• Israel and Somaliland have entered into a mutually beneficial declaration of recognition. 
• Netanyahu is expanding Israel’s geopolitical reach to counter Iran and the Houthis while also mitigating growing international isolation.
• Abdullahi is actively pursuing international recognition for Somaliland to relieve Somaliland’s economic constraints and consolidate his domestic political legitimacy. 

Why are Netanyahu and Abdullahi in a transactional alliance?

Answer: Israel and Somaliland’s deal advances Israel’s strategic geopolitical interests in the Red Sea region while Somaliland gains long-sought international recognition. 

On the 26th of December 2025, Benjamin Netanyahu and Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi signed a declaration of mutual recognition, making Israel the first state to formally recognise Somaliland, a de facto independent state in the Horn of Africa. Since declaring independence from Somalia in 1991, Somaliland has built a reputation as one of the most stable and democratic polities in the Horn of Africa. It holds largely peaceful elections, with the most recent being in 2024, when Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi was elected president. Despite exercising effective self-rule, Somaliland has struggled to secure widespread international recognition.

In its fight for recognition, Somaliland has taken advantage of its strategic location along one of the world’s most critical maritime corridors. The coastal territory sits on the Gulf of Aden near the Bab al-Mandab Strait, a chokepoint through which roughly 12% of global trade and over 6 million barrels of oil per day pass. Its geostrategic importance has made the region a site of intense geopolitical competition among regional middle powers, including Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, as well as Egypt, Ethiopia, and Eritrea along the opposite coast. Major global actors, including China and the United States, have also expanded military, commercial, and logistical presence across the Red Sea region.

Although several states have engaged in partnerships with Somaliland, no country recognised under the UN Charter had formally recognised it as a de jure state until Netanyahu’s announcement in December 2025. Despite no prior formal ties, Netanyahu’s decision marks a strategic expansion of Israel’s geopolitical agenda in the region. For Somaliland, the deal offers the prospect of expanded cooperation. Tel Aviv intends to cooperate with Somaliland across agriculture, health, technology, and economic sectors. Notably, cooperation in the water sector is already underway, with a Somaliland delegation visiting Israel’s National Center for Water Education and Innovation to examine water-recycling technologies and explore options for future cooperation, professional training, and water infrastructure development. 

What does Netanyahu want?

Answer: Netanyahu wants to strengthen Israel’s position against Iran while expanding its diplomatic reach.

Netanyahu’s actions are largely driven by the upcoming elections in October, as his domestic standing is reaching a critical juncture. Polls suggest that his coalition is unlikely to secure the 61-seat majority needed to govern in the Knesset. At the same time, he is facing ongoing legal challenges that threaten his legitimacy, including trials for bribery and fraud, alongside mounting international pressure following the International Criminal Court’s issuance of an arrest warrant based on allegations of war crimes in Gaza.

Netanyahu’s main goal in partnering with Somaliland is to strengthen Israel’s military positioning against Iran. Iran’s axis of resistance is no longer as strong as it was prior to October 2023, with key allies such as Hezbollah and Hamas weakened by recent conflicts. However, the Houthis in Yemen across the Red Sea continue to demonstrate resilience despite the weakening of other proxies. Addressing the Iranian threat plays into Netanyahu’s narrative to consolidate a loyal support base. This strategy has been popular domestically, enjoying strong domestic support with regard to military action during the 12-day war in June 2025 and the subsequent escalation in February 2026. 

As well as seeking support domestically by cooperating with Somaliland, Netanyahu is attempting to counter Israel’s growing diplomatic isolation.  This can be seen in calls within the European Union to review or suspend elements of bilateral cooperation, such as the EU-Israel Association Agreement and the International Court of Justice’s advisory opinion that Israel’s presence in the occupied Palestinian territories is unlawful.

Moreover, the war in Gaza has suspended Israel’s ongoing normalisation efforts with Saudi Arabia under the framework of the Abraham Accords, as well as recently severed diplomatic relations with Turkey. By formalising diplomatic ties with Somaliland, Netanyahu wants to revive momentum around the Abraham Accords and display that he can still gain new allies even during a period of heightened isolation.

What does Abdullahi want?

Answer: He wants to translate international recognition into economic relief and political legitimacy. 

Abdullahi, Somaliland’s 6th president, promised to intensify the pursuit of international recognition, which he views as fundamental to alleviating the economic strain the de facto state has experienced over the past decade. Israel’s recognition took place during the first term of Abdullahi’s rule, which was marked by an inherited political and economic turmoil from the previous ruler. 

Somaliland has faced persistent climate-driven crises, which repeatedly strain the country’s limited resources. Severe and prolonged droughts in recent years have displaced over 800,000 people, disrupting livelihoods and undermining food security. Somaliland’s economy, heavily reliant on livestock and animal products, has also been hit hard, compounding the already high youth unemployment, which reports suggest has surpassed 70%. These challenges are driving a growing brain drain, as young and skilled Somalis leave in search of better opportunities abroad. 

