• Noboa implemented the Phoenix Plan, a security strategy, to combat insecurity related to narcotrafficking in Ecuador.
• The Phoenix Plan seeks international cooperation to deal with drug-related violence which surpasses Ecuador’s borders.
• Noboa’s security strategy temporarily reduced violence; however, the crime resurged as it failed to address deeper structural issues.

Why is Noboa’s HEAT LEVEL MILD?

Answer: Noboa’s national security program, the Phoenix Plan, targets organised crime in Ecuador; however, the program’s limited results leave him MILD.

Following his election in 2023, Daniel Noboa, the president of Ecuador, implemented the Phoenix Plan, a national security strategy aimed at dismantling organised criminal networks and reducing drug-related violence. While the plan initially reduced violence through mass arrests and expanded military operations, it has failed to produce a sustained decline in crime, limiting Noboa’s ability to achieve his security objectives and leaving him MILD.

The program consists of increasing military deployment and expanding security powers to restore state control over territories affected by organised crime; this entails constructing high-security prisons, restructuring defence forces, centralising the intelligence centre, and establishing a new defence unit under the executive branch.

The Phoenix Plan initially projected to cost $830 million over 10 years. To finance the initiative, Noboa increased VAT taxes from 12% to 15% in 2024 generating additional state revenue for security spending. In addition, the plan received support from the US through a $200 million security assistance agreement.

Noboa faces a large systemic and transnational issue. Ecuador used to be one of Latin America’s safest countries, but since the end of the 2000s, the homicide rate has increased by eightfold. This is due to factors such as Ecuador’s dollarisation at the turn of the century, facilitating money laundering, and its proximity to Colombia and Peru, the two largest producers of cocaine. In the 2010s, Ecuador became one of the main routes for narcotrafficking towards the US or Europe. 

The surge in organised crime placed significant pressure on Noboa’s administration, prompting the government to declare a state of internal armed conflict, in January 2024, in which he designated 22 criminal organisations as terrorist entities. Under this state of national emergency, Noboa’s government expanded military responsibilities to support civil authorities. This included establishing a presence in the jails, combatting illegal mining, and controlling the clandestine passages on Ecuador’s land border and its maritime spaces. These measures expanded the state’s operational capacity, but failed to produce a sustained reduction in violence, illustrating the limitations of a security-first approach.

In the first 48 days of the program, Ecuador’s security forces incarcerated more than 10,000 people. Noboa’s plan bears similarities to Nayib Bukele’s security model in El Salvador, which relies on mass arrests and incarceration to restore state control.

However, the Phoenix Program has not produced the same sustained reduction in violence. During the  early stages of the Phoenix Plan, the mass jailing of narcos resulted in a brief decline in  violence, but this trend did not last. Homicide rates surged in 2025, setting a record of 51 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants, reflecting a deeper structural and transnational issue which must be approached through international cooperation. This suggests that while the Phoenix Plan has strengthened the state’s immediate response capacity, it has not addressed the transnational drivers of organised crime, limiting its long-term effectiveness. 

What is changing Noboa’s heat level?

Answer: Noboa’s policy receives strong international support from the US and Europe, yet the lack of support from neighboring countries hinders his plan.

Noboa’s policy framework depends on international cooperation, particularly from the United States and Ecuador’s neighbours, Colombia and Peru, given that Ecuador lacks the economic and military capacity to manage the crisis. 

Since the beginning of his presidency, Noboa’s relations with the US grew tighter. In February 2024, he ratified treaties regarding military cooperation with the US, including joint naval operations and intelligence-sharing.

Noboa has consistently advocated for foreign military aid from the US and European nations to combat drug trafficking associated with violence, a transnational issue that requires a coordinated response. The Ecuadorian 2008 Constitution does not allow for foreign military bases; thus, in November 2025, he held a referendum to reopen a shuttered US military base allowing US military personnel to operate in Ecuador. The proposal to lift the constitutional ban on foreign military bases was rejected with over 60% of the votes. The rejection demonstrated domestic limits to Noboa’s security agenda, despite widespread concern over crime.

