• The growing security threat in the Sahel has driven Goïta and Tebboune into a transactional partnership based on shared security interests.
• Goïta seeks to preserve his government through military force, while Tebboune combines diplomacy and economic integration for regional influence.
• Although both leaders benefit from this partnership, Tebboune gains more by re-establishing Algeria as the leading diplomatic mediator in the Sahel.

Why are Goïta and Tebboune pursuing a transactional partnership? 

Answer: The growing Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) alliance has created a security threat that neither Goïta nor Tebboune can manage alone.

On 10 July 2026, President of the Transition General Assimi Goïta of Mali and President of the People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria Abdelmadjid Tebboune agreed to restore diplomatic relations by returning their ambassadors and reopening their airspace to civilian and military flights, ending more than a year of restrictions imposed since April 2025.

On 17 March 2025, a Malian drone destroyed Algerian trucks near the border, claiming they were transporting supplies to Tuareg rebel groups. Algeria retaliated on 1 April 2025 by shooting down a Malian armed drone near Tin Zaoutine, transforming an already strained relationship into a full-fledged diplomatic crisis. 

After these incidents, Mali withdrew from the Algeria-based Comité d’Etat Major Opérationnel Conjoint. Both countries recalled their ambassadors and closed their airspace to each other, resulting in the closure of communication between them. This breakdown in diplomatic communication made bilateral cooperation against terrorism and other cross-border security threats increasingly difficult. Meanwhile, JNIM and the FLA intensified their operations across Mali, carrying out coordinated attacks against Malian forces and expanding their territorial influence. Their growing collaboration increased the threat to both Mali and Algeria, highlighting the need for renewed security cooperation. 

Both countries have now decided to reduce tensions. Although they have not resolved their differences about their major issue of Tuareg communities in northern Mali, they recognise that keeping diplomatic channels open is better than remaining in conflict, especially in light of the deteriorating regional security environment.  

Despite restoring diplomatic relations, differences remain. Goïta continues to favour military action as the primary means of combating armed groups, whereas Tebboune advocates dialogue alongside security measures. Although both leaders have chosen to cooperate on border security, intelligence sharing, and regional stability, their renewed transactional relationship is driven less by mutual trust than by the shared need to address a common security threat. 

What does Goïta want?

Answer: Goïta wants to restore his control over northern Mali, protect Mali’s sovereignty, and contain the growing threat from JNIM and the FLA. 

After coming to power through the 2020 military coup, Assimi Goïta strengthened presidential powers through a new constitution (2023), postponed elections several times, and banned political party activities in April 2024. Goïta’s main priority is to stay in power. His domestic and foreign policy decisions support this goal. By delaying elections and concentrating power in the presidency, he reduced political challenges at home while presenting himself as the leader capable of restoring Mali’s sovereignty and security. 

Goïta gradually moved Mali away from France, the United Nations, Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the G5 Sahel and Algeria, while strengthening ties with Russia and Morocco and later establishing the AES with Burkina Faso and Niger. The AES brought together three military juntas that had seized power through coups and shared an interest in resisting external political pressure while deepening regional security cooperation to counter the growing cross-border threat. This marked a deliberate shift in Mali’s foreign policy. Instead of relying on traditional Western and regional partners, Goïta sought relationships with countries that were less critical of his military government.

However, Goïta has failed to restore stability in Mali. Instead, the conflict has become more complex due to cooperation between FLA and JNIM. By coordinating attacks and pooling resources, both groups have increased pressure on Malian Armed Forces (FAMa), undermining the junta’s credibility and strengthening their ability to recruit local support. At the same time, intra-jihadi competition has intensified as the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP), which controls much of the Ménaka region, competes with JNIM while also fighting the junta and the Africa Corps. This multi-sided conflict has fuelled displacement, stretched Mali’s military resources, making Goïta’s renewed engagement with Tebboune a strategic necessity. 

What does Tebboune want?

Answer: Tebboune wants to secure Algeria’s southern border, assert Algeria’s role as the main diplomatic power in the Sahel and Africa, and protect his economic interests. 

Tebboune is looking for a stable and connected Sahel where security, economic integration, and regional diplomacy support each other. He wants to prevent instability in northern Mali from spilling across the 1,400 km shared border, which would threaten Algeria’s Tuareg population, its southern oil and gas infrastructure, and its internal security. At the same time, he sees stability in Mali as essential for his long-term economic ambitions. Projects such as the Trans-Saharan Road Corridor, linking the ports of Algiers and Lagos through Niger and connecting Mali, Chad, and Tunisia through additional highways, depend on a peaceful Sahel.

