• Since taking office in 2010, Orbán has strengthened executive power through constitutional and legal reforms.
• Recent constitutional amendments have provoked widespread public outrage, signaling a surge in domestic opposition.
• The main opposition party, TISZA, led by Magyar, is capitalizing on the discontent and poses a challenge to Orbán’s FIDESZ ahead of the 2026 elections.

Why is Orbán MILD?

Answer: Orbán’s recent constitutional amendments have strengthened his executive control but triggered widespread domestic protests.

Viktor Orbán, leader of the FIDESZ party, has served as Hungary’s Prime Minister since 2010. Over his 15-year tenure, he has pursued a long-term strategy to consolidate power under the FIDESZ government. Leveraging his two-thirds parliamentary supermajority, he enacted a new constitution in 2011 and has since passed over a dozen amendments that have expanded executive authority and reshaped the country’s legal and political landscape. 

These reforms have entrenched government control over the judiciary, shielding Orbán’s administration from dissent by democratic checks and balances. Despite the extent of these changes, pushback from the public has remained limited in the past. 

However, that dynamic is now shifting. Orbán’s most recent constitutional amendment, which was passed in April 2025 and includes a ban on pride events, has sparked widespread protests. Demonstrators argue it directly attacks the rights to protest and freedom of assembly. On June 10th, around 15,000 people gathered to oppose the bill. These protests form part of a broader wave of unrest, much of it directed at Orbán. Notably, on Hungary’s National Day in March, opposition leader Péter Magyar mobilized over 50,000 demonstrators in one of the largest shows of public resistance to Orbán’s leadership.

Beyond fueling domestic unrest, the recent constitutional amendments have also heightened tensions with the EU. The European Commission argues they violate EU law and undermine the union’s core values. Hungary is already under pressure from Brussels, facing a freeze on nearly all cohesion and recovery funds since 2022 and over €500 million in fines for migration law non-compliance since 2024. The new amendments have only deepened EU concerns over judicial independence and rising illiberalism.

This affects Orbán, as in response, several Members of the European Parliament have called for a complete suspension of financial transfers to Budapest. For Orbán, the risk of losing critical EU funding threatens both his ability to deliver domestic programs and his image as a defender of national interests, especially as the opposition gains ground by promising to restore EU relations and unlock the frozen funds. 

Despite growing backlash, the constitutional amendments leave Orbán’s position mild rather than cold. While domestic protests and EU pressure have increased, he has not faced a complete political freeze or loss of control. His government still retains significant power, and the opposition, though growing, has yet to achieve a decisive political defeat ahead of the April 2026 elections

What is changing Orbán’s heat level?

Answer: The TISZA Party’s rise, fueled by economic struggles and EU tensions, poses a challenge to Orbán’s dominance ahead of the 2026 elections.

Since coming to power in 2010, FIDESZ has maintained a dominant position in Hungarian politics, with limited opposition competition. However, for the first time, Orbán’s political position is being significantly challenged. 

In the 2024 European Parliament elections, the newly formed TISZA party, led by Péter Magyar, won 29% of the vote compared to FIDESZ’s 44%. Polling for the 2026 parliamentary elections now shows TISZA leading FIDESZ 46% to 38%. This marks the first time since 2010 that a single opposition party has unified broad segments of the electorate and overtaken FIDESZ nationally. Unlike previous fragmented opposition efforts, anti-government sentiment is now consolidating around a cohesive political force. This makes Orbán’s chances of maintaining his grip on power in 2026 less certain than ever before.

A key factor in Magyar’s rise is TISZA’s outreach beyond urban centers into rural areas, home to about one-third of Hungarians and long dominated by FIDESZ. Unlike earlier opposition efforts, TISZA has adopted FIDESZ’s own grassroots tactics to build local support in villages and small towns. This has produced TISZA-affiliated networks and a growing social media presence, even in traditionally pro-FIDESZ regions. While deeply loyal areas like the Northeast remain difficult terrain, TISZA’s rural expansion marks a major shift in opposition strategy and a direct challenge to FIDESZ on its most secure ground.

Growing frustration with Orbán’s increasingly centralized leadership style has created fertile ground for Magyar, who positions himself as a bold alternative to the status quo. Central to TISZA’s appeal is a strong anti-corruption message, which resonates with voters who see corruption as the defining failure of Orbán’s government. Magyar has accused the government of running a “propaganda machine” and built his campaign around highlighting the state’s misuse of power. With a powerful social media strategy and large campaign rallies, he has significantly increased his visibility and expanded his support base, directly challenging FIDESZ’s long-standing dominance. 