Abdulahi’s urgency for international recognition has also been heightened by recent territorial losses and increasing pressure from Somalia’s federal government. In 2023, Somaliland lost control of Las Anod, a city in its eastern territory, to anti-separatist forces. As a result, a new administration loyal to Somalia’s federal government was established to govern the city and its surrounding areas. This coincides with heightened efforts by Somalia during the past year to reassert authority over Somaliland, including tightening airspace controls, port regulations, and visa restrictions.

All of these pressures unfold against the backdrop of the postponement of the parliamentary elections originally scheduled for May 2026, extending the tenure of the current government. The delay increases Abdullahi’s incentive to prioritise international recognition, as diplomatic breakthroughs can help reinforce his political legitimacy and demonstrate tangible progress to voters despite mounting criticism over the postponed elections. Wide public support for initiatives like the Israel deal reinforces the domestic appeal of pursuing recognition, allowing Abdullahi to frame it as both a national priority and a personal achievement. 

What is Netanyahu doing?

Answer: He is securing a strategic foothold in the Red Sea region to monitor and counter Houthi threats while expanding Israel’s geopolitical influence.

By partnering with Somaliland, Israel is securing a strategic military foothold to counter the Houthis’ threat in the Red Sea region. After October 7th, Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen began launching missile and drone attacks against Israel, claiming they were defending the Palestinians. While the ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas has caused a pause in the fighting between the Houthis and Israel, the group remains a decentralised and resilient challenge. 

From a military perspective, Somaliland’s Berbera port is situated only about 500km from Houthi-controlled areas in Yemen, making it a strategic location for intelligence monitoring, providing logistical support to Yemen’s government against the Houthis, and also for conducting direct operations against them.

Tel Aviv’s recognition of Somaliland reflects a broader strategy in which Israel engages with factions in weak or contested states to expand its geopolitical influence while fostering a degree of political and security dependence. In the case of Somaliland, this quid pro quo revolves around economic and social factors. Thus, Israel is not simply forming alliances but creating relationships structured around strategic dependence. By supporting actors that lack strong international backing, Israel can cultivate loyal partners that rely on Israeli diplomatic, economic, and security cooperation. 

What is Abdullahi doing?

Answer: Abdullahi is leveraging Somaliland’s geostrategic importance to secure international recognition and deepen ties with foreign partners.

Somaliland’s strategic location has long been used as a diplomatic bargaining tool for recognition and economic partnership. Ethiopia, for example, signed a memorandum of understanding under Somaliland’s previous administration to secure access to Somaliland’s coastline and Berbera port, reportedly in exchange for prospective recognition of Somaliland. Moreover, the Dubai-based company DP World has invested approximately $442 million over the past decade in modernising Berbera port by establishing a free trade zone and an airport which it controls. Israel’s recognition follows a similar logic, with recognition being exchanged for access to a strategically located partner near the Bab al-Mandab Strait and Houthi-controlled Yemen.

In the relationship with Israel, Abdullahi is demonstrating a highly pragmatic approach to foreign policy, this is illustrated by Somaliland’s decision to establish its embassy in Jerusalem, aligning itself with one of Israel’s most contentious foreign-policy positions. The decision shows that Abdullahi is willing to accommodate the preferences of potential recognition partners when doing so advances its long-standing goal of statehood. 

Who is winning?

Answer: The deal strengthened Israel’s regional position but intensified opposition to Somaliland’s independence. 

The Israel–Somaliland deal has strengthened resistance to Somaliland’s separatism by triggering widespread regional and international support for Somalia’s territorial integrity. Major actors such as the African Union, the Arab League, the European Union, and China have explicitly rejected the move and reaffirmed Somalia’s sovereignty, either in defense of the rule of law or against Israel’s expansionist policy over the Red Sea. 

The deal has also contributed to the formation of a broader counter-alignment. Turkey, a long-standing security and infrastructure partner of Somalia, Qatar, which has provided security assistance and diplomatic backing to Mogadishu to secure a foothold in the region, and Egypt and Saudi Arabia, both of which support Somalia’s territorial integrity due to their Red Sea security interests, have coordinated in opposition to what is perceived as a growing ‘axis of secession‘. Thus, rather than securing Somaliland’s political existence, Israel’s recognition has strengthened Somalia’s diplomatic position.

At the same time, the deal has exposed Somaliland to new security risks. The Houthi leader has warned that any Israeli presence in Somaliland would be treated as a military target, effectively placing the territory within the scope of the wider regional conflict between Israel and Iran. Moreover, Egypt has responded strategically by expanding its military mission in Somalia, with the goal of “ensuring the survival of the state of Somalia”.

However, Israel’s move also serves its goals in terms of wider regional power dynamics, particularly those involving its close partner, the United Arab Emirates. The recognition helps Israel position itself inside a UAE-led power network in the Red Sea region and can be seen as part of a broader Israel–UAE effort to reshape influence in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea region. Reports indicate Emirati involvement in the negotiations leading to Israel’s recognition of Somaliland, suggesting that the decision aligns with a UAE-led regional power network.