Xi Jinping and Narendra Modi’s Transactional Thaw: Rebuilding Ties Without Resolving Rivalries

  • Xi and Modi are cautiously rebuilding relations after years of tensions, using diplomacy and economic cooperation to prevent the border dispute from derailing wider ties.
  • Both have strategic incentives for normalisation: Xi seeks stability on China’s western frontier, while Modi wants to ease border tensions and manage India’s economic dependence on China.
  • The thaw remains limited by territorial disputes, China’s partnership with Pakistan, and economic imbalances, making this a transactional détente rather than full reconciliation.
Xi Jinping - President of the People's Republic of China & Narendra Modi - Prime Minister of India
Xi Jinping – President of the People’s Republic of China & Narendra Modi – Prime Minister of India

Why are Xi Jinping and Narendra Modi TRANSACTIONAL?

Answer: Xi and Modi are strategically rebuilding diplomatic and economic engagement, but unresolved border disputes prevent deeper rapprochement.

Since the confrontation in the Galwan River valley on June 15, 2020, the President of the People’s Republic of China, Xi Jinping, and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi have taken steps to improve their relationship. 

In October 2024, a patrolling agreement at Depsang and Demchok, disputed border regions in the Line of Actual Control (LAC), created conditions for the resumption of political contact between the two countries. Xi and Modi have since met on several occasions, including in Kazan in October 2024 and Tianjin in August 2025. 

On 12 September, 2026, Xi visited New Delhi for the BRICS Summit, meeting Modi in India for the first time since 2019. The meeting focused on restoring bilateral relations, expanding trade and supply-chain cooperation, and maintaining peace along the disputed border. 

Bilateral trade reached approximately US$151.1 billion in FY 2025–26, although the relationship remains asymmetric: India recorded a US$112.16 billion trade deficit with China. India’s reliance on Chinese machinery, electronics components, and industrial inputs makes rapid economic disengagement costly, particularly as Modi seeks to expand domestic manufacturing. Both leaders therefore have an economic interest in preventing political tensions from disrupting commercial ties.

BRICS and the SCO provide additional platforms for cooperation on global governance, regional security, and regional affairs. However, India remains wary of Chinese regional influence, particularly Beijing’s relationship with Pakistan at the border, commercial, and economic levels. At the same time, China continues to pursue its own regional priorities of strategic partnerships and hegemony in South Asia. These institutions allow both leaders to cooperate where their interests overlap without resolving their wider disagreements.

Modi has emphasised that resolving the border dispute is essential to deepening bilateral relations, whereas Xi has called for both countries to approach their relationship from a strategic, long-term perspective, without allowing their differences to define it. This tension was further highlighted on 16 September 2026, when India rejected the Pakistan-China Boundary Joint Commission, arguing that it had no legal basis to address territory claimed by India.

What does Xi want?

Answer: Xi wants to stabilise China’s relationship with India without compromising Beijing’s regional influence.

Xi wants stability on China’s western frontier by avoiding military confrontation with India. Xi’s operationalisation of the China-Pakistan Border Commission feeds into his goal of preserving China’s regional influence. Beijing’s relationship with Pakistan is a strategic partnership which encompasses military cooperation, economic investment through the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor, and diplomatic support. Xi will therefore engage New Delhi without compromising this partnership, which serves several of China’s wider regional objectives.

Xi’s approach reflects his wider ambition to consolidate China’s position as a major international power. Xi has explicitly called for China to pursue a more prominent role in reforming and shaping the international governance system, while presenting national rejuvenation and the expansion of China’s international influence as central foreign-policy objectives. 

Maintaining stable relations with India can support these ambitions by reducing regional tensions and demonstrating Beijing’s ability to sustain engagement with foreign actors despite differences. Xi seeks a more multipolar international order with a greater voice in the region, an aim Modi shares despite their competition for influence. 

What does Modi want?

Answer: Modi wants to avoid more conflict and restore engagement without compromising India’s strategic autonomy and goals.

Modi, like Xi, seeks stability on India’s borders. Preventing another military confrontation along the LAC and reducing the security costs associated with maintaining a heavily militarised border are his main security objectives. Moreover, for Modi, resolving the border issue is key to deepening relations with China, thus making it an essential part of his agenda. He wishes to maintain India’s territorial claims and resist Chinese actions that New Delhi considers to undermine its sovereignty.

At the same time, Modi is seeking to prevent China from expanding its regional influence, particularly through its strategic and military partnership with Pakistan, where cooperation between Beijing and Islamabad intersects with India’s territorial claims.

Economically, Modi wants to reduce India’s dependence on Chinese imports while improving the balance of the bilateral relationship. Considering the trade deficit with China in FY 2025–26, he is seeking to strengthen domestic manufacturing, diversify supply chains, and expand Indian exports, while preserving the trade and investment opportunities that engagement with China provides. Industrial initiatives such as the Production Linked Incentive (PLI) scheme and the Electronics Component Manufacturing Scheme (ECMS) reflect this ambition to strengthen domestic output capacity.

