Net Zero by 2050: A Roadmap for the Global Energy Sector
Net Zero by 2050: A Roadmap for the Global Energy Sector functions as a blueprint for individual countries wishing to restructure their national energy sector to promote renewable energy sources over fossil fuels, in hopes of maintaining the Paris Agreement. Due to the fact that the IEA does not possess legislative power, the adoption of the initiative is voluntary. Because of this, the overall impact of the roadmap is determined by limited reports of the countries choosing to adopt the policy. In 2023, the framework was updated to include over 400 milestones, which together help quantify the impact of the policy.
Since its publication in 2021, the roadmap “quickly became an important benchmark for policymakers, industry, the financial sector and civil society” (IEA). The initiative has contributed to progress in solar PV capacity and electric vehicle sales, which are two goals outlined in the report. Net Zero by 2050 aims for solar PV capacity to reach 630 gigawatts by 2030, and in the 2023 update of the roadmap it is stated that “if all announced projects are realised, manufacturing capacity for solar PV will exceed the level required in 2030” (IEA). Similarly to that of solar PV, the manufacturing capacities for electric vehicle batteries are already “sufficient to meet projected demand in 2030” (IEA). Additionally, the sales of electric cars have increased 240% since 2020, showing progression towards less emissions from the transportation sector.
The IEA clearly outlines investment milestones in the roadmap, one being the need for increased investment in clean energy. In 2023, USD 1.8 trillion was invested in clean energy. The policy also highlights the importance of the investments to average approximately USD 4.5 trillion by 2030. In 2024, investments hit USD 2.1 trillion and the following year USD 2.3 trillion. This shows an increase of roughly 11% and 8% respectively between the years.
The overarching goal of Net Zero by 2050: A roadmap for the Global Energy Sector is to decrease the use of and investment in fossil fuels and increase that of renewable energy. While there is an evident increase in investments for clean energy, the initiative also highlights the need for a rapid reduction of investments for fossil fuels. In 2026, global energy investments are expected to reach USD 3.4 trillion, clean energy representing almost two-thirds, the remainder being fossil fuels. This directly conflicts with the roadmap’s goal of no new fossil fuel projects.
In 2024, carbon dioxide emissions from the global energy sector amounted to 38 gigatonnes. To achieve the goal of net zero emissions by 2050, the IEA estimates the need for a 55% decrease in emissions by 2035. This would mean a decrease from 38 gigatonnes to roughly 18 gigatonnes in a span of 11 years. It is difficult to currently assess whether this target is on track. However, as investments in renewable energy sources are seeing a significant increase, it is likely this form of energy will play a more significant role than before, also concurring with fossil fuel based energy sources currently representing close to 68% of all greenhouse gas emissions.
Net Zero by 2050 directly addresses the main causes of anthropogenic climate change by fundamentally challenging current energy systems based on fossil fuels. Reducing the general use of fossil fuels would lead to a decrease in emissions, thereby also decreasing the negative human pressures on systems such as food security and economic stability.
While the roadmap has been widely praised for its guidance towards a more sustainable future, it has also attracted criticism from countries where fossil fuel production is central. Organisations such as OPEC have argued that the initiative underestimates the importance of oil and gas in the world, and that the transition is not as simple as the IEA roadmap makes it out to be.
For example, Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman, Saudi Arabia’s Energy Minister, has also directly dismissed the framework by describing it as a “La La Land” scenario and saying: “why should I take it seriously?” in a press conference. Similarly, Qatar’s Energy Minister, Saad Sherida Al Kaabi, has also criticised the roadmap by expressing his concern over the “dangerous” “euphoria” that comes with the clean energy transition. Saudi Arabia and Qatar are two countries strongly dedicated to the continued expansion of fossil fuels. Together with Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Novak, they have also expressed concern for the perceived extreme price increase of fossil fuels that will follow the IEA-proposed transition away from these energy sources.
