The following section assesses the impact of three policies implemented by Ursula von der Leyen through the Green Deal, considering her economic drive, the extent to which environmental concerns have been reflected throughout her mandate, and the effectiveness of these policies in national, political, and environmental terms.

Fit for 55

The Fit for 55 package aims to reduce GHG emissions by 55% through legally binding targets set for 2030. As of 2026, all 15 core legislative acts have been adopted, strengthening existing mechanisms while introducing new regulations concerning climate policies, energy, transport, buildings, and land usage.

In 2024, GHG emissions from ETS-covered power sector installations fell by nearly 11% compared to 2023, reflecting a continuous reduction in emissions due to the increase of renewable energy and the replacement of coal with gas in power generation and heavy industry sectors.

The ETS has also generated significant revenue for the clean transition, raising up to €38.8 billion in 2024 and enabling member states to accelerate their shift towards renewable energy and reduce dependence on carbon technologies. Furthermore, the EU’s renewable electricity has increased from 34% in 2019, the year the Green Deal was introduced, to 47% in 2024, while the combined share of wind and solar energy rose from 17% to 29%. Rather than just setting policy targets, this acceleration is also directly attributed to EU-level funding. The Recovery and Resilience Facility allocated €153.8 billion to energy-related measures, which accounts for 27% of its total funding, while the Modernisation Fund, financed by the ETS revenues, has distributed an additional €20.7 billion to clean energy projects since 2021, creating financing channels that did not previously exist at the EU level. The leader in such transitions is Denmark, with more than 55% of their electricity generated from wind and solar power, demonstrating strong national implementation and a sustained commitment to the clean energy transition.

While the revised ETS has accounted for over 65% of the total EU GHG emissions, significant limitations in sectors such as road transport, buildings, and agriculture have showcased a much slower emissions reduction pace. The agricultural sector, for example, has only reduced its emissions by 1.2%, illustrating an uneven pace of decarbonisation shaped by political and economic constraints. To address this gap, the EU adopted ETS2, initially scheduled for implementation in 2027, extending emissions trading to suppliers of fuels used in buildings and road transport, alongside integrating the Social Climate Fund to mitigate the policy’s social impacts. However, its implementation has been postponed by one year and is now expected in 2028. Furthermore, the €45 per tonne limit and the absence of mechanisms addressing methane and nitrous oxide from agriculture limit its overall effectiveness.  

Beyond these sectoral gaps, the carbon market framework has generated economic discrepancies across the EU. Carbon prices rose to €80 per tonne between 2022 and 2023, briefly exceeding €100 per tonne in February 2023, making home and industry energy much more costly, in an industry that had already been impacted by the Russo-Ukrainian war, which had heightened volatility in gas markets. 

These disparities can be attributed to three main fault lines. First, among member states, the carbon-intensive economies of Central and Eastern Europe have experienced significantly greater losses in production and employment compared to Western countries, partly because free emission allowances have been concentrated in a few nations with steel and refinery capacities. Second, across income groups, low and middle-income households bear a disproportionately greater burden, as energy represents a larger share of their household expenditure at the same price per tonne. Third, across sectors, industries with high energy consumption, such as steel and chemical production, remain exposed to carbon leakage, as free allocation covers more than 90% of industrial emissions without sufficient differentiation based on the risk of leakage.

The automotive sector also posed a significant political and economic challenge. Employing approximately 13.8 million people across the EU, the industry faced mounting pressure from the transition to zero-emission mobility, rapid technological change, and growing competition from Chinese electric vehicle manufacturers. At the same time, manufacturers were required to invest heavily in battery production, charging infrastructure, and workforce reskilling while maintaining their global competitiveness. These challenges intensified concerns over industrial competitiveness and employment, contributing to political resistance against several Green Deal transport measures.

Politically, the Fit for 55 package of the Green Deal became one of the defining policies in von der Leyen’s presidency. It remained a central priority despite the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, the subsequent energy crisis, and the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, all of which disrupted the pace of the energy transition. At the same time, rising carbon prices contributed to higher energy costs, fuelling public discontent and strengthening support for far-right and agrarian parties in the June 2024 European Parliament elections.

