian instructors, intelligence sharing and joint military exercises. The Russian State Duma ratified the military cooperation agreement on 7 October 2025, while Togo’s National Assembly has not yet ratified it.

The Mikhail Britnev’s cargo was destined for the Africa Corps, a force controlled by the Russian Defence Ministry that replaced the Wagner Group in Mali. The equipment crossed Togo and Burkina Faso and reached Bamako on 23 July. 

The presence of approximately 300–350 Africa Corps personnel in Togo was also alleged by Jeune Afrique, particularly in Lomé and in the northern regions. Although Foreign Minister Robert Dussey denied the deployment of Russian troops on 24 September 2026, he acknowledged the presence of foreign trainers alongside Togolese forces.

What is changing Gnassingbé’s heat level?

Answer: Opposition groups have raised concerns, but neither domestic actors nor outside pressure have restricted Gnassingbé’s agenda.

Through a joint statement in July 2026, several opposition parties and civil society organisations have expressed concern about the alleged presence of Russian military personnel in Togo, but their institutional leverage is minimal. Gnassingbé’s party, UNIR, won 108 of the 113 seats in the 2024 legislative elections, giving the government overwhelming control of Parliament. The Constitutional Court has not attempted to block the agreement or otherwise constrain Gnassingbé’s military agenda. 

In January 2026, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Court declared Togo’s 2024 constitutional reform an unconstitutional change of government, but it did not address the military agreement with Russia. Still, the ruling had no impact on Gnassingbé’s new position, which he continues to hold. 

While there is no specific survey measuring Togolese public opinion towards the military agreement with Russia, according to Afrobarometer in Togo 49% of respondents expressed a positive view of Russia’s economic and political influence. However, this only measures attitudes towards Russia more generally, rather than support for the military agreement itself. 

Separately to the Russian partnership, Gnassingbé faces significant domestic opposition. Because of the 2024 constitutional reform and his new role as the President of the Council of Ministers, protests erupted in June and July 2025, with at least five people killed by the authorities. The July 2025 municipal elections were also marked by low turnout, showing widespread dissatisfaction.

What is driving Gnassingbé?

Answer: The partnership is primarily driven by Gnassingbé’s personal objective of consolidating his position in power, while also contributing to his government’s broader security objectives.

Gnassingbé’s political career has consistently been characterised by efforts to consolidate his hold on power. Critics argue that successive constitutional amendments were designed to keep him in power. The 2024 constitutional reform further transformed the presidency into a  ceremonial role, while executive authority was transferred to the President of the Council of Ministers, the new role assumed by Gnassingbé on 3 May 2025. 

This position has no fixed term limit and can be renewed indefinitely by Parliament. In this context, military cooperation with Russia helps diversify Togo’s external security relationships, expanding the international support available to Gnassingbé’s administration. Maintaining relationships with both France and Russia allows Lomé to balance competing external relationships rather than commit completely to one side. 

Also, the growing presence of the Jihadist group Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) in the Sahel and in northern Togo has made counterterrorism an increasingly important security priority. The agreement with Russia includes military information exchange, cooperation in the use of military equipment and joint military training, all of which could help the government dealing with the growing number of terrorist attacks. 

However, there is no clear evidence that the cooperation has improved Togo’s security. While the July 2026 shipment demonstrates the partnership’s logistical importance, the equipment was destined for Mali rather than Togo, and jihadist threats continue to affect the country’s northern regions.

What does this mean for you?

Answer: The port of Lomé could become vital to Moscow’s military shipments in the Sahel, while the partnership with Russia allows Gnassingbé to assume the role of mediator in the region.

The Mikhail Britnev, which docked in Lomé in July 2026, is a US-sanctioned vessel, possibly exposing Togo to risks of repercussions. However, this remains only a future possibility, as no concrete response from the US has yet reached Lomé. 

The agreement gives Russian vessels access to the Gulf of Guinea, through Lomé. Conakry, in Guinea, has been Russia’s only port for military shipments in the region, but its low capacity and long waiting times may have pushed Moscow towards Lomé. Over time, the port could shift from a transit point to part of Russian military engagement in the region. 

Regionally, the partnership brings Togo closer to the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), whose members, including Mali, already rely heavily on Russian security assistance. In 2025, Togolese Foreign Minister Robert Dussey even announced that the country was exploring the possibility of joining the Alliance of Sahel States. Given Togo’s tense relationship with ECOWAS, closer ties with Russia and the AES allow Gnassingbé to position himself as a mediator between the two groups, easing the pressure on his government.