While the roadmap has seen critiques like the ones mentioned above, the IEA is continuously dedicated to its plan of reaching net zero by 2050 and to achieve all other goals outlined in the initiative. The IEA is already seeing great progress toward goals related to solar PV and increased investments in clean energy. At the same time, goals of reducing fossil fuel emissions and fully cutting all new fossil fuel projects are currently not going according to the outlined plan. Overall, the milestones presented in the roadmap provide clear guidance on how to reach net zero by 2050, and it continues to receive praise and support from countries worldwide.
Scaling Up Private Finance for Clean Energy in Emerging and Developing Economies
The implementation and impact of this policy are difficult to directly measure as the IEA lacks hard power and cannot force countries to adopt policies or directly finance projects. Instead, it works through policy recommendations, technical support, partnerships and international cooperation. Therefore, implementation is best measured through outcomes the policy was designed to encourage in countries that cooperate with the IEA, such as increased clean energy investment, greater private sector participation and the growing use of financial mechanisms that reduce investment risks. By partnering with the IFC for this initiative not only are they increasing exposure and credibility of the policy but also addresses one of the key challenges the IEA faces as an international organisation which is having the resources to directly finance projects or mobilise capital itself. The IFC specialises in mobilising private investment in developing economies allowing this initiative to combine both energy expertise from the IEA with the IFC’s experience in attracting private investment and developing financial instruments.
There is evidence that implementation is occurring. One of the initiative’s main objectives was to increase private investment in clean energy projects by reducing risk and improving investment conditions. Since the report was published in 2023, many of the financial mechanisms it recommends have increasingly appeared in international financing strategies.
An OECD report on clean energy finance highlighted in 2025 the growing use of guarantee schemes and other risk-mitigation instruments designed to mobilise private capital in clean energy projects in developing countries. The report also relies on information from the IEA and acknowledges contributors from IEA experts, suggesting that the agency’s analysis is helping shape broader international discussions on clean energy finance.
Similarly, the World Bank Group launched a new guarantee platform in 2024 that consolidates guarantee products across institutions, including the IFC, and aims to significantly increase guarantee issuance and private finance mobilisation. While the platform was not created by the IEA, it reflects the same risk-reducing and blended finance approach promoted by the IEA-IFC initiative. The involvement of the IFC makes the connection stronger because the organisation that helped develop the policy is also involved in expanding the types of guarantee and risk-sharing mechanism recommended in the report.
Implementation can also be seen through the IEA’s own activities. Through its Clean Energy Transition programme, the IEA has worked directly with governments to improve financing conditions for clean energy projects. In Indonesia, the programme provided analysis to support financing and deployment of 6GW of energy storage over the next decade. Additionally, in Brazil, the IEA supported efforts to scale clean energy-investment through the Brazil Investment Platform. Although these initiatives do not provide direct financing these examples demonstrate that the IEA is actively working to create the conditions necessary to attract private-sector investment.
One of the most significant challenges remains the high cost of capital in middle and lower income economies. In response to this, the IEA launched the Cost of Capital Observatory in September 2025 to increase transparency around financing conditions and provide investors with more reliable information on energy-sector financing costs, particularly in emerging and developing economies where such data is often limited. The observatory also provides governments with tools, analysis and case studies designed to identify investment barriers and improve financing conditions for clean energy projects. This reflects one of the central objectives of this initiative, creating a more attractive environment for private capital.
However, the Observatory also demonstrates that many of the barriers identified by the policy remain. While concessional finance, guarantees and other risk-mitigation instruments can help attract investment, financing conditions in many middle and lower income economies remain significantly less favourable than in advanced economies. In Kenya and Senegal the cost of capital for utility-scale solar projects was estimated at around 8.5-9% compared with 4.7-6.4% in Europe and North America.
The IEA found that concerns about government and regulatory risks, the financial health of electricity utilities and wider macroeconomic risks continue to increase financing costs for investors. As a result, many clean energy projects remain far more expensive to finance and more difficult to develop, limiting the flow of private capital into the sector. Progress in Africa remains slow, with the continent receiving only around 2% of global clean energy investment despite being home to roughly 20% of the world’s population. Additionally, energy investment has fallen by approximately 34% since its peak in 2014. This suggests that not only does the financing gap remain, but in some areas investment has actually declined despite growing energy demand.