A clear example was the revision of the planned ban on new combustion engine vehicles in December 2025. Under pressure from the EPP and the German government, the policy was diluted by allowing greater flexibility for certain vehicle technologies, thus weakening the originally established targets. The European Commission changed the requirement for all new cars to be 100% zero-emission by permitting exemptions for certain hybrids and range-extender vehicles. 

By June 2024, most member states had missed the deadline for submitting the updated NECPs. In response, the Commission opened infringement proceedings against 13 member states, and as of March 2025, Belgium, Croatia, Estonia, Poland, and Slovakia had still not submitted, raising concerns about the consistency of implementation across the EU. 

These limitations suggest that the effectiveness of the package relies on the ability to extend emission reduction mechanisms to more dispersed and politically sensitive sectors. These include areas where GHG emissions are more difficult to regulate, given that policies directly affect citizens, voters, or influential parties.

Overall, the Fit for 55 package has delivered measurable progress towards the EU’s climate objectives through strengthened emissions regulation, increased renewable energy deployment, and greater financial support for the clean transition. However, its implementation has also exposed significant political, economic, and social trade-offs. These challenges have placed Ursula von der Leyen under increasing pressure to balance the EU’s climate ambitions with concerns over industrial competitiveness, affordability, and member state support, making the implementation of Fit for 55 one of the defining pressure points of her presidency.

Adaptation Strategy

The Adaptation Strategy does not directly reduce CO₂ emissions but instead aims to minimise the damage caused by extreme weather events, economic losses, and systemic societal disruptions, while preparing member states for increasingly severe climate impacts. However, this broad political commitment has not been matched by equally effective implementation. 

By 2024, all 27 member states had started implementing the adaptation strategy, but monitoring is irregular. The EEA’s Climate resilience in Europe 2025 found that while all EEA member countries have adopted national adaptation policies, progress remains uneven. Persistent gaps in implementation, financing, monitoring and cross-border cooperation continue to limit Europe’s preparedness for escalating climate risks.

The strategy’s impact has varied considerably across the member states. Finland, the Netherlands, and Austria are among the most successful examples, having developed advanced multisectoral plans with dedicated financing streams. Finland, for example, demonstrates one of the most developed adaptation systems within the EU. Apart from implementing the national adaptation plan, it has designed multi-sector-specific policies that target health, agriculture, forestry, and environmental protection. These measures translate national adaptation objectives into sector-specific actions, such as strengthening climate-resilient agricultural and forestry practices, protecting ecosystems, and improving preparedness for climate-related health risks. Austria is also well recognised for its comprehensive adaptation framework. It has implemented 132 adaptation recommendations throughout 14 priority sectors, targeting agriculture, forestry, water management and energy These recommendations promote climate-resilient agricultural and forestry practices, improved water management, and stronger resilience of critical infrastructure and energy systems.

The best example is the Dutch National Delta Programme, funded continuously since 2011, which protects the Netherlands from extreme floods and ensures freshwater security for the community, aiming to make the country water-resilient by 2050. The programme strengthens the country’s climate resilience through coordinated governance and a continuous, long-term monitoring system. It combines sustained investments in flood defences, freshwater management, and spatial planning with regular assessments of climate risks, allowing measures to be adjusted as conditions change. 

In contrast, many Central and Eastern European countries have faced constraints in adaptation efforts as they are fossil-fuelled, industry-driven economies, which limits their financial and institutional focus on climate adaptation. This dependence has created political and economic resistance to stronger climate policies, as governments face pressure from energy-intensive industries and concerns over the costs of transitioning away from fossil fuels. These competing interests can divert political attention and public funding towards energy security and economic competitiveness rather than long-term climate resilience. This showcases how the policy’s main weakness is the lack of binding targets and enforcement mechanisms. 

