- Tokayev has replaced Kazakhstan’s 1995 Constitution with a new political order presented as an effort to modernise the country and foster stability.
- The new Constitution strengthens Tokayev’s control over key state institutions and consolidates his political position.
- The reforms mark a decisive shift away from the political era of his predecessor, Nazarbayev.

Why is Tokayev BLAZING?
Answer: Tokayev has successfully introduced a new Constitution that reshapes Kazakhstan’s political system and consolidates his own political position.
Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, Kazakhstan’s second president, is reshaping Kazakhstan’s political system. More than 80% of the country’s 1995 Constitution has been rewritten, creating a new Constitutional order that came into force on the 1st of July 2026.
The new Constitution introduces a significant transformation of Kazakhstan’s political system. Whereas the 1995 Constitution established a highly centralised presidential system with a bicameral parliament and broad presidential powers, the new 2026 Constitution abolishes the Senate in favour of a unicameral parliament, reintroduces a fully proportional electoral system, and creates a consultative People’s Council.
Together, these reforms replace the institutional framework inherited from Tokayev’s predecessor, Nursultan Nazarbayev. Tokayev presents the changes as a move away from a “super-presidential” model towards a more modern and institutionalised state with stronger checks and balances and a greater emphasis on the rule of law.
Despite its stated objective of reducing presidential dominance, the new Constitution reinforces Tokayev’s influence over key state institutions. It gives the president sole authority to nominate candidates for the country’s highest judicial offices, including the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court, though the final appointment still requires Kurultai consent. Moreover, the abolition of the bicameral legislature and the return to party-list voting reduce institutional checks on presidential authority and reinforce ruling-party control.
This concentration of institutional power is further strengthened by the recent absorption of Kazakhstan’s ruling Amanat party into the newly formed pro-Tokayev Adilet party, which, according to projections, is expected to secure between 70% and 80% of seats in the new Kurultai. Taken together, these developments display Tokayev’s success in redefining Kazakhstan’s political order while strengthening his position at the centre of power.
What is changing Tokayev’s heat level?
Answer: The Constitutional overhaul is the culmination of Tokayev’s post-January 2022 effort to dismantle the Nazarbayev political system.
Although Tokayev assumed the presidency in 2019 as Nazarbayev’s chosen successor, his early presidency remained closely tied to the personalised political system Nazarbayev had built. The former president continued to wield considerable influence through his Constitutional privileges and leadership of the Security Council.
The January 2022 unrest marked a decisive turning point. Protests began over rising fuel prices but escalated into broader public frustration with the political and economic inequalities associated with the Nazarbayev era. Therefore, Tokayev responded by entering into a process of “de-Nazarbayevication”. He dismantled the remaining pillars of Nazarbayev’s influence by removing him from the Security Council, abolishing his lifetime Constitutional privileges, dismantling Nazarbayev’s patronage networks, and distancing the presidency from the Nazarbayev political brand.
The 2026 Constitution completes this process. By replacing, rather than merely amending, the 1995 Constitution that underpinned Nazarbayev’s rule for nearly three decades, it symbolically and institutionally closes the Nazarbayev era. This is reinforced by the merger of Amanat and Adilet, with Amanat previously serving as Nazarbayev’s main political vehicle under its former name, Nur Otan. Through these changes, Tokayev has been able to distance himself from his predecessor’s legacy while repurposing existing political structures to strengthen his own position.
What is driving Tokayev?
Answer: Tokayev is driven by a combination of domestic power consolidation and the need to foster a stable political environment capable of attracting investment.
In the creation of the new Constitution, Tokayev has been driven by the desire to create a more stable and institutionalised state, capable of supporting Kazakhstan’s long-term development. He has consistently presented the 2026 Constitution as a response to changing economic, geopolitical and technological realities, arguing that the institutional framework established in 1995 no longer reflects Kazakhstan’s contemporary needs and ambitions.
Against the backdrop of the January 2022 unrest, the economic disruption caused by the Russia–Ukraine war, and Kazakhstan’s ambition to diversify into sectors such as critical minerals, transport and the digital economy, Tokayev has sought to establish a stronger and more predictable system of governance. Ultimately, his constitutional project reflects a broader ambition to build a resilient state with the institutional capacity to manage future challenges, attract investment and secure Kazakhstan’s long-term economic and political stability.
Beyond his stated ambitions, the constitutional reforms also appear to serve a strategic political purpose: preserving Tokayev’s ability to influence Kazakhstan’s future direction. He has repeatedly stated that he intends to leave office in 2029. However, after the Constitution came into place, Tokayev requested the Constitutional Court to clarify whether he would be eligible to run. The Court ruled that presidential terms served under the 1995 Constitution do not count towards the new term limits, potentially allowing him to seek another term. While the current president has not announced any intention to remain in power, securing this legal possibility ensures that he retains the option to continue shaping Kazakhstan’s political trajectory.
Furthermore, the introduction of the vice presidency in the 2026 Constitution creates a formal succession framework that could allow Tokayev to influence strategic policymaking even after leaving office. Together, these reforms provide Tokayev with multiple pathways to preserve political influence beyond 2029, suggesting that he seeks to ensure continued relevance in Kazakhstan’s political landscape beyond his current presidency.
What does this mean for you?
Answer: Kazakhstan’s Constitutional reforms reflect a broader pattern of using constitutional change to consolidate executive power.
Tokayev’s reforms illustrate a growing feature of contemporary politics: constitutional reform is increasingly used not only to restructure states but also to consolidate political authority. By redesigning institutions and promoting the language of efficiency, stability and the rule of law, governments can strengthen executive power while maintaining an image of political renewal. Rather than relying solely on coercion or electoral control, certain leaders such as Tokayev are using constitutional change to reshape the political system in ways that increase institutional legitimacy while preserving their influence.
In particular, similar dynamics can be observed in countries such as Russia and Turkey. In Russia, Vladimir Putin’s 2020 Constitutional amendments also reset presidential term limits and expandeded presidential authority. Similarly, in Turkey,Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s 2017 Constitutional Referendum replaced the parliamentary system with an executive presidency, significantly increasing the powers of the presidency. In both cases, constitutional reform was framed as necessary to address institutional challenges and improve political stability, while simultaneously reinforcing the incumbent leader’s long-term political position. Understanding Tokayev’s constitutional reforms is therefore important not only for assessing Kazakhstan’s political trajectory, but also for recognising a wider pattern in which constitutional change is increasingly used to strengthen political legitimacy and executive influence.
