• The fuel blockade imposed by the JNIM in September 2025 and later expanded in November, has led to massive fuel shortages in the capital city of Bamako. 
• Assimi Goïta, the leader of the country’s military Junta now faces internal and external opposition with rising protests and a failed coup attempt.
• The Mali government has lost control of its northern and central territories to Jihadist forces, with decreasing military capacities cooling their ability to recover territory. 

Why is  Assimi Goïta Cold?

Answer: JNIM blockades have restricted fuel and goods entering Bamako, Goïta’s base of operations.

Assimi Goïta’s Junta government rose to power after two military coups in 2020-2021. Goïta’s criticism of Ibrahim Keïta (in power since 2013) in his inability to subdue the Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) was crucial for this shift. Despite a strong policy focus to fight the JNIM, Bamako is facing a blockade that restricts the city’s fuel entering the city since September, increasing prices by 400%. The blockade is also observed in the city of Kayes and Nioro du Sahel with a population of 127,000 and 70,000 restricted from leaving their cities.  

JNIM was once confined to the rural cities of Mali, but the 2025 siege indicates that the Junta’s control may be limited to Bamako. With increasing revenue streams, the group can generate over$770,000 from stealing and selling livestock in just one Malian territory. This figure doesn’t include additional revenue from ransom, which generated €50 million and several tons of ammunition and weapons from the UAE in exchange for 3 individuals. 

Since the Junta assumed power, JNIM attacks in Mali have increased, rising from 142 in 2021, plateauing around 750 in 2023-24. Suggesting that the Junta’s offensive stance on the JNIM has provoked a response that damages rather than stabilises the country. Hence, Goïta’s capacities erode as violence in the country grows. 

Goïta’s hold on Mali’s political landscape proves to be increasingly fragile. The Junta suspended all political parties earlier this May following protests over the detainment of Former Prime Minister of Mali, Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, and wider dissatisfaction with security operations. Suspending political parties in May 2025 led to nationwide protests. These were the First pro-democracy protests since the coup nearly 4 years ago. In response, Goïta postponed elections set for 2025 till 2030, during which he will remain in charge of the country.  However, consolidating power within his government resulted in an attempted coup in August. The government subsequently arrested 45 soldiers, including two high-level officers. 

Effectively, Goïta priorities dissipating internal collusion in lieu of neutralising the JNIM. This is important for political ambitions, but leaves the rest of the country and his constituents vulnerable. The areas of Mopti, Gao, Timbuktu, and Menaka are under increasing risk, but his political manoeuvrings to consolidate power are dissonant to this urgency.

What is changing  Assimi Goïta’s heat level?

Answer: The shifting tides of foreign support for Goïta’s government have a significant impact on his fight against the JNIM.

While the JNIM increases its power, the Junta loses essential military alliances and support. France played a crucial role against the Islamist movements of the 2010s with the 8-year-long Operation Berkhane involving 5000 troops in Mali. In November 2022 Goita ended the operation. This move was crucial to consolidate sovereignty within Mali and garner much needed popular support at the time of his coup, but it did remove crucial military resources that could have been used to combat the JNIM. These forces were immediately replaced by the Wagner, and most connections with France burned, including those with UN peacekeepers.  

After the loss of the French, the Wagner group took a foothold in Mali. It provided the main backing to the Junta, but unlike the French only provided 1,500 troops, much fewer than in Operation Berkhane. On the 5th of January, it also withdrew from Mali. The Wagner Group  claims to have transferred control of all regional capitals to the Junta, but the siege in November is contrary to this assertion.  In addition, Sahel experts like Ulf Laessing, believe that while the capital is safe, parts of the north government control are still weak. 

Compounding on to weakening power, the civilian cost of these operations attest to an increasingly inefficient campaign. Russian forces have been accused of extra judicial killings of suspected militants without due process, attesting to the junta’s lack of conduct or control in its own organisation. Today the Wagner group is slowly being replaced by the African Corps, a direct subsidiary of the Russian government. In one instance the Wagner group and African corps tortured three in the Segou region and incinerated 25 people including 4 children in the Nara region the next day.