Regarding its positive outcomes, the Adaptation Strategy’s impact is best reflected in its social benefits, particularly through its implementation in local projects and improvements to climate information systems. Projects funded by the LIFE programme have already produced visible changes in micro-climatic variables controlling the local climatic demand, including a 15% reduction of evapotranspiration demand, soil evaporation and plant transpiration, with a 15% increase in water infiltration rates. These improvements strengthen climate resilience by reducing heat stress while increasing water retention and ecosystem stability. A clear example of this is the expansion of Lisbon’s urban green infrastructure through the LIFE LUNGS programme that planted over 113,000 trees and shrubs, allowing for the development of 10.9 hectares of grassland. This helps reduce urban heat by providing shade and lowering surface temperatures, while the vegetation absorbs rainfall and strengthens the city’s resilience to flooding and erosion. The programme also increases biodiversity and, as the trees mature, will increasingly sequester carbon, demonstrating how urban greening can simultaneously address multiple climate risks.

Furthermore, the Adaptation Strategy has expanded the Climate-ADAPT platform and supported the development of the Copernicus climate services, in line with its objectives of promoting smarter adaptation by providing more accurate climate risk data, adaptation tools, case studies, and guidance for member states. These resources improve access to reliable climate information, helping member states identify vulnerabilities, anticipate future climate impacts, and incorporate adaptation into long-term planning and policymaking.

Despite these efforts, the policy still needs a more rigorous and developed system regarding social vulnerability to climate change. Particularly vulnerable groups include agricultural workers exposed to extreme heat and low-income households that lack access to adequate cooling systems. This suggests that while adaptation planning has expanded across the EU, implementation has not consistently translated into effective protection for vulnerable populations. 

For example, in August 2024 in Italy, agricultural worker Dalvir Singh, 54 years old, died after being exposed to temperatures above 40°C, during outside work without proper regulations, protections, or adaptations. Although Italy had adopted the National Climate Change Adaptation Plan (PNACC) in 2023, implementation remained insufficient, allowing for alarming incidents that highlight the gaps between national adaptation planning and its actual practice.

Lastly, from an environmental perspective, the Adaptation Strategy recognises that emissions reductions alone are insufficient to address the climate impacts that are already unfolding. As mentioned, the lack of binding targets and enforcement mechanisms results in regional disparities in adaptive capacity. These limitations are visible in southern Europe, particularly through the environmental challenges of extreme heat and drought, especially agricultural production, outdoor work, and the water availability. 

A clear example is the already mentioned 2024 Valencia DANA flood in Spain, where poor adaptation implementation resulted in catastrophic events. Although the floods were triggered by an extreme rainfall event, researchers at the University of Valencia argued that the severity of the disaster was amplified by the neglect and poor management of strategies by the state. Lack of policies and actions regarding land usage, flood-risk management, infrastructure resilience, and even timely responses to early warning systems are some of the implementations that could have reduced the magnitude of the disaster.

Overall, the Adaptation Strategy has strengthened the member states’ capacity to prepare for ongoing climatic challenges. Through the implementation of a common framework, the EU has allowed member states to develop their own national strategies and improve the system by expanding access to climatic data, developing planning management, and implementing nature-based solutions. Nevertheless, its impact is disproportionate throughout the member states because it relies on voluntary implementation. The absence of legally binding targets that hold members accountable for their national plans, together with differences in financial resources, institutional capacity, and political commitments, continue to produce significant disparities in adaptation outcomes. 

Nature Restoration Law

The Nature Restoration Law entered into force in 2024 as part of the EU’s environmental legislation. However, early assessments by the non-governmental organisation BirdLife suggest a mismatch between the regulation’s objectives and the progress achieved so far, highlighting significant disparities in national progress.

Although the law has not yet been fully implemented, it has already generated political and economic opposition at the national level, particularly within the agricultural sector. Agricultural organisations and farmers staged protests in Brussels, Warsaw, Paris and Berlin throughout 2023 and 2024 during the legislative process, arguing that the law’s binding restoration targets, a historic baseline, and deadlines would impose significant costs to them and their production, contributing to widespread early opposition.  