Overall, this initiative can be considered partially implemented. The IEA has established multiple programmes and partnerships with governments, development banks and IOs to improve financial conditions and encourage greater private investment. However, financing levels remain far below what is needed to support the goals set and investment risks remain high. One of the policy’s greatest strengths is that it recognises climate action and economic development as complementary rather than competing objectives, encouraging investment as it can also help with long-term economic growth with job creation. Birol does not present the clean energy transition as an environmental objective alone but frames it as a way of supporting economic growth, improving energy security by having more diverse energy streams and expanding access to affordable energy. Furthermore, this policy is relevant to the broader climate crisis as future energy demand growth and a significant part of future emissions are expected to come from middle and lower income economies. Without investment, these countries will remain dependent on fossil fuels to support economic growth. By improving access to finance for clean energy projects, the policy addresses one of the biggest barriers to reducing global greenhouse gas emissions.
IEA Critical Minerals and Clean Energy Policy
The implementation of the IEA Critical Minerals and Clean Energy is uneven across its three main mechanisms, The Global Critical Minerals Outlook, The Critical Minerals Policy Tracker, and The Voluntary Security Programme. It has reached full implementation in some objectives, while others are still lacking depth and development.
For example, the Global Critical Minerals Outlook, is considered to be fully operational, as it has reached the highest degree of operational maturity, with successive editions published in 2024 and 2025, establishing a stable annual framework for monitoring critical mineral markets and supply risks. Through these publications, the IEA has significantly expanded global knowledge regarding mineral demand, investment trends, and potential supply vulnerabilities. Following the 2025 publication, the Outlook has established a stable annual publication cycle. This informational role has been further strengthened through the development of the Critical Minerals Policy Tracker, an interactive platform that monitors and compares government policies related to critical minerals across major economies.
Yet, implementation in the Voluntary Security Programme is still in progress and lags behind the other objectives . Emergency preparedness exercises were only held in late 2024 and November 2025, with stockpiling measures remaining voluntary and subject to no binding commitments. Consequently, although the initiative has successfully increased market transparency and awareness of supply risks, its ability to coordinate collective responses to potential supply disruptions remains limited.
Economically, the policy has not yet reversed the market dynamics it seeks to address. Despite growing political attention to critical mineral security , mineral markets experienced considerable volatility in 2023. Battery mineral prices fell sharply, for example, lithium spot prices dropped by 75%, while the prices of nickel, cobalt, and graphite declined by 30% to 45%. Rather than encouraging investment diversification, this led to a weakening of new investment in diversified production at precisely the moment when alternative supply chains were being promoted.
These vulnerabilities also have significant industrial implications. According to IEA models, a severe supply shock could lead to a five-fold increase in graphite prices that could widen the gap in battery manufacturing costs between Europe and China or between the United States and China to around 70%. This threatens industrial competitiveness and jobs in economies building out clean energy manufacturing. This could undermine employment and industrial strategies that depend on large-scale battery production. Consequently, the initiative has succeeded in identifying and incorporating risks relating to the security of mineral supply, but has so far had limited capacity to mitigate the underlying economic dynamics that continue to reinforce the concentration of supply.
Politically, the initiative has substantially elevated both the IEA’s and Birol’s standing in global economic and climate governance. Birol’s concerns regarding supply concentration have become mainstream policy positions, reflected in the Group of Seven (G7) communiqués and European Union (EU) industrial strategy documents. The initiative has also allowed the IEA to successfully establish itself as a key actor within the framework of the emerging governance architecture surrounding critical minerals, especially in the critical minerals agendas of the EU Critical Raw Materials Act and the United States Inflation Reduction Act, two of the most consequential industrial policy instruments of the 2020s. However, the initiative has had a considerably greater impact on setting the agenda than at the operational level. As the Voluntary Security Programme is based entirely on voluntary participation, the level of commitment among member states remains uneven, limiting the Agency’s ability to coordinate collective responses to supply disruptions.
