• Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, president of Egypt, has bilaterally deployed over 1,000 troops to Somalia to help fight insurgency groups.
• The deployment also supports el-Sisi’s goal to contain Ethiopia’s control over the Nile and maintain influence in the region.
• El-Sisi is focusing on Egypt’s long-term goals despite domestic concerns over resource allocation.

Why is el-Sisi HOT?

Answer: Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, president of Egypt, has deployed troops in Somalia, strengthening his influence in the region.

In February 2026, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, president of Egypt, deployed over 1,000 Egyptian troops to Somalia to support the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), which has been combating insurgent groups since its creation in 2012. Somalia has been in conflict since the end of Siad Barre’s dictatorship in 1991, which left a power vacuum and saw the rise of violent Islamic groups fighting for control of the country. Since then, international organisations and allied states have tried to assist Somalia in creating a capable government. Al-Shabaab, an insurgency group which originated in the 1980s, has been the biggest obstacle to the central government’s success.

Despite signing a defense agreement with Hassan Sheikh Mohamud, president of Somalia, committing to send troops in 2024, el-Sisi only sent troops in 2026.  Only a few weeks prior, Israel recognised Somaliland– a breakaway region of Somalia- heightening threats to regional security and Egyptian influence. This bilateral agreement bypasses the African Union Support and Stabilisation Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM), whose main purpose is to support the FGS against insurgency groups, especially Al-Shabaab. The deployment is a natural progression for the long-standing Egyptian-Somalian relationship which el-Sisi has supported with other military resources, such as weapons and counterterrorism advisors, in the past.

What is changing el-Sisi’s heat level?

Answer: El-Sisi sent over 1,000 troops bilaterally to Somalia expanding Egypt’s influence, despite growing concerns over resource allocation.

The bilateral deployment frees el-Sisi from the AUSSOM institutional oversight and gives him more control over the troops’ actions. AUSSOM has faced funding issues; in 2025, only half of the necessary funds were provided, and there has been no funding commitment for 2026. It was predicted that this would delay Egypt’s deployment, but el-Sisi has avoided this problem altogether with bilateral action instead of relying on AUSSOM resources. 

El-Sisi’s military background, which assisted his rise to the presidency after the June 30 revolution, and consistent support for the institution have made the EAF a loyal group supporting his ambitions to stabilise the region. For over a decade, Egyptians have also supported el-Sisi’s role in providing regional stability, but with the increasing and persistent conflict and the cost-of-living crisis, the population worries about the allocation of government resources. There have been no protests against this deployment, but the tension between maintaining regional stability and solving internal problems indicates growing displeasure among the general population. 

The United States’ lack of action and focus on other conflicts has bolstered el-Sisi’s success. Egypt has long been an important partner for the US because of its geography, its control over the Suez Canal, and its stabilising role in the region more generally. Among other things, el-Sisi’s position on the war in Gaza and Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, have left US President Donald Trump balancing his alliance with Egypt and Israel. Trump has also offered to mediate the conversations between Egypt and Ethiopia regarding the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), but it is unlikely that he will limit el-Sisi’s actions in Somalia because of the importance of maintaining good relations with Egypt.

What is driving el-Sisi?

Answer: El-Sisi wants to contain Ethiopia’s influence and growing power in the region.

El-Sisi wants to secure the longevity of his position as president of Egypt and regional leader by focusing on long-term goals despite the short-term sacrifices Egyptians will have to make. The deployment, while intended to support the FGS, particularly strengthens Egypt’s position against Ethiopia, its main rival in the region, in large part due to its upstream position along the Nile. 

El-Sisi has deemed the GERD, Africa’s largest hydroelectric dam, an existential threat to Egypt as the Nile is crucial for Egyptian life and the economy. The dam, which Ethiopia argues is crucial for its economy and development, is increasing Ethiopia’s control over the Nile as a whole. El-Sisi wants to isolate Ethiopia and delegitimise its control over the river that ten other countries rely on. Prior to this, Egypt had a monopoly over the water and its distribution, therefore, stopping the GERD is important for Egyptians but also for the influence el-Sisi wants to maintain in the region. 

The troops are deployed in southern Somalia near the Ethiopian border, which places indirect pressure on Ethiopia and is an answer to increased military posturing from Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. This increases the odds that Somalia is rapidly becoming a proxy battleground in the water dispute between Egypt and Ethiopia.

Egypt’s military presence allows el-Sisi to keep an eye on Somaliland and especially its relationship with Ethiopia. On top of the GERD, Ethiopia has secured access to the Red Sea via an agreement with Somaliland, undermining Somalia’s sovereignty, increasing its influence and exacerbating regional tensions. Access to the Red Sea is vital for Ethiopia, a landlocked country, to boost its economy and increase its regional influence. El-Sisi has consistently argued that the Red Sea should be controlled by states bordering it; through this deployment, el-Sisi will have more influence over Somalia, support its sovereignty and monitor both Ethiopia and Somaliland. 

If Somalia were to collapse, Egypt would lose significant influence over the region while strengthening Ethiopia, Egypt’s biggest rival. Though presented as a deployment to assist the FGS, the troops in Somalia are a direct answer to Somaliland’s recognition by Israel and Ethiopia’s growing influence in the region.

What does this mean for you?

Answer: This situation demonstrates the general trend away from institutional diplomatic dispute resolution towards more hard-power approaches, which are exacerbated by the impacts of climate change.

This situation reflects the broader trend away from diplomatic peace resolutions towards more realist hard-power methods. Egypt’s bilateral deployment, separate from the African Union mission, reflects the realist, isolationist trend spearheaded by the United States. The tensions between Egypt and Ethiopia regarding the GERD, in which Somalia finds itself caught, also point to the growing resource disputes that will inevitably increase with the impacts of climate change. Indeed, this deployment displays early symptoms of the larger trends present in international relations.