Goïta initially resisted the less flexible and more institutionalised corps but was forced to make the switch, a change that displayed Goïta’s limited autonomy over the military within Mali. In slowly supplanting Mali’s sovereignty the involvement of Russian forces hinders Goita’s progress against the JNIM. 

Goita seems to face a misalignment of goals, unable to drive out the JNIM, increasingly sporadic attacks places civilians under increasing risk. Malian security forces under the Junta carried out 239 operations against civilians, between January and October of this year, resulting in the deaths of over 1,021 people, a repetition of operations that took place the previous year. In Attara village, they threatened villagers, killing seven in the process. Goïta established himself on the principle of providing stability and security for citizens but the extent to which he has achieved this goal is increasingly unclear.

What is driving Assimi Goïta?

Answer: Goïta wants to establish greater control of Mali, the JNIM however poses a formidable threat.

While the Goïta has secured political authority over the Malian government, he does not have territorial control over most of Mali. The sovereignty of the government does not extend to the country’s borders. In fact, the JNIM not only controls a larger proportion of territory but is also organised, and diverts key sources of revenue. Goita in his goal to subdue the JNIM aims to restore government control in these regions. 

Central Mali (areas of Mopti and Segou) have shown signs of a protracted armed conflict and the Junta’s powerlessness to stop combat. These areas consist of nearly 30% of the lands’ territory. While northern Mali, mostly Sahara (⅔ of Mali landmass is desert), is under the control of the Tuaregs. This ethnic group is 10% of the population but in control of the north. They have demanded autonomy and even independence of the northern Azawad region. The Strategic Framework for the Defence of the People of Azawad (CSP-DPA) here is increasingly effective and organised. 

Goïta’s inability to fight this resistance risks resource-rich areas of Gao, Timbuktu and Kidal. Consequently, gold mining in these territories is the JNIM’s primary income. JNIM controlled regions generate up to 725 kilograms of gold each year, production worth $34 million that could be the Junta’s if Goita succeeded in his fight against the Jihadist. Gold mines are also hubs for social influence and key recruitment grounds.

Their imposition of sharia law involves the collection of Zakat (charity) and taxes that fund their operations primarily in central Mali where it is mandatory. Lastly, protection fees hinder supply routes and trading crucial for the economic stability of Mali. One trader reported that non compliance led to a whole truck of tea being seized, which took a year to re-supply. Thus generating revenue for themself and disrupting Junta trade is a significant drive to restore control in Mali. However, Goïta only controls the southernmost region of Mali, consisting of Bamako, Koulikoro, Sikasso and Kayes which accounts for 15% of the country’s territory.

What does this mean for you?

Answer:  With increasing pressure from the Jihadist movements in the Sahel, Goïta’s ability to resist the JNIM’s political and military force remains uncertain.

As of 2024, more than 50% of the world’s Terrorism related deaths occur in the Sahel, a trend for which Mali is a striking example of. The JNIM’s increasing resources, coordination, and capabilities have led to the collapse of fuel entering Mali’s last stronghold. This creates the conditions for a large-scale decline of welfare and social services, primarily healthcare and defence. 

The trajectory of Mali and the wider Sahel region will be defined by the outcomes of this blockade and the Junta’s ability to survive or cave under pressure. As for its neighbouring states, Burkina Faso has lost 40% of its territory to islamist groups, Niger’s southwestern region is no longer under government control with kidnapping and infrastructure attacks recorded in Benin and Nigeria. All the while, the JNIM and other jihadists movements like the Islamic State in the Sahel (ISSP) are increasing in capabilities and power. 

A few possible futures await Mali. The growing organisation of rival jihadist groups could weaken the JNIM through internal conflict. While the JNIM and ISSP share the same goal, they have strikingly different methods, with the JNIM pursuing a decentralised model to the ISSP’s vertical approach. Recorded clashes between the two are often attributed because of this difference. However, with the decreasing support of foreign forces in the conflict, it seems unlikely that either Mali or Burkina Faso will be able to exploit these schisms, especially considering the junta frequently deals with its own internal weakness.