Environmentally, the policy has addressed an increasingly important structural dimension of the global energy transition by focusing on the material preconditions for clean energy technologies. This includes solar panels, wind turbines, electric vehicle batteries, and electrolysers. The significance of this challenge is illustrated by the fact that a typical electric vehicle requires six times the mineral inputs of a conventional vehicle. Consequently, supply chains for these minerals remain highly concentrated, vulnerable to disruption, or governed by weak ESG standards that invite regulatory backlash or community opposition and slow broader decarbonisation efforts.
It is also important to highlight that the policy does not tackle carbon emissions directly. The initiative’s climate relevance therefore remains indirect and dependent upon broader decarbonisation policies that generate demand for clean technologies. Furthermore, framing mineral supply as an energy security problem can inadvertently license accelerated extraction in new jurisdictions without adequate environmental safeguards, replicating the damage it claims to address. Hence, climate mitigation is only effectively addressed once mineral security objectives are combined with environmental governance frameworks and emission reduction targets.
Overall the policy has significantly strengthened the IEA’s role in global energy governance and improved awareness of the strategic vulnerabilities associated with clean energy supply chains. Through the establishment of the Global Critical Minerals Outlook and related policy-monitoring mechanisms, the Agency has successfully mainstreamed concerns regarding supply concentration, investment risks, and mineral security within major industrial economies. Nevertheless, implementation remains uneven, particularly regarding the Voluntary Security Programme and environmental governance mechanisms, while persistent market volatility continues to constrain supply diversification efforts.
Ultimately, the stated policies have been partially implemented, and their impact varies. Starting with Net Zero by 2050: A Roadmap for the Global Energy Sector, many of its milestones, particularly those related to clean energy investment, are on track to be achieved. However, it remains misaligned with goals such as reducing global emissions. The Scaling Up Private Finance for Emerging and Developing Economies initiative has made progress by strengthening collaboration between governments, development banks, and private investors to reduce investment risks.
Despite this, investment continues to remain concentrated in advanced economies, with issues such as high borrowing costs limiting its full implementation. Finally, the IEA Critical Minerals and Clean Energy initiative reflects a similarly uneven pattern of implementation, albeit for different structural reasons. The Global Critical Minerals Outlook and the Critical Minerals Policy Tracker have developed into stable, widely referenced instruments, and their influence is evident in the extent to which supply concentration has become a mainstream concern within G7 and EU industrial policy circles. Yet, the Voluntary Security Programme remains structurally weak, as its reliance on non-binding commitments has left the IEA without a mechanism to achieve its primary objectives.
Birol has strengthened both his reputation and institutional credibility by shifting the IEA perspective to an energy governance focused institution. Birol has gained domain expertise in clean energy, as he launched the first-ever global summit in relation to critical minerals, published the defining annual market reviews, and convened the first emergency preparedness exercise in the sector. Through these initiatives, he has enabled for the Agency to accumulate significant expertise and positioned itself as an authoritative source of data, policy coordination, and strategic guidance on critical minerals.
The combined impact of these three policies reflects Birol’s approach to climate leadership. They all focus on facilitating the clean energy transition and the significant decarbonisation of dependent industries while supporting economic, social, and environmental development. However, the persistent constraints highlighted by these policies, resulting from the IEA’s lack of legislative or financial authority, mean that implementation ultimately depends on the voluntary cooperation of member states and private capital. Hence, the policies have been effective in redefining terms and shaping discourse rather than addressing the recurring gaps they are intended to resolve.
IE x RAIA Summer Research Programme:
This article is an excerpt from a report on Fatih Birol produced as part of a RAIA research programme on climate leaders. For a full picture of Birol’s climate leadership, including the sources, read the full report. This project was fully financed by IE University’s School of Politics, Economics and Global Affairs and School of Science and Technology.
Authors: Sofia Hession, Alexandra Björkman & Ariadna Alvarenga
Editor: Roxane de Bergevin
Project Lead: Dario Hasenstab