Currently, the European People’s Party, von der Leyen’s political family, is fighting to weaken it, framing it as a threat to food production. The EPP claimed that it “does not want new forms of bureaucracy and reporting obligations for farmers”, as it feared national governments would use the regulation to introduce reporting obligations and later blame the European Commission. At the same time, opposition has grown from those who fear that climate policies will undermine economic competitiveness, particularly as the costs of the transition have become clearer. The shift towards competitiveness during von der Leyen’s second term shows that she is weakening her climate agenda. This opposition highlights the tensions between the ambitions of the European Green Deal and the political realities of competitiveness. 

However, a think-tank report by Bruegel suggests that the projected economic burden of implementation may be overstated, as members that prioritise the efficiency of their national restoration plan could reduce implementation costs by 81%. This challenges the arguments put forward by agricultural organisations and farmers regarding the expected economic costs of the regulation.

From an environmental perspective, implementation has already begun through ecosystem restoration initiatives that contribute towards the EU’s 2030 restoration objectives. Early measures include river restoration, peatland rewetting, reforestation, the restoration of carbon sinks and improvements in water retention, demonstrating early environmental progress. 

This progress is reflected in the 2025 LIFE SUPER EU project, which aims to scale up peatland restoration across 15 European countries. The project seeks to restore 1,285 hectares of peatland while preparing 14,600 hectares for future restoration. According to the European Environmental Bureau, countries such as Spain, Germany, Finland, Portugal, and Czechia are among the most advanced in integrating restoration objectives into national planning, supported by existing biodiversity strategies, scientific assessments, and stakeholder consultation processes. Spain, for example, had already linked restoration planning to ongoing river restoration and drought resilience initiatives, while Finland and Germany benefited from established ecosystem monitoring systems that facilitated compliance with the new regulation. 

The Nature Restoration Law is a significant development in the EU climate policy, as it is the first EU instrument to legally require active restoration of degraded ecosystems. This is particularly relevant as 80% of Europe’s natural habitats are currently in poor condition and the policy focuses on restoring degraded ecosystems rather than solely conserving them. Furthermore, the policy simultaneously contributes to climate mitigation through carbon sequestration and to adaptation by enhancing resilience to extreme weather events. 

The EU is the second-largest GHG emitter from drained peatlands, releasing 230 million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent per year accounting for approximately 15% of global emissions from drained peatlands. If peatland and wetland restoration is fully implemented, it could absorb 230 million tonnes of CO₂ annually, demonstrating the considerable climate potential of ecosystem restoration. At the global level, the policy counts on nature-based solutions, which could contribute up to 30% of the global emission reduction needed to limit warming to below 2°C. Nevertheless, these benefits ultimately depend on effective implementation, as poor management could significantly reduce the EU’s annual carbon sequestration potential. This demonstrates that ecosystem-based mitigation depends not only on restoring natural carbon sinks such as forests, wetlands, and peatlands, but also on ensuring that these ecosystems are effectively managed and protected over time to maintain their carbon storage capacity.

Overall, the Nature Restoration Law has the potential to significantly reshape the EU’s environmental policy by establishing the first legally binding restoration targets across members. Although still in early stages, the regulation has already started to have an influence on national planning processes, and ecosystem restoration programmes have already been launched in accordance with it and the European Green Deal. However, additional implementation is required before the regulation’s effectiveness can be comprehensively evaluated. Ultimately, the results will depend on the quality and consistency of the national restoration efforts each member state offers. The regulation therefore demonstrates considerable potential, but its long-term impact will depend on the quality and consistency of national implementation and the achievement of the 2030 and 2050 targets.

IE x RAIA Summer Research Programme: Ursula von der Leyen Profile

This article is an excerpt from a report on Ursula von der Leyen produced as part of a RAIA research programme on climate leaders. For a full picture of von der Leyen’s climate leadership, including the sources, read the full report. This project was fully financed by IE University’s School of Politics, Economics and Global Affairs and School of Science and Technology.

Authors: Daria Holtea, Bianca Albu & Ariadna Alvarenga

Editor: Dario Hasenstab

Project Lead: Dario Hasenstab