• Saïed signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the EU in July 2023 to formalise Tunisia’s migration partnership.
• With most checks on his power removed, protests and a divided society create tension without affecting the policy.
• This MoU suggests the EU is prepared to accept governance concerns in return for fewer arrivals.

Why is Saïed‘s heat level HOT?

Answer: Saïed has delivered on his promise to stop Tunisia from becoming a transit country, and turned it into money and legitimacy. 

In a February 2023 speech, Saïed claimed that irregular migration from Sub-Saharan Africa was a plot to ‘alter the demographic structure of Tunisia’. He has insisted ever since that Tunisia will not become a land of transit or settlement. The MoU gave that position a financial and diplomatic framework.

The MoU promised up to 1 billion euros, but the sums committed were smaller: 105 million euros in migration funding and 150 million in budget support, with a further 208 million euros reportedly allocated in 2024, mostly for coast guard and police equipment. In exchange, Tunisia strengthens border surveillance, accepts the return of its nationals and cooperates against smuggling networks. More than 30,000 people were intercepted at sea between January and May 2024, a 36% increase on the year before. 

The results match Saïed’s rhetoric. Arrivals in Italy from Tunisia fell from 97,667 in 2023 to 4,841 in 2025, a 95% drop. Migrant camps were evacuated, Saied pushed for more voluntary returns, and the Foreign Ministry is aiming for 10,000 repatriations by the end of 2026.

The MoU is a non-binding political declaration with no human rights clause and no independent monitoring. This suggests Saïed secured EU money without conceding anything on governance. He has also framed this relationship as one between equals, saying Tunisia accepts EU cooperation, but ‘not charity’.

What is changing Saïed‘s heat level?

Answer: Although Saïed has removed most of the veto players who could block him, protests and a divided society create tension around the policy without having substantially altered it.

Since 2021, Saïed has built an ‘ultra-presidential’ regime that weakened parliament, so formal institutions no longer function as real checks. Civil society is also under pressure. Anti-racism activist Saadia Mosbah was prosecuted on money-laundering charges that activists see as retaliation for opposing state racism, and a parliamentary draft amending Decree 88 on associations could entrench NGO restrictions. However, the courts have not been entirely compliant, as several NGO workers accused of helping migrants received only suspended sentences.

Public opinion is divided. Saïed’s framing of migration as a question of ‘sovereignty’ resonates: 65% of Tunisians say migrants harm the economy, though 60% would not mind them as neighbours. While these crackdowns have not dramatically shaken his popularity, in August 2026, anti-government protests calling for his removal and a return to democracy entered their second month. Protests over migration point both ways: some denounce racism and the treatment of migrants, whereas others demand deportation.

The human cost is significant. Saïed’s rhetoric was followed by a wave of racist violence, including in Sfax, and in July 2026, 46 organisations said that the MoU had fuelled and normalised serious human rights violations. However, this has not translated into real pressure on Saïed. The African Union initially asked him to refrain from racialised hate speech, but this faded once the EU deals went ahead. Overall, the policy has helped Saïed more than it has hurt him. The main risk to his standing is wider discontent over democracy and the economy.

What is driving Saïed?

Answer: Saïed is driven by regime survival and legitimacy, using migration as both scapegoat and leverage over Europe.

Regime survival comes first: EU funds flow into the Interior Ministry, the regime’s backbone. The MoU also gives de facto recognition to his anti-democratic leadership, and EU criticism of his authoritarian turn has been toned down to avoid hurting him.

Saïed has also used migration flows as leverage, extracting money and political legitimacy from EU capitals fearing mass arrivals. Scapegoating Sub-Saharan migrants also lets Saied deflect anger over the economic crisis.

Ideology matters alongside these calculations. Saïed presents migration as the product of an ‘unjust’ global economic order of which Tunisia is also a victim. He has declared that Africa ‘must remain the land of Africans’. In a March 2026 call with Macron, he described the partnership as ‘unfair’ and called for a revised framework and the recovery of misappropriated assets. This suggests his rhetoric centres on sovereignty and dignity, not just economics.

The policy also met his stated aim of preventing transit and settlement, but did not tackle the root causes of emigration. 41% of Tunisians want to emigrate, including 67% of young people, and 78% of potential migrants cite economic conditions. Inflation and public debt have risen, and IMF support is almost impossible to access. His calls for renegotiation and asset recovery have stalled, highlighting the gap between his bold rhetoric and limited leverage.

What does this mean for you?

Answer: The EU is outsourcing migration control to its neighbours, giving leaders like Saied leverage to extract funding and recognition.

Tunisia is not an isolated case. Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni called the MoU a ‘model’ for relations with North African countries, and it became a template for further EU deals, most notably Egypt’s 7.4 billion euro agreement, with similar arrangements in Mauritania and Morocco. 

This raises questions about what Europe is willing to trade for lower arrivals. In Tunisia, it accepted a deal with no human rights clause in exchange for fewer crossings. Yet funding authoritarian partners like Saïed does little to address why people leave.

There is also a stability risk. Saïed faces continuing protests and an economic crisis. If the protests destabilise the regime, or the economy worsens further, departures could rise again, including among Tunisians, given how many want to leave. By tying its migration policy to one leader, the EU has made its border control only as stable as Saied’s rule.