Another significant challenge to Orbán’s leadership is Hungary’s deteriorating economy. Inflation remains high, the forint has weakened, and cuts to social welfare have deepened public hardship. Nearly 70% of Hungarians say they are worse off than a year ago, reflecting frustration with the government’s economic management. This is compounded by the EU’s freeze on cohesion and recovery funds, which has further strained public finances. Crucially, most Hungarians blame Orbán, and not the EU, for the funding stalemate. This economic discontent has bolstered support for the opposition. Magyar’s credibility on economic issues is viewed more favorably, giving the opposition an advantage heading into the 2026 elections.

What is driving Orbán?

Answer: Orbán is driven by a desire to win the 2026 elections to maintain political control and protect the economic and legal interests tied to his rule.

Orbán’s primary goal is to win the 2026 parliamentary elections and extend his political dominance. To this end, he promotes nationalism and Hungarian sovereignty, portraying himself as a defender against what he presents as external threats, such as the EU and immigration. This strategy invokes fears of foreign domination rooted in Hungary’s history of subjugation. By framing current EU and immigration pressures as echoes of past foreign control, Orbán taps into  deep-seated national anxieties, thereby strengthening his appeal among voters who prioritise sovereignty and cultural preservation, and in turn legitimizing his rule.

The drive to consolidate power has also led Orbán to implement substantial institutional changes across Hungarian society. As noted, he has expanded control over the judiciary and reshaped the constitutional order to strengthen executive authority. The Constitutional Court has been weakened by loyal appointments and reduced jurisdiction, while public prosecutors face ongoing accusations of shielding the government from accountability. 

This centralization of authority extends into civil society. Today, 23 of 25 Hungarian universities are run by public foundations led by ruling party affiliates. In the media, ownership is heavily concentrated among pro-government actors, with most major outlets state-run or aligned with FIDESZ. These reforms have eroded oversight, allowing Orbán to govern with fewer constraints. 

Legislation like the National Sovereignty Protection Act has further expanded state control, allowing a government body to investigate foreign-funded organizations—including media and civil society, without judicial approval. Hungary has also opted out of supranational mechanisms such as the European Public Prosecutor’s Office and plans to withdraw from the International Criminal Court. While these steps may bolster national legal sovereignty, they greatly reduce external oversight. Together, they reflect a deliberate strategy to shield the government from both domestic and international accountability.

Orbán’s drive to maintain political control is closely tied to preserving the economic advantages and legal protections sustaining his political network. Under his leadership, political and economic elites have grown increasingly intertwined. An estimated 25–30% of the Hungarian economy is controlled by actors linked to FIDESZ, often through public contracts. These developments point to a patronage-based model where political control is closely linked to preserving economic advantages. 

Orbán’s push to win the 2026 election is thus not solely about political dominance but also about safeguarding these benefits and legal protections. Losing power could unravel networks built over the past decade.

What does this mean for you?

Answer: Magyar’s rise exemplifies how political outsiders gain support amid weak institutional trust and how the EU shapes political narratives despite limited formal leverage.

Péter Magyar’s rise shows that in contexts of declining institutional legitimacy, political change increasingly comes from outsiders who mobilize support beyond traditional party structures. These figures gain traction because established parties, both ruling and opposition, are seen as complicit in systemic failure or out of touch with everyday concerns. Magyar presents himself as a political outsider, appealing across demographics with a message of pragmatic reform and anti-corruption. His success reflects a broader pattern: when institutions lose credibility, outsider narratives gain power. 

On the European level, Orbán’s ongoing constitutional changes and reforms highlight the EU’s limited formal ability to reverse his consolidation of control. The EU’s formal tools, such as the freezing of funds or legal proceedings, have had limited success in reversing the concentration of power and institutional changes in Hungary. 

However, Orbán’s declining popularity also reveals the EU’s continuing informal influence in shaping political discourse. Despite government criticism of Brussels, public trust in the EU appears relatively intact; many Hungarian citizens continue to view the EU as a legitimate and valuable institution. This is reflected in the narrative of opposition figures like Péter Magyar, who emphasize a pro-Brussels stance and promise to restore relations with the EU as part of their campaign. 

This dynamic highlights how the EU’s soft power, grounded in its role as a reference point for democratic standards, can continue to shape domestic political narratives, even in contexts where its direct leverage is limited.