Preserving India’s strategic autonomy and regional position is another central objective for Modi. He wants to maintain the freedom to cooperate with the United States, Japan, and other partners without becoming dependent on any single strategic relationship. India’s policy of multi-alignment reflects this approach, as New Delhi deepens security and technological cooperation with Washington and Tokyo while engaging with Beijing through international forums.

What is Xi doing?

Answer: Xi is steering normalisation towards trade and diplomatic cooperation, separating unresolved territorial and strategic disputes from wider bilateral engagement.

At Xi and Modi’s August 2025 meeting in Tianjin, Xi described the previous year’s Kazan meeting as having enabled bilateral relations to reset and called for the two countries to become good-neighbour partners. He reinforced this approach during his 12 September 2026 meeting with Modi, advocating a strategic and long-term perspective on the relationship.

Xi has also supported the restoration of practical bilateral exchanges. The August 2025 agreement between the foreign ministers of India and China included plans to resume direct flights, facilitate visas for tourists and business travellers, and restore official dialogue mechanisms. By giving political backing to these initiatives, Xi is helping move normalisation beyond summit diplomacy towards the restoration of regular institutional and commercial engagement.

During his September 2026 meeting with Modi, Xi supported expanding business links, improving mobility, and addressing barriers to market access. However, these commercial obstacles extend beyond investment screening, with Chinese machinery and components facing prolonged customs delays and businesses reporting visa difficulties and restrictions on industrial equipment. 

Xi’s renewed political engagement with Modi, in pursuit of expanded commercial access, allows him to reinforce China’s regional position while managing tensions with a major regional competitor. However, negotiations have yet to produce a comprehensive easing of the restrictions affecting Chinese businesses in India. 

Xi is therefore using renewed political engagement to pursue greater commercial access, although the negotiations have yet to produce a comprehensive easing of the restrictions affecting Chinese businesses.

What is Modi doing?

Answer: Modi is reducing India’s dependence on China whilst engaging in a strategic diplomatic thaw.

Through the Special Representatives’ mechanism, Modi is continuing to negotiate the border dispute, seeking tighter controls on the LAC to prevent further military confrontation. India rejected the Pakistan–China Boundary Joint Commission, arguing that it had no authority over territory claimed by India, including the bordering Shaksgam Valley. He is willing to engage with Xi in commercial terms and multilateral organisations, but not to compromise on sovereignty or abandon the demand for a border settlement.

Introduced in 2020, the PLI schemes provide incentives across 14 commercial sectors to address the economic imbalance between India and China. As of March 2026, they have attracted ₹2.40 trillion in investment across all sectors, not only in terms of investment specifically aimed at replacing Chinese imports. Furthermore, the ECMS received an increased allocation of ₹400 billion in the 2026 budget, as Modi is aiming to expand domestic electronics component manufacturing and reduce reliance on imports, mainly from China. 

Modi has maintained selective economic engagement with China. Amendments to Press Note 3 were made in March 2026. The revised framework allows non-controlling foreign investments of up to 10% through the automatic route and sets a 60-day approval timeline for proposals in specified manufacturing sectors. The government authorised select state-owned companies to procure certain equipment from Chinese suppliers, reflecting India’s continued reliance on Chinese manufacturers for specialised industrial equipment and components that domestic suppliers cannot yet provide at comparable scale.

Through these objectives, Modi is demonstrating that India can defend its sovereignty while managing relations with China, reinforcing the image of his government as capable of managing strategic challenges and clear in its foreign policy priorities on the regional stage.

Who is winning?

Answer: Both leaders are gaining from recent cooperation, preserving their strategic interests without resolving the rivalry that divides them.

Xi has secured renewed high-level engagement without making major concessions on the border dispute, while reducing tensions along China’s western frontier, and has maintained Beijing’s strategic partnership with Pakistan. The bilateral trade imbalance demonstrates that diplomatic normalisation has not produced a more balanced economic relationship. 

Modi has also benefited from reduced border tensions and renewed diplomatic engagement, which give him greater room to pursue India’s wider foreign-policy priorities. He has also maintained relations with the United States and other strategic partners while engaging China through BRICS and the SCO. Domestic manufacturing and supply chain diversification are also intended to reduce India’s long-term vulnerability. However, China’s continued cooperation with Pakistan and India’s dependence on Chinese industrial inputs continue to constrain its position.

In the short term, both Xi and Modi have an incentive to preserve border stability, maintain diplomatic channels, and pursue economic cooperation where their interests overlap. The durability of this arrangement will depend on whether military confidence-building translates into sustained de-escalation and whether India’s supply-chain diversification reduces its economic exposure in terms of supply chains and production capacity.

Beyond the bilateral relationship, how Xi and Modi manage their rivalry will shape the balance of power in Asia and the wider international order. This remains a TRANSACTIONAL détente where both leaders have gained room to manoeuvre, but neither has resolved the strategic competition that brought them into confrontation.

Gabriela Vargas Hernandez

Research and Analysis Intern