Nevertheless, international security cooperation continued through joint operations and intelligence-sharing initiatives, such as when the US, Ecuador, and European international police agency launched a military operation in Quito to dismantle one of the largest gangs in the region, Los Lobos, in early March 2026. This demonstrated that Noboa was able to secure external support even without a permanent foreign military presence.

Ecuador is not one of the main producers of cocaine; however, an estimated 70% of the world flows through its ports and is then shipped towards the US or Europe. For instance, cocaine from Colombia is shipped through Ecuador, making Colombia an essential player to tackle narcotrafficking. While Noboa receives support from the US and Europe, this has not been matched by Colombia.

Faced with Colombia’s unwillingness to collaborate, Noboa imposed 50% tariffs. Ecuador accused Colombia of failing to take sufficient action against organised criminal groups operating near the border. Colombia retaliated by cutting sales of electricity to Ecuador, leaving the country in an energy crisis. Moreover, Gustavo Petro, Colombia’s president, raised Colombian tariffs on Ecuadorian imports to 30% on essential goods such as rice and car parts.

The deterioration of relations with Colombia illustrates the limits of Noboa’s security strategy. While he has secured support from distant partners such as the United States, the absence of sustained cooperation from neighbouring countries constrains Ecuador’s ability to address the regional networks that drive organised crime. 

What is driving Noboa?

Answer: Noboa is driven by a desire to reduce insecurity in Ecuador to support economic growth.

Noboa’s presidential campaign was centred around national security, driving him to combat organised crime with an iron fist. In 2023, he was elected on the premise of bringing back security to Ecuador. The IMF estimates that a 1% increase in homicide is associated with a decrease in economic activity of up to 0.5%. Hence, it is important for Noboa to achieve security goals for his legitimacy and to foster sustainable economic development. Since the security crisis extends beyond Ecuador’s borders, Noboa seeks international cooperation with the US, the EU, and the UK, leading to a series of joint military operations.

Moreover, Noboa has consistently emphasized economic growth, investment, and competitiveness, as he recognises that lack of opportunity drives people to crime. Noboa, Ecuador’s youngest president, comes from one of the country’s most prominent business families. His father built one of Ecuador’s largest banana export companies. Educated in the US and shaped by a business background, he set a target of 4% economic growth, though the Central Bank predicted 2.8%.

In Ecuador, 50 percent of citizens between 18 and 29 are unemployed or self-employed, illustrating the lack of economic opportunities for the youth. To dissuade them from entering gangs or engaging in violent activities, Noboa focuses his domestic policies on employment opportunities and education for the youth. The interdependent relationship between security and economic growth drives him to take a broader approach to tackle violence in Ecuador.

What does this mean for you?

Answer: The Phoenix Plan points to a broader trend in Latin America where governments rely on regional and international cooperation to address transnational security threats.

Despite Noboa’s efforts to decrease narcotrafficking in Ecuador with the Phoenix Plan, drug-related violence persists, leaving the country as one of the most violent in Latin America. The repeated implementation of states of emergency and increased militarisation suggest that the threat is expanding rather than receding. Noboa’s Phoenix Plan reflects the limits of national response to transnational crime in providing a sustainable and long-term solution to reducing violence. The plan only treats the symptoms of the narcotrafficking trade without addressing weak border coordination between Ecuador and its neighbours, Colombia and Peru.

Ecuador, being one of the main narcotrafficking corridors, makes cooperation with its neighbours increasingly important to tackle the issue at its source. Due to tensions with its neighbours, Ecuador increasingly relies on the cooperation of the US and Europe potentially deepening its dependence on external security partnerships in the long term. Additionally, the repeated reliance on the military and state of emergency risks undermining civil liberties, as cases of abuse by security forces are increasing as their role expands. Ecuador’s trajectory exemplifies how state militarisation without regional cooperation is merely a temporary solution to violence and that it remains reliant on aid from more distant powers to solve its domestic crisis.