He has also proposed a regional free trade zone, invested $1 billion in African development projects, written off Mali’s debt, and is exploring energy cooperation in the Taoudeni Basin through SONATRACH. However, with Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger now coordinating their political and security policies through the AES, the success of these economic and connectivity initiatives increasingly depends on constructive relations with them. Politically, Tebboune wants to assert Algeria’s role as the region’s main mediator.

Rather than relying on military intervention, Tebboune believes that dialogue between the Malian government and armed groups, regional intelligence sharing to counter terrorism, and political agreements such as the 2015 Algiers Accord, which provided a framework for peace and reconciliation between Bamako and Tuareg groups, offer the best chance of achieving lasting peace in the Sahel. 

What is Goïta doing?

Answer: Goïta is combining military operations with selective diplomacy with Tebboune to strengthen his government’s control in Mali. 

Goïta continues to rely on FAMa and Russia’s Africa Corps to defeat JNIM, FLA, and ISSP. Since taking power in 2020, he has withdrawn from the 2015 Algiers Accord, expelled French forces (Operation Barkhane), forced the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali to withdraw, and rejected negotiations with Tuareg groups in favour of military action. However, this strategy has not brought lasting stability.

Instead, JNIM and the FLA have started working together, carrying out coordinated attacks across northern and central Mali, including the 18 July 2026 ambush near Anéfis that killed more than 50 Malian soldiers and members of the Africa Corps, and attacks on military convoys, fuel routes and key towns such as Gao, Sévaré and Timbuktu. While Goïta still prefers a military solution, he now recognises that cooperation with Algeria is necessary to improve border security and deal with threats that cannot be managed by military force alone. 

What is Tebboune doing?

Answer: Tebboune is using diplomacy, regional cooperation, economic partnerships and external pressure to solve the dispute between Algeria and Mali.

Tebboune has continued to support a political solution to the conflict in Mali even after relations between the two countries broke down in 2025. While Mali ended the 2015 Algiers Accord and accused Algeria of interfering in its internal affairs, Tebboune continued to assert Algeria’s respect for Mali’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, and in July 2026, restored diplomatic relations.

Before rebuilding ties with Mali, he had already improved relations with Niger, helping to create a more stable political environment. He is also strengthening Algeria’s regional role by promoting economic integration, expanding regional connectivity, and deepening cross-border cooperation with Sahelian states. At the same time, he continues to strengthen security along the border because he fears that violence in northern Mali, the growing cooperation between JNIM and the FLA, and the rise of cross-border smuggling and terrorism could spill over into Algeria. Through diplomacy, economic engagement, and border security, Tebboune is rebuilding Algeria’s influence while encouraging Mali to move towards dialogue instead of relying only on military force. 

Who is winning?

Answer: Tebboune is gaining more from this transactional partnership, because Goïta is moving towards a diplomatic solution to the longstanding mistrust and conflict between their nations.

Goïta has achieved an important diplomatic success by restoring relations with Algeria without returning to the 2015 Algiers Accord, allowing him to maintain his sovereignty-first policy. However, his main objective of restoring security has not yet been achieved. JNIM and the FLA continue to carry out coordinated attacks, control territory in northern Mali, and target military convoys despite support from Russia’s Africa Corps. These developments have forced Goïta to seek cooperation with the same neighbour he had criticised a year earlier, showing that military force alone has not delivered the desired results.

Goïta restored ambassadors, reopened airspace, and resumed cooperation, all without Tebboune having to abandon his long-standing support for dialogue and regional mediation. Tebboune has also improved relations with Niger and is once again positioning himself as an important diplomatic actor in the Sahel while protecting Algeria’s security and economic interests, including cross-border cooperation and regional infrastructure projects. 

The renewed relationship has also enhanced Tebboune’s international standing. Russia, while continuing to support Mali militarily, has become more receptive to Tebboune’s argument that a durable settlement requires political dialogue alongside military operations. The prospect of U.S. military action against JNIM under the Trump administration further highlights the Sahel’s growing strategic importance and reinforces Tebboune’s role as a